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LEGAL IDEOLOGY AND INCORPORATION I:
THE ENGLISH CIVILIAN WRITERS, 1523-1607t
DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE*
"And sure I am that no man can either bring over those bookes of late
written (which I have seene) from Rome or Romanists, or read them, and
justifie them, or deliver them over to any other with a liking and allowance of
the same (as the author's end and desire is they should) but they runne into
desperate dangers and downefals .... These bookes have glorious and
goodly titles, which promise directions for the conscience, and remedies for
the soul, but there is mors in olla: They are like to Apothecaries boxes...
whose titles promise remedies, but the boxes themselves containe
poyson."
Sir Edward Coke
"A strange justice that is bounded by a river! Truth on this side of the
Pyrenees, error on the other side." 2
Blaise Pascal
This Article initiates a three-part series entitled Legal Ideology and In-
corporation. In this series, Mr. Coquillette demonstrates that, although
England has fostered a strong common law system, significant intellectual
work was done in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by
students of the civil law systems dominant on the Continent. Mr. Coquillette
traces the development of the juristic works of these English civilians, and
examines the civilians' intellectual influence on the English common law. It
t © 1980 by Daniel R. Coquillette. Earlier versions of this Article were presented
on October 4, 1977 to a Cornell Law School faculty symposium and on December 18,
1979 to the Faculty Legal History Dinner at the Harvard Law School. I am particu-
larly grateful to Professor Harold Berman of the Harvard Law School for his encour-
agement of the first version of this paper, and to Professor John P. Dawson of the
Harvard Law School and the Boston University School of Law, Professor Charles
Donahue of the Harvard Law School, and Professor John Leubsdorf of the Boston
University School of Law for their invaluable assistance. Remaining errors are my
own.
* Lecturer in Law, Harvard Law School; Member, Massachusetts Bar. A.B.,
Williams College, 1966; B.A. (Juris.), Oxford University, 1969; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1971.
Coke, Preface to 7 Coke Rep. (8th page, unpaginated) (London 1608).
2 B. PASCAL, PNSEES 101 (W. Trotter trans. 1941) (1st ed. Paris 1670).
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is his central thesis that the English civilian jurists never intended to achieve
a direct "incorporation" of civil law doctrines into the common law. Rather,
their lasting achievement has been the significant influence that their ideas
about law-their "legal ideology"--have exercised on leading common
lawyers.
Mr. Coquillette divides the development of English civilian jurisprudence
into three periods. The first period, which is the subject of this Article,
includes the years from the publication of Christopher St. German's seminal
Doctor and Student in 1523 to the storm of protest from common lawyers
following the publication of John Cowell's highly controversial The In-
terpreter in 1607. During this significant period, English civilian writing
tended to promote synthesis and accommodation with the common law, and
formed a pioneering venture in comparative law, a remarkable ideological
effort that rewards study for its own sake.
The second Article in this series, Sir Thomas Ridley, Charles Molloy, and
the Literary Battle for the Law Merchant, 1607-1676, which will appear in
the March 1981 issue of the Boston University Law Review, discusses the
second period of English civilian juristic development. This period includes
the years from the publication of the civilian Sir Thomas Ridley's major
work, A View of the Civile and Ecclessiastical Law in 1607 to the publication
of the common lawyer Charles Molloy's great Treatise of Affairs Maritime
and of Commerce in 1676. During this period, the common lawyers, initially
led by Coke, mounted increasing jurisdictional and political attacks on the
civilians and at the same time attempted to co-opt civilian methodology in
those vital, growing fields in which the civilians had exhibited particular
expertise, most notably the law merchant. In response, the civilians became
defensive in their juristic attitudes. Instead of continuing previous attempts
to synthesize civil and common law, they began to try to isolate and main-
tain whatever pockets of influence they had already established. The critical
struggle was in important part literary and intellectual, and it centered on
the traditional civilian strongholds of the international law merchant and the
Admiralty jurisdiction.
The forthcoming third Article in this series, The Restoration Civilians and
Their Influence, 1629-1685, discusses the third period of English civilian
juristic development. This period essentially includes the years during and
after the Commonwealth. By then, the common lawyers were succeeding in
their attacks, leaving civilian scholars, such as Godolphin, Duck, Wiseman,
Zouche, Exton, and Leoline Jenkins, with what could have been an increas-
ingly narrow and specialized role in the English legal system. Mr. Coquil-
lette argues that although the doctrinal work of later English civilian writers
may be relatively better known than the work of their intellectual forebears,
the most important contribution of these and earlier civilian writers to
Anglo-American law lies in their influence, direct and indirect, on such
leading common lawyers as Bacon, Selden, Hale, Holt, Mansfield, and
Bentham.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two years ago, a group of Russian jurists visited Boston as part of the
exchanges made possible by the Prague Accords. It was their first trip out of
Russia. They had prepared certain lines of questions, hoping to surmount
both the language and cultural barriers.
I was part of a small group of nervous American lawyers assigned to be
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their guides. The initial questions of the Russians all concerned what they
hoped would be our common bond as lawyers and jurists, namely, our
university programs in Roman and foreign legal systems, comparison of our
legal procedures with those of Roman and other civil law systems, and our
notions of ius gentium and universal principles of law. Owing to our narrow
professional training as common lawyers, it was most difficult for us to
respond in any meaningful way.
There is danger in a limited, provincial view of what a lawyer should
know, and what legal principles can do. This danger was a basic concern of
the early English specialists in civil and Roman law, the so-called English
"civilians." These English civilians were dedicated to legal science as a
transnational force and as a critical source of principles of universal applica-
tion.
Harold Berman has emphasized that "the growth of nationalism in mod-
ern times has made inroads into the transnational character of Western legal
education and the links between law and other university disciplines have
been substantially weakened." 3 The insular professionalism of legal education
in America today would be striking to English civilians such as Alberico
Gentili, William Fulbecke, or John Cowell. They believed that ideas about
law were eminently suitable for transplanting. 4 It made no difference to them
whether the source was university scholarship, legal practice, or a foreign
system. They were committed to the transnational character of Western
legal science, and to the nature of law as a universal discipline inviting
comparative study and innovative thought. As Fulbecke observed, "ITihe
common lawe cannot otherwise bee divided from these twain [canon and
civil law], then the flower from the roote and the stalke." '
It has been too easy to forget that not all "English lawyers" were "com-
mon lawyers." The English civilians played an important role in the
development of English legal science. 6 Stereotypical views of these civi-
l Berman, The Origins of Western Legal Science, 90 HARV. L. REV. 894, 941
(1977).
4 See Donahue, What Cause Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in
England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 MICH. L. REV. 59, 60 (1979). See
generally A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974).
1I W. FULBECKE, A PARALLELE OR CONFERENCE OF THE CIVIL LAW, THE
CANON LAW AND THE COMMON LAW OF THIS REALME OF ENGLAND 62 (2d ed.
London 1618) (1st ed. London 1602) [hereinafter cited as 1 A PARALLELE].
6 Holdsworth asserted that "we must know something of the manner in which
ideas drawn from the civil and chnon law shaped the political theory of western
Europe, if we are to understand the medieval history of [England] or of any other
western European country .... " Holdsworth, The Place of English Legal History in
the Education of English Lawyers: A Plea for Its Further Recognition, in ESSAYS IN
LAW AND HISTORY 20, 22 (1946). Donahue has commented,
The abrasive contact between the civil law taught in the academies, the non-civil
law espoused in the courts, and the diverse human conflicts which call for
resolution led thoughtful men to search for first principles. That contact occured
[Vol. 61: 1
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lians, often invented by their enemies, have greatly obscured the extent and
quality of their contribution.7 The critical distinguishing feature of English
civilians was their specific legal ideology-their ideas about law.$ "The
in England at many times, most notably in the 16th and early 17th centuries, and
it is the effect of this contact that ought to be more fully explored.
Donahue, Book Review, 84 YALE L.J. 167, 181 (1974) (reviewing B. LEVACK, THE
CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND 1603-1641).
The Boston University Law Review has published a number of important Articles
which have promoted the study of civil law ideas in America, many of them by
a founder of the Review, the Roman law scholar Charles P. Sherman. See, e.g.,
Sherman, Moderness of Roman Military Law, 24 B.U.L. REV. 31 (1944); Sherman,
Roman Law in the United States: Its Effect on the American Common Law, 14
B.U.L. REV. 582 (1934); Sherman, Salient Features of the Reception of Roman Law
into the Common Law of England and America, 8 B.U.L. REV. 183 (1928); Setaro,
History of the English Ecclesiastical Law (Parts One & Two), 18 B.U.L. REV. 102,
342 (1938); Setaro, Prologue to a History of English Ecclesiastical Law, 16 B.U.L.
REV. 158 (1936). Additionally, the Review has published significant Articles in
conjunction with the Charles P. Sherman Lectureship in Comparative Law at Boston
University. See Lawson, Roman Law as an Organizing Instrument, 46 B.U.L. REV.
181 (1966); Schiller, The Nature and Significance of Jurists Law, 47 B.U.L. REV. 20
(1967); Stein, Logic and Experience in Roman and Common Law, 59 B.U.L. REV.
433 (1979). See generally Speidel, Foreword-Logic and Experience in Roman and
Common Law, 59 B.U.L. REV. 433, 433-36 (1979).
7 See, e.g., J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 50-58 (1st
ed. 1971); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 19-23; A. HARDING, A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 190-93 (1973); T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW 298-300, 661-63 (5th ed. 1956). Whig historians such as
Trevelyan linked the "[situdents of the Roman Law" directly with the excesses of
the Stuart "prerogative courts," G. TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 391 (3d ed.
1945); Macaulay observed that these courts, "guided chiefly by the primate and freed
from the control of Parliament .... displayed a rapacity, a violence, a malignant
energy, which had been unknown to any former age," I T. MACAULAY, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 88 (London 1849). Only recently has John Langbein laid to
rest one of the worst curses on the civilians, that they introduced torture to England.
See J. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 131-34 (1977).
8 If we look for civil law influence in the specific rules that the common law or
equity courts adopted, we quickly find ourselves in a helpless morass. For every
principle of common law alleged to have civil law ancestry, there is a case to be
cited which explains it totally in common law terms, or a text from the Digest
which suggests that the civil law rule was really quite different.
The problem with this kind of analysis is that it glorifies the specific rule by
which the case is decided and underplays the basic principles underlying the rule
and the methodology used to arrive at that rule. If it is true that the life of the law
has not been logic but experience, it is equally true that experience has been
shaped by the power of certain fundamental ideas and methods of proceeding.
And in the development of these ideas and methods in England, civilian
influence may have played some part.
Donahue, supra note 6, at 179-80.
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community of civil law systems consists more in a unity of formal technique
than of content." 9 Although particular substantive legal rules can be charac-
terized as "civilian" because of their Roman origins,10 the most critical
contributions of the Roman jurists and their civilian followers have been in
the nature of legal ideas and legal methods; not so much the formulation of
specific substantive rules of law, but "the basic principles underlying the
rule and the methodology used to arrive at that rule." "
The writings of the English civilians in the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries support this thesis. Their important contribution to English juris-
prudence was not a system of specific rules, but a professional "world view"
that was distinctly different from that of the common lawyers. In particular,
these civilians were the pioneers of English comparative legal studies, the
study of public international law in England, and the development of a
private international law of commerce-all at a time when the intellectual
efforts of the common lawyers were narrowly focused on the centralized
national law courts in London. Furthermore, these early English civilians
had a distinctive view of the study of law as a kind of humanistic study.
Accordingly, they cultivated ties between civilian legal practitioners in Lon-
don and law teachers in the English universities. By contrast, throughout the
sixteenth century, legal study at the common law Inns of Court remained
practical and insular. 2
I Sundberg, Civil Law, Common Law, and the Scandinavians, 13 SCAN. STUD. L.
181, 200 (1969) (quoting M. Rheinstein); see Donahue, supra note 6, at 179-80.
"0 See generally W. HOWE, STUDIES IN THE CIVIL LAW, AND ITS RELATION TO
THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1896); Baker, The Law Merchant and the
Common Law Before 1700, 38 CAMB. L.J. 295 (1979); Sack, Conflicts of Laws in the
History of English Law, in 3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1835-1935, at 342
(1937); Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 VA.
L. REV. 403, 403-04 (1966); Stein, Continental Influence On English Legal Thought,
1600-1900, in 3 ATTI DE III CONGRESSO INTERNAZIONALE DELLA SOCIETA' ITALIANA
PER LA STORIA DEL DIRITTO 1105, 1120 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Stein, Continen-
tal Influence I; Sutherland, The Law Merchant in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries, in 17 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 149 (4th ser.
1934).
See Donahue, supra note 6, at 179-80.
J . BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 147-48 (2d ed.
1978); J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 35-45 (1968); A. HARDING, supra
note 7, at 187-90; see notes 38 & 42 infra.
Practicality and insularity also characterized fourteenth century common law
literature. "The wretched poverty of English Year Book learning stands in striking
contrast to the wealth and range and intellectual power of Italian legal literature of the
fourteenth century." J. DAWSON, supra, at 143; see T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, EARLY
ENGLISH LEGAL LITERATURE 114 (1958); W. ULLMAN, THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF
LAW 5 n.l (1946); Arnold, Introduction to THE OLD TENURE & THE OLD NATURA
BREVIUM (Ist page, unpaginated) (1974). -[T]he common lawyers became wholly
ignorant of that fund of legal principles and material for legal speculation which were
stored up in the writings of the civilians and canonists, and in the texts upon which
(Vol. 61: 1
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The early English civilians also believed that legal principles could form
the building blocks for a cosmopolitan world order. This world order would
rationalize international trade and relations between nations, and most im-
portantly, establish universal conceptions of justice recognized by all edu-
cated jurists as part of the civilian ius gentium. Such a commitment to the
study and use of transnational law was important in England in the sixteenth
and seventeenth century, and it remains important today.' 3
This Article is the first in a three-part series called Legal Ideology and
Incorporation. It focuses on the legal ideas of the English civilians, and their
literary efforts to achieve incorporation of these ideas in the English legal
system during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Outwardly, the ci-
vilian story is one of failure. As a specialized branch of the English legal
profession, the civilians became extinct in 1858. Their great London head-
quarters, Doctors' Commons, was destroyed, and its library-perhaps the
best in Europe on comparative and international law-was scattered and
sold. Their lucrative professional monopolies-admiralty, probate, and
domestic relations-fell to the common lawyers.
Yet it is the thesis of these Articles that the English civilians, particularly
the civilian writers, succeeded better than they knew-that their peculiar
view of legal institutions and doctrines did impact on the development of
common law jurisprudence in critical ways and, even where they failed,
they commented." 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 287 (rev. 3d
ed. 1923).
13 It is ironic that the specialized civilian idea of a private law merchant, to be
discussed in the second Article in this series, has attracted more continuing interest
than the civilians' fundamental commitment to a cosmopolitan legal order. See
Berman & Kaufman, The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex
Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 224-29, 272-77 (1978); Schmitthoff, The Law
of International Trade, Its Growth, Formulation and Operation, in INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF LEGAL SCIENCE, THE SOURCES OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 5 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1964); Note, A Modern Lex Mercatoria: Political
Rhetoric or Substantive Progress?, 3 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 210, 211-16 (1977).
Nevertheless, American jurists and lawyers are beginning to recognize the impor-
tance of legal literature in the broader sense of "those fundamental distinctions in
legal ideas that [affect] the way legal results are reached ... Donahue, supra note
4, at 59. As Dean Rostow stated:
The pressure of events and the piling up of statutes and decisions tend to
confine perspective, both in the classroom and in much legal writing, to yester-
day or the day before, or even to today and tomorrow. Social institutions have
deep roots. And social groups have powerful memories. If law is cut off from its
history, the student tends to emerge as a limited technician, who may find
himself at sea as the law he has learned in school vanishes before his eyes. By
the same token our legal literature could become more and more trivial and
inadequate to its responsibilities.
Woodward, History, Legal History, and Legal Education, 53 VA. L. REV. 89, 109
(1967) (quoting E. Rostow); see Berman, supra note 3, at 941-43; Shapiro, Law and
Science in Seventeenth-Century England, 21 STAN. L. REV. 727, 761-62 (1969).
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their surviving literature may yet offer rich inspiration to Anglo-American
lawyers, and insight into the historical relationship of law and science.' 4
14 Objective, analytical scholarship about English civilians has been remarkably
scarce. The bulk of the work has focused not on the civilians themselves, but on the
courts and government agencies in which they usually practiced and on the jurisdic-
tional disputes concerning these courts. See notes 54 & 71 infra.
The first serious study was C. COOTE, SKETCHES OF THE LIVES AND CHARACTERS
OF EMINENT ENGLISH CIVILIANS (London 1804). Following were the works of
William Senior. W. SENIOR, DOCTORS' COMMONS AND THE OLD COURT OF ADMI-
RALTY (1922); Senior, The Advocates of the Court of Arches, 39 LAW Q. REV. 493
(1923) [hereinafter cited as Senior, The Advocates]; Senior, Early Writers of
Maritime Law, 37 LAW Q. REV. 323 (1921) [hereinafter cited as Senior, Early
Writers]. But by far the best early study was by a Belgian civilian. E. Nys, LE DROIT
ROMAIN, LE DROIT DES GENS ET LE COLLEGF DES DOCTEURS EN DROIT CIVIL (1910).
The studies by Coote and Senior, although valuable, were primarily antiquarian in
emphasis, and were romantic in their approach to Doctors' Commons. In some ways,
the Nys study still remains the best juristic study of the English civilians.
Much of the better earlier work touched only indirectly on the English civilian
experience. See F. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE (1901) [here-
inafter cited as F. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW]; F. MAITLAND, ROMAN CANON LAW
IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND (1909) [hereinafter cited as F. MAITLAND, ROMAN
CANON LAW]; P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1909)
[hereinafter cited as P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW]; F. C. VON SAVIGNY, HIS-
TORY OF ROMAN LAW DURING THE MIDDLE AGES (E. Cathart trans. Paris 1829);
Hazeltine, The Renaissance and the Laws of Europe, in CAMBRIDGE LEGAL ESSAYS
139 (1926).
There have been a few outstanding studies on the contribution of English civilians
in the area of public and private international law. See T. HOLLAND, Alberico
Gentili, in STUDIESIN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1898) [hereinafter cited as T. HOL-
LAND,Alberico Gentili]; T. HOLLAND, The Early Literature of the Law of War, in
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, at 40 [hereinafter cited as T. HOLLAND,
Early Literature]; P. VINOGRADOFF, Historical Types of International Law, in 2
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF PAUL VINOGRADOFF 248 (1928) [hereinafter cited as P.
VINOGRADOFF, Historical Types of International Law]. See also Sack, supra note
10, at 342.
Last, but by no means least, are two recent books on the English civilians, each
remarkable in its own way. First, G. SQUIBB, DOCTORS' COMMONS (1977), is the
final, authoritative account of the physical setting of Doctors' Commons, and its
library and institutional records and operation as a professional society. Squibb even
includes a chapter on the silverware and the food. Id. at 76-87. But Squibb does not
concern himself with the juristic work of the civilians. Second, B. LEVACK, THE
CIVIL LAWYERS IN ENGLAND, 1603-1641 (1973), is a most important study from which
this Article has profited, as must all future works on English civilians. This book
contains an invaluable "Biographical Dictionary" of English civilians who received
their doctorates before 1641 and who resided in England between 1603 and 1641. Id.
at 203-82. But Levack's work, as its subtitle, "A Political Study," indicates, focuses
on the political, not the legal, activities of the English civilians. Additionally, as the
title indicates, Levack's work focuses on a restricted chronological period. As
Charles Donahue has rightly indicated, "[i]t is the work of a careful historian who is
[Vol. 61: 1
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Ironically, their most lasting contributions to the substantive law would be
because of their influence on great common law jurists, particularly through
civilian ideas about the law merchant, procedure, and codification. I5 Among
these common law jurists were Francis Bacon, John Selden, Mathew Hale,
John Holt, William Murray, and even, Jeremy Bentham.1
6
interested in lawyers, their political ideas and alliances, but it is not really a work of
legal history, if we define 'legal history' as the history of legal doctrine . .....
Donahue, supra note 6, at 177. It is, nevertheless, a most valuable book.
15 The key link was Sir Thomas Ridley (1549-1629), the next major civilian writer
after Cowell and Fulbecke. A man of affairs and of great perception, Ridley learned
the lesson of his predecessors. To avoid the censure they incurred when they sought
to synthesize common and civil law, Ridley formulated an entirely new approach to
promoting civilian ideology: he concentrated on the practical civilian legal
specialities-particularly the Admiralty jurisdiction. Ridley's writing will be the
subject of the second Article in this series, Legal Ideology and Incorporation II: Sir
Thomas Ridley, Charles Molloy, and the Literary Battle for the Law Merchant,
1607-1676 (forthcoming in 61 B.U.L. REV. No. 2 (March 1981)).
16 This influence will be the subject of the third Article in this series, Legal
Ideology and Incorporation III: The Restoration Civilians and Their Influence,
1629-1685 (forthcoming). For discussions of the civilian influence on particular
common law jurists, see Hazeltine, Introduction to J. SELDINI, AD FLETAM Dis-
SERTATIO ix-xvi (1925); Ogg, Introduction to J. SELDINI, supra, at xix-lxvi; Yale, A
View of the Admiralty Jurisdiction, Sir Mathew Hale and the Civilians, in LEGAL
HISTORY STUDIES 1972, at 87 (D. Jenkins ed. 1975); Ziskind, John Selden: Criticism
and Affirmation of the Common Law Tradition, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 22, 22
(1975).
The most overlooked example of civilian influence has been Francis Bacon. Like
Gentili and Fulbecke, see note 309 and accompanying text & note 359 infra, Bacon
was a member of Gray's Inn and not of the College of Advocates, but also like Gentili
and Fulbecke, Bacon possessed a literary style and jurisprudence that reflected
civilian influence. Bacon appears to have been tutored by Jean Hotman, the French
civilian, during 1575-79, the time that Bacon was attached to Sir Amyas Paulet, the
English ambassador to France. See Nys, Introduction to A. GENTILI, DE
LEGATIONIBUs LIBRI TRES 33a-34a (second volume of Carnegie Endowment edition)
(J. Scott ed., J. Laing trans. 1924). Bacon always wrote in Latin or English, and
never in Law French. He believed that Latin was a greater language than English. He
wrote treatises and collections of maxims, but never law reports. He never relied on
cited authority, but used reason as his only test. See F. BACON, Example of a
Treatise on Universal Justice or the Fountains of Equity, by Aphorisms: one Title of
it, in 5 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 88-110 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D. Heath eds.
new ed. 1870); F. BACON, A preparation toward the Union of Laws, in 7 THE WORKS
OF FRANCIS BACON 727-43 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D. Heath eds. new ed. 1872); F.
BACON, The Argument of Sir Francis Bacon . . . In the Case of the Post-Nati of
Scotland . . . . in id. at 637-79; F. BACON, Maxims of the Law, in id. at 307-87; F.
BACON, Of Judicature, in 6 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 506-10 (J. Spedding, R.
Ellis, & D. Heath eds. new ed. 1870); F. BACON, The Advancement of Learning, in 6
THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 79, 387-93 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis, & D. Heath eds.
1863). He proposed to James I a scheme to prepare Institutes, a Code, and a Digest of
1981]
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English civilian writers never achieved any substantial "incorporation" in
the sense of a "reception" of substantive Roman law doctrine into the
English national law, either directly or indirectly.I7 They never sought such
a thing. The English civilians sought to enrich the existing English national
law with civilian methodology and principles, most particularly the tech-
niques of comparative legal study and the doctrines of the ius gentium. Later
academic controversies about whether "Roman law" did or could "invade"
England missed the point.18
English laws, together with a law dictionary. See F. BACON, A Memorial touching
the Review of Penal Laws and the Amendment of the Common Law, in 12 THE
WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON 84-86 (J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D. Heath eds. 1869)
[hereinafter cited as F. BACON, Memorial]; F. BACON, A Proposition ... touching
the Compiling and Amendment of the Laws of England, in 13 THE WORKS OF
FRANCIS BACON 61-71 (J. Spedding, R; Ellis & D. Heath eds. 1872) [hereinafter cited
as F. BACON, Proposition]. Would Bacon's proposed law dictionary have been an-
other Interpreter? See notes 398-421 and accompanying text infra. He wrote exten-
sively on the problems of the union with Scotland's more civilian-oriented legal
system, and welcomed the union as a chance to reexamine and reform the English
law. F. BACON, Preparation toward the Union of Laws, in 7 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS
BACON, supra, at 727-43. Most importantly, he looked to the cosmopolitan culture of
Europe in matters legal, as well as scientific and artistic.
As to the influence of some civilian ideas on the English radical movements, the
precursors of the Benthamites, see C. HILL, PURITANISM AND REVOLUTION 59-60
(1964); S. PRALL, THE AGITATION FOR LAW REFORM DURING THE PURITAN REV-
OLUTION, 1640-1660, at 12-13 (1966); D. VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR
LAW REFORM, 1640-1660, at 65-96 (1970).
17 At least, the civilians did not achieve "incorporation" in the sense of persuad-
ing the common lawyers to borrow "ready-made law from another jurisdiction."
Baker, supra note 10, at 322. Baker demonstrates conclusively, for example, that a
substantive foreign law merchant was not "incorporated" into the English common
law during the Renaissance period. See Baker, supra note 10. Such "incorporation"
of substantive legal rules or doctrine, however, was never the end sought by English
civilian writing. The early civilian writers, who are analyzed in this Article, were
concerned instead with broader issues of methodology and legal philosophy-
particularly the issues of the usefulness of comparative legal study and the notion of
ius gentium. See notes 73-132 and accompanying text infra. The later civilian writers,
who are analyzed in the following two Articles in this series, sought to protect the
jurisdiction of existing English civilian courts and institutions, not to "'incorporate"
civilian doctrines into the common law. See notes 15 & 16 supra.
18 Maitland's famous thesis was that such a "reception" threatened in the 16th
century. See F. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW, supra note 14. Thorne has conclusively
shown that this thesis was wrong, if what it meant by "reception" was a reception of
substantive Roman law doctrines. See Thorne, English Law and the Renaissance, in
ATTI DEL PRIM CONGRESSO INTERNAZIONALF DELLA SOCIETA' ITALIANA DI
STORIA DEL DIRITTO, LA STORIA DEL DIRITTO NEL QUADRO DELLE SCIENZE
STORICHE 436 (1966). But the proper focus for evaluating civilian influence in En-
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II. THE ENGLISH CIVILIANS
A. The Institutional and Educational Setting: Doctors' Commons and the
Ancient Universities
The English civilians are extinct. As one of their contemporaries put it,
"[They] will ere long be as extinct as the dodo." 19 Extinction occurred on
January 15, 1858, when a majority of the last twenty-six surviving English
civilians voted to distribute the considerable assets of their professional
organization, the College of Advocates, to themselves. 20 There was about
£4,000 for each; a lot of money at the time. 2' This distribution entailed the
breakup of their great library and the sale of their armorial relics and
portraits. Ultimately, it also meant the destruction of the quadrangle and
buildings of Doctors' Commons, for nearly two hundred years the home of
civilians and the College of Advocates, and one of the great centers of
cosmopolitan legal learning in the world. 22 Much of the site is now under
gland is not specific substantive doctrine, but the influence on juristic literature and
methodology. See Donahue, supra note 6, at 168-69, 179-80.
19 1875 THE SPECTATOR 641 (1864), quoted in 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 422 (1971) (definition of "civilian").
20 For the detailed account of the ultimate dissolution of Doctors' Commons-a
story not without pathos, greed, and human drama-see 12 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 48-49 (1938); E. Nys, supra note 14, at 121-22; W.
SENIOR, supra note 14, at 110-12; G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 102-09; F. WIS-
WALL, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE SINCE
1800, at 75-95 (1970); Carr, Introduction to PENSION BOOK OF CLEMENT'S INN
lxii-lxiii (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 78, C. Carr ed. 1960); Manchester, The Reform of
the Ecclesiastical Courts, 10 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 51, 75 (1966).
21 G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 104.
22 Fragments of this great library of comparative law, legal history, and interna-
tional law can now be found in the Admiralty Registry, Royal Courts of Justice,
London, and in the storage basement of the Royal Courts of Justice in the Strand,
London. F. WISWALL, supra note 20, at 91. The Subscription Book and the Minute
Book of Doctors' Commons, as well as other important manuscripts, are at the
Lambeth Palace Library, London. Other remaining records, most notably the Long
Book, PRO 30/26/8, and the Library Account Book, PRO 30/26/9, are acces-
sible at the Public Records Office, London. See B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 293-95
(Select Bibliography); G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 9-13, 111-15. One of the best
physical descriptions of Doctors' Commons was the brochure published in 1862 by
the solicitor charged with the final sale. See E. NYs, supra note 14, at 122 n. 1.
For accounts of the heroic but futile efforts of Dr. John Lee, a member, and others
to save Doctors' Commons and its great library for the study of civil law, compara-
tive law, and international law, see G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 104-06; F. WIs-
WALL, supra note 20, at 188-90. At a critical meeting, Lee accused his fellows of "a
palpable breach of trust" in vesting the Doctors' Commons property in themselves.
G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 106. According to Lee, Doctors' Commons represented
centuries of accumulated value property that should have been regarded as a public
trust. Id.
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Queen Victoria Street. The remainder is a modern office block. Such institu-
tional mass suicide, using as a weapon an enabling clause in the 1857 Court
of Probate Act23 designed for that purpose by their rivals, the common
lawyers, hardly speaks well of the civilians' idealism or the vigor of their
intellectual allegiances.24
Charles Dickens, at sixteen, covered Doctors' Commons as a freelance
reporter. 25 He candidly observed that Doctors' Commons was, if not in fact
dead, at least suffering advanced senility by 1828.26 It was
a little out-of-the-way place where they administer what is called
ecclesiastical law, and play all kinds of tricks with obsolete old monsters
'of acts of parliament, which three-fourths of the world know nothing
about, and the fourth suppose to have been dug up, in a fossil state, in
the days of the Edwards. It's a place that has an ancient monopoly in
suits about people's wills and people's marriages, and disputes among
ships and boats. 27
Dickens' great character, David Copperfield, visited Doctors' Commons
shortly before its dissolution. It was like a nursing home:
The languid stillness of the place was only broken by the chirping of this
23 Probate Act of 1857, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 77, §§ 116-117.
24 There has been a "chicken or egg" controversy about who was most to blame
for the tragedy-the Parliament that passed the enabling clause, or the remaining
civilians, whose greed led them to exercise the statutory power. Senior puts the onus
on the Act. W. SENIOR, supra note 14, at 110. Wiswall states that the truth was more
"complicated." F. WISWALL, supra note 20, at 88. According to Wiswall, it was not
really the fault of the common lawyers or Parliament "that they condemned the
civilians and then handed them a razor with which to cut their own throats ...
Sadly the main motive of the majority of the doctors in devising the dissolution of the
College appears to have been nothing more than simple avarice." Id.
The heroes, however, were clearly those civilians who joined Dr. Lee and sought
to preserve Doctors' Commons as a kind of institute for advanced legal study in
comparative law. Ironically, London is now the liome of the Institute for Advanced
Legal Studies. If only it could have had the initial resources and setting of Doctors'
Commons!
25 Dickens knew Doctors' Commons well and was knowledgeable about law.
At 15 he began work in the office of a firm of Gray's Inn solicitors. At 16 and 6
months, still too young to be a parliamentary reporter, he became a free lance
reporter covering the Court of the Bishop of London at Doctors' Commons. W.
HOLDSWORTH, CHARLES DICKENS AS A LEGAL HISTORIAN 9, 30-33, 35-36,65 (1928);
15 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 377 (1965); Blount, Introduction
& Notes to C. DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIFLD ix, 954 (T. Blount ed. 1966). The
descriptions of Doctors' Commons in David Copperfield, first published in 1850,
could have contributed indirectly to the passage of the Probate Act of 1857, 20 & 21
Vict., c. 77, §§ 116-117.
26 C. DICKENS, DAVID COPPERFIELD 403 (T. Blount ed. 1966) (1st ed. London
1850).
27 Id.
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fire and by the voice of one of the Doctors ... [a]ltogether, I have never,
on any occasion, made . . . [a stop] at such a cosey, dosey, old-
fashioned, time-forgotten, sleepy-headed little family-party in all my
life; and I felt it would be quite a soothing opiate to belong to it in any
character--except perhaps as a suitor. 28
How could this geriatric ward symbolize a vital option in the development of
English law? By Dickens' day, the ideological juices at Doctors' Commons
had almost ceased to flow.2 9 The civilian jurisdictions had been pared away,
and there was corruption among the staff.30 The scent of decay hung in the
air.
But three hundred years earlier the picture was very different. The renais-
sance of humanist legal study on the continent, closely related to the English
civilian scholarship, could have made the English common law institutions
appear isolated, parochial, and old-fashioned in a Europe of new national
states.3 The triumph of the Tudor monarchy over the Church had largely
eliminated the canonical lawyers as a distinct class, and powerful royal
patronage was being exerted to see to it that the common lawyers, hardly
more trusted by Henry VIII, would not exclusively benefit. Instead, favor
fell on the civilians. 32
The civilians enjoyed nearly exclusive monopolies of university teaching
in law at Oxford and Cambridge. Between 1540 and 1546 Henry VIII had
28 Id. at 413.
29 The last intellectual sorties of the civilians, including those of Lord Stowell, will
be examined in the third Article in this series. For descriptions of the lingering
civilian practice in admiralty and ecclesiastical law, respectively, see F. WISWALL,
supra note 20, at 75-115; Manchester, supra note 20, at 58-75.
30 In November 1853, the Deputy Registrar of the Admiralty Registry of Doctors'
Commons, Mr. Henry B. Swabey, disappeared with approximately £75,000. The
money was taken from various escrow funds and from the Doctors' Commons'
Suitor's Fund. Wiswall reported that the Admiralty court, and its civilian practition-
ers, had "the gloom of scandal," F. WISWALL, supra note 20, at 52, and that its
"tranquil atmosphere" was "shattered . . . by the revelation of the Swabey affair,
and it was never regained." Id. at 83. It was only four years after the "Swabey
affair" that Doctors' Commons was dissolved.
31 T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 39-44.
32 "[I]t was to the civilians that Henry VIII turned when he was founding or
reorganizing such administrative courts as the Privy Council, the Star Chamber, the
Court of Requests, the Court of High Commission, the Council of the North, the
Council of Wales, and the rest." Id. at 43; see Logan, The Origins of the so-called
Regius Professorships: An aspect of the Renaissance in Oxford and Cambridge, in
14 STUDIES IN CHURCH HISTORY 271, 277-78 (1977); note 49 infra. But see Elton, The
Political Creed of Thomas Cromwell, in 6 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HISTORICAL
SOCIETY 69, 78 (5th ser. 1958) (stating that although "many of Henry VIII's lesser
servants were civilians [as well as "some bishops"]," most supporters of the civil
law were subordinates or "excluded from shaping ... policy").
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assisted in the establishment of the regius professorships in Civil Law.3 3
These positions would provide prestigious leadership for the civilian
cause. 34 By 1568, the civilians had also obtained a new and luxurious
professional headquarters at Mountjoy House in Knightrider Street, Lon-
don.35 In addition, the powerful Sir Thomas Gresham, chief financial advisor
to the Queen, had established Gresham College, which had a special man-
date to provide civil law instruction, in London in 1597.36 Blessed with royal
33 Logan, supra note 32, at 277-78. Logan established that there was no evidence
that linked Henry VIII personally to the establishment of the professorships; "Ao]nly
indirectly was the crown involved in their funding." Id. at 278. According to Logan,
'[c]ivil law was included quite probably to buttress the law school, which had
suffered from the elimination of canon law as a university subject." Id. at 277.
34 Three of the five primary civilian writers-Sir Thomas Smith, Alberico Gentili,
and John Cowell-held regius professorships in civil law; of the two remaining
writers, St. German died before the chairs were established, and William Fulbecke
was Gentili's student at Oxford when Gentili was regius professor, although Ful-
becke never held a regius professorship. The influence of the new professorships on
civilian writing was very great. Logan, supra note 32, at 276.
35 By 1500 groups of civilians began to associate in their own legal "inn" in
Paternoster Row. The location was near St. Paul's Cathedral, close to the ecclesias-
tical "Court of the Arches" at St. Mary le Bow, and not too distant from the
Admiralty Court in Southwark across London Bridge. G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at
56-57. From the beginning these civilians had trouble separating themselves, symbol-
ically as well as legally, from the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's on the one hand,
and their nominal landlord, Trinity Hall, Cambridge, on the other. But these civilians
clearly wanted to be an independentprofessional association, not just another part of
the Church or a university. Certainly by 1511, and probably earlier, their London
professional association became structured, and known as the Association of Doc-
tors of Law and the Advocates of the Church of Christ at Canterbury. E. Nys, supra
note 14, at 114-15; G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 1-22; W. SENIOR, supra note 14, at
33; F. WISWALL, supra note 20, at 76. Admission to the Association usually required
the degree of doctor of civil laws-a D.C.L.-or its equivalent, from a recognized
university. B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 2; G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 15-22, 31. In
1568, the Association of Advocates rented from the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's
larger and more stately premises in London, on Knightrider Street. The Association
and the premises both became known as Doctors' Commons. E. Nvs supra note 14,
at 115-16. But university ties were still strong. The 1568 lease was technically granted
to Trinity Hall of Cambridge University, an academic center of civilians; Trinity
Hall in turn held the premises in trust for the Association. G. SQUIBB, supra note 14,
at 60. Only over 200 years later, in 1770, did the members obtain their own lease, free
from Trinity Hall. This was the main reason for the Association's final incorporation
by Royal Charter in 1768. Other ties to the universities remained, however. Most
importantly, the criterion for membership in the Association remained in practice a
university training in civil law. Id. at 30-31.
36 See Buc, The Third University of England, or a Treatise of the Foundations of All
the Colleges . . . Within and About the Most Famous City of London, in J. STOW,
ANNALS 978-79 (London 1615); W. SENIOR, supra note 14, at 74-75. Gresham
College, like Doctors' Commons, is now extinct, together with all its brilliant
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favor, and directly tied to a great renaissance of continental jurisprudence,
the civilian prospect in England was at least hopeful. To some contem-
poraries, common lawyers and civilians alike, it seemed filled with exciting
opportunity. 37
At the heart of this opportunity was the civilians' unique chance to unite
university legal education, specialized practice, and government service.
Unlike the common lawyers, whose powerful professional establishments,
the Inns of Court, had cut off legal training from the study of the
humanities,38 the civilians-alone among English lawyers-required a uni-
versity education. Admission to the Doctors' Commons and the civilian
College of Advocates effectively required a university doctorate in civil law
(D.C.L.)-hence the name "Doctors' Commons." '39 The English civilians
also recognized appropriate doctorates from foreign universities as meeting
these requirements, 40 a true and early form of interjurisdictional legal cer-
tification. The College of Advocates was thus the first English professional
society to have direct, formal ties to higher education; its particularly close
relationship to All Souls College at Oxford and Trinity Hall at Cambridge, as
well as to the regius professorships, were sources of great potential
influence. 4 1
promise. It had a distinguished career as the seventeenth century seat of the Royal
Society; for a contemporary account, see Buc, supra, at 980-81. Gresham College
was dissolved by the Parliament in 1767, havingJbeen in decay since at least 1710. See
E. Nys, supra note 14, at 70. One of the college's seven endowed chairs was for the
study of civil law exclusively. Buc, supra, at 979. Samuel Pepys includes many
accounts in his Diary-beginning on January 23, 1661-of his visits to Gresham
College and of the "great company of persons of Honour there." See 2 S. PEPYS,
THE DIARY OF SAMUEL PEPYS 21-22 (R. Latham & W. Mathews eds. 1970) (1st ed.
London 1825).
37 See note 439 and accompanying text infra.
38 Many common lawyers, including Coke, were university graduates. But such
training was largely regarded as irrelevant for professional purposes. For descrip-
tions of the early curricula and educational techniques of the Inns of Court, see
J. DAWSON, supra note 12, at 34-50; Baker, Counsellors and Barristers: An Histori-
cal Study, 27 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 205 (1969); Prest, The Learning Exercises at the Inns
of Court, 1590-1640, 9 J. Soc'Y PuB. TCHRS. L. 301 (1967); Thorne, The Early
History of the Inns of Court with Special Reference to Gray's Inn, 50 GRAYA 79, 82
(1959); Thorne, Introduction to READINGS AND MOOTS AT INNS OF COURTS IN THE
15TH CENTURY (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 72, S. Thorne ed. 1954). "Unlike the
education offered to common lawyers at the Inns of Court, the study of law at the
universities was almost entirely theoretical and did not train the students in court
procedures and techniques." B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 16. There were similari-
ties between common law and civilian training, however. The required "disputa-
tions" of the university did resemble, at least in form, the -moots" and "bolts" of
the Inns of Court, and they were led by the professional faculties. See generally C.
THOMPSON, UNIVERSITIES IN TUDOR ENGLAND 21 (1959).
39 G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 30-31.
40 Id.
41 Trinity Hall was founded in 1350 by Bishop Bateman specifically to "train more
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Furthermore, the civilian "Roman law" curriculum came to dominate law
instruction at Oxford and Cambridge. 42 After the Act of Supremacy of
153443 and the expurgation of canon law instruction by Henry VIII,4 4 the
lawyers for the Church and the State." It was to have "a Master, 20 Fellows, 10-13
Civilians and 7-10 Canonists." F. REEVE, CAMBRIDGE 32-33 (1964). New College
and All Souls' College at Oxford had remarkable law collections in 1556, consisting
almost exclusively of Roman law and civilian commentaries. See Ker, Oxford
College Libraries in 1556, at 8, 46-49 (guide to. Bodleian Library exhibition). See also
Logan, supra note 32, at 277.
42 The "Roman law" curriculum was primarily the study of the Byzantine compi-
lations of the classical Roman law in Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis, together with
the numerous scholarly glosses and commentaries on the Byzantine text. See J.
DAWSON, supra note 12, at 100-28. By the 16th century, however, some
"humanists'--under the influence of Cujas, Valla, Hotman, and other continental
jurists-were trying to isolate and study the "true" Roman law of the earlier
"classical period." See Hazeltine, Introduction to W. ULLMAN, THE MEDIEVAL
IDEA OF LAW xxv (1946). See generally F. HOTMAN, FRANCOGALLIA (R. Giesey
ed., J. G. M. Salmon trans. 1972) (1st ed. Geneva 1573); D. KELLEY, FOUNDATIONS
OF MODERN HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP 39-43 (1970); J. A. C. SMITH, MEDIEVAL
LAW TEACHERS AND WRITERS, CIVILIAN AND CANONIST (1975); Hazeltine, supra
note 14, at 139-72.
The courses were rigorous. It took a candidate from three to four years to obtain a
B.C.L. (Bachelor of Civil Law) if he already had the basic undergraduate degree, the
B.A. Without a B.A., it took from five to six years to obtain a B.C.L. C. THOMPSON,
supra note 38, at 14. The coveted D.C.L. or L.L.D. (Doctor of Laws) required at
least four or five years more. H. LYTE, A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
221-22 (1886); C. THOMPSON, supra note 38, at 14. Candidates were also required to
lecture on the Institutes, the Digestum Novum and the Infortiatum. The candidate
gave "an ordinary lecture for each regent doctor, and he must have opposed and
responded in the school of each Decretit." 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 229 (3d ed. 1945).
Whether the civil law program was more rigorous than that of the common lawyers
depended both on the specific historical period and how far the common lawyer had
progressed on the hard road to the Sargeant's coif. As to minimum intellectual
standards, the "civilian way" was, at most times, arguably more demanding. For
comparisons of the civil and common law programs, see J. DAWSON, supra note 12,
at 40-42; Thorne, supra note 38, at 82. Inarguably, the civil law program was different
from the common law program. The lectures and scholastic disputations at the civil
law program's core had little to do with the common law of England. Surprisingly,
these lectures and disputations also had little to do with the substantive law of the
canonical courts, the Admiralty, and other English courts that, at least nominally,
had Roman-based rules and procedure. For comparisons of civilian and common law
training programs, see note 38 supra.
43 26 Hen. 8, c. I.
41 Canon law instruction ceased with the commissioners' Visitation and Royal
Injunction Act, 1535, 27 Hen. 8, c. 17, which opened all offices in the ecclesiastical
courts to doctors of civil law, married or not. See generally Senior, The Advocates,
supra note 14, at 503.
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civilians enjoyed a complete monopoly over the teaching of law in the
universities. 4 Despite the efforts of Blackstone, this monopoly was not
broken until 1839, and then at the "new" University of London.46 During
the critical periods of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the civilian
university monopoly was fully intact. University fellowships and professor-
ships were occupied by powerful spokesmen for the civilian cause, including
Thomas Smith, Alberico Gentili, Thomas Ridley, John Cowell, Richard
Zouche, and Arthur Duck. 47
The civilian specialties of international public law, admiralty law, and the
international law of commercial transactions made the civilians natural can-
didates for governmental preferment in the developing renaissance nation-
state, particularly in regard to foreign relations. Many English civilians
became devoted civil servants of the Tudor Crown and its expanding
bureaucracies.4 8 It had even been suggested that the zeal of the civilians for
humanistic learning and imperial authority was seen by Henry VIII as an
excellent substitute for the influence of the clerics and canonists of the
Roman Church, which he was rapidly dismembering and integrating into his
government.
49
4S Some canon law studies did continue in the universities after 1535, but only a
handful of students specialized in canon law; a majority received instruction in both
civil and canon law as part of the regular civilian curriculum. In as late a year as 1624,
canon law study could be set forth as one of the objects of the founding of Pembroke
College at Oxford, and the last application for a degree in canon law was at Oxford in
1715. See J. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF THE UNIVERSITIES 18-19 (1910). Moreover,
civilian control of university legal education did not extend to administration, but
only to teaching. See B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 30.
46 See J. BAKER, supra note 7, at 148-49; F. LAWSON, THE OXFORD LAW
SCHOOL, 1850-1965, at 1-5 (1968); Logan & Vyse, Blackstone and Oxford 19 (1980)
(catalogue of Bodleian Library exhibit).
47 All of the civilian leaders named above held regius professorships except
Ridley and Duck. Ridley and Duck, however, held other academic positions. Ridley
was at various times a fellow of King's College at Cambridge and Headmaster of
Eton, and Duck was a fellow of All Souls' College at Oxford. See 1 THE COMPACT
EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 453 (Cowell), 580 (Duck),
765 (Gentili) (1975); 2 id. at 1777 (Ridley), 1950 (Smith), 2357 (Zouche).
48 See B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 24-30. Francis Bacon, in a draft of an
important letter to Sir George Villiers, later Duke of Buckingham, observed:
[A]lthough I am a professor of the common law, yet am I so much a lover of
truth and of learning, and of my native country, that I do heartily persuade that
the professors of law, called civilians, because the civil law is their guide, should
not be discountenanced or discouraged: else whensoever we shall have aught to
do with any foreign king or state, we shall be at a miserable loss, for want of
learned men in that profession.
6 J. SPEDDING, THE LETTERS AND LIFE OF FRANCIS BACON 27, 39 (London 1872)
(reprinting draft of Bacon's letter), reprinted as 13 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON
(J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D. Heath eds. 1872). Bacon was strongly influenced in his
writing by civilian ideas. See note 16 supra.
49 The initial effect of Henry VIlI's Act of Supremacy, 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1,
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In all events, the late sixteenth century saw a great strengthening of
Doctors' Commons. The physical facilities continued to improve, and the
Court of Admiralty and lesser ecclesiastical courts began to meet in the hall
itself.5 0 The library grew steadily. It included not only the "classical"
Roman law texts, but also many of the best continental commentaries. Many
books about international law, law of trade, the "customary" or "common"
law of continental countries, and ecclesiastical law were acquired, making
Doctors' Commons one of the centers of cosmopolitan learning in London
and Europe. 51 The civilians' expertise in many fields of law was well recog-
nized by the Tudor government.5 2 The members of the College of Advocates
came to regard themselves as a professional elite, equal at least to the
abolishing the Roman Catholic Church as the English state religion, was nearly a
disaster for the civilians. Enrollments in civil law at the universities plunged between
1544 and 1551, as students apparently foresaw the loss of the traditional Church
careers and the advent of a secular Chancery. See C. THOMPSON, supra note 38, at
13-14. But Henry VIII, with his usual astuteness, apparently perceived the civilians
as useful allies against the forces of both the Roman religion and the common law.
The civilians thus received his patronage in professional and educational spheres,
and their lot improved. See T. MACKIE, THE EARLIER TUDORS, 1485-1558, at 359-60,
564 (1972). "Henry VIII was well aware of the merits of the civilians .... .As
administrators and as judges in the prerogative courts their influence was paramount.
They also maintained an ancient feud with the canonists and papacy." T. F. T.
PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 44.
10 It is not clear when the Admiralty Court moved from the Church of St.
Margaret in Southwark-not far from the docks-to Doctors' Commons. According
to Wiswall, it was "soon" after the civilians leased Mountjoy House in 1567. F.
WISWALL, supra note 20, at 77. But see Steckley, Merchants and the Admiralty
Court During the English Revolution, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 137, 175 (1978)
(implying a later date).
The Admiralty Court continued to meet in Doctors' Commons-except in 1665,
when the plague drove the civilians first to Winchester and then to the Hall of Jesus
College, Oxford. From 1666-1671, after the fire of London had destroyed Mountjoy
House, the Admiralty Court sat in Exeter House in the Strand, until the new
buildings of Doctors' Commons were completed on the old site in 1671. See F.
WISWALL, supra note 20, at 66.
Eventually, the Common Hall of Doctors' Commons became the home of nine
ecclesiastical courts, including the Court of the Arches, the Admiralty, and, occa-
sionally, the High Court of Chivalry. Id. at 78.
51 See Catalogue of the Books in the Library of the College of Advocates in
Doctors' Commons (London 1818), cited in G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 216; A
Catalogue of Sale of Library of College of Advocates (London 1861), cited in G.
SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 216. Copies of these rare catalogues are kept at Lambeth
Palace, where I have examined them. Only fragments of the Library of Doctors'
Commons now remain. See note 22 supra.
52 See T. F. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 43, quoted in note 32 supra. But see
Elton, supra note 32, at 277-78, quoted in note 32 supra.
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Sergeant's Order of the common lawyers,53 and unequaled in their unique
ties to university legal studies at Oxford and Cambridge.
B. The English Civilians as Specialist Legal Practitioners: The "Civilian
Monopolies"
Nearly as important as the civilian monopolies in the university legal
education were their monopolies in certain specialist areas of legal practice.
The civilians had a complete monopoly over actions in the High Court of
Admiralty, which included not only the law of prize and shipwreck, but
many overseas commercial transactions as well. 5 4 Equally significant-as
well as lucrative-was the civilians' stronghold on the central ecclesiastical
courts. These courts represented a far more important practice than the
church courts of today, and heard probate, matrimonial, and estate mat-
ters.5 5 All wills in the Archdiocese of London were actually stored at
Doctors' Commons until the Court of Probate Act of 185756 and the Mat-
rimonial Causes Act of 1857. 5 7 Other less significant civilian monopolies
included proceedings in the ancient court of the Constable and Marshal, and
the High Court of Chivalry.5 8 The latter court was still active in the seven-
teenth century and, indeed, had a case in 1954.
59
13 On the nature of the Sergeant's Order, see J. DAWSON, supra note 12, at 12-34;
Arnold, Introduction to YEARBOOKS OF RICHARD II, 2 RICHARD If, 1378-1379
xxviii-xxxv (M. Arnold ed. & trans. 1970). The Sergeants claimed precedence over
the Masters in Chancery who, at least in Tudor times, were usually civilians. The
civilians expressed displeasure through a speech in the House of Lords by Dr.
Berkeley, and were rebuked. W. JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY
106-07, 111 (1967).
54 Eventually, the common lawyers limited civilian admiralty jurisdiction. See
generally F. WISWALL, supra note 20, at 4-11. Among the best works on the courts in
which the civilians regularly practiced are G. DUNCAN, THE HIGH COURT OF
DELEGATES (1971); SELECT CASES IN THE COURT OF REQUESTS A.D. 1497-1569
(Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 12, J. Leadam ed. 1898); 1 SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF
ADMIRALTY (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 6, R. Marsden ed. 1892) (encompassing the
years 1390-1404, 1527-1545); 2 SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF ADMIRALTY (Selden
Soc'y Pub. No. 11, R. Marsden ed. 1897) (encompassing the years 1547-1607); G.
SQUIBB, THE HIGH COURT OF CHIVALRY (1959); R. USHER, THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE HIGH COMMISSION (1913); Hill, Introduction to J. CAESAR, THE ANCIENT
STATE AUTHORITIE, AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF REQUESTS ix-xlvi (L. Hill
ed. 1975); James, Court of Arches During the Eighteenth Century: Its Matrimonial
Jurisdiction, 5 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 55 (1961); Manchester, supra note 20.
55 See Manchester, supra note 20, at 54 passim; James, supra note 54.
56 20 & 21 Vict., c. 77.
57 Id., c. 95. See generally G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 102-06.
58 See generally G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 1-104.
59 Id. at 123. The case was Manchester Corp. v. Manchester Palace of Varieties
Ltd., [1955] P. 133 (1954), cited in G. SQUIBB, supra note 54, at 123. It involved the
unauthorized use of the "arms, crest, and supporters" of the Manchester Corpora-
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Also important were the civilian "specialties" in areas in which they did
not have exclusive privileges. These areas included (1) legal positions in the
provincial church bureaucracies, such as commissaries or prebendaries for
archdeacons and bishops, and as deans; 60 (2) positions as legal deputies of
vice-admirals, and judges of local admiralty courts; 61 or (3) positions as
commissioners and members for various conciliar courts, including the High
Court of Delegates and the King's Council of the North.62 In addition;
civilians traditionally held positions as Masters in Chancery63 and had active
practices in the busy and popular Court of Requests, although common
lawyers could also practice in that court. 64 Finally, Levack's research has
shown that a substantial number of civilians held important diplomatic
positions, as well as some high academic posts at Oxford, Cambridge, and
Gresham College.65
In short, civilian legal practice and civilian careers were not narrowly
confined during the renaissance. Their law practices spread from their valu-
able monopolies into many other fields. An Elizabethan man of affairs who
needed a will, or had troubles with his wife, or suffered a shipwreck, or
wished a coat of arms, or sought to import wine from France, or wanted to
complain about his vicar's behavior, or sought advice about a sensitive
foreign transaction, or wished to consult about the special equitable relief
and procedures available in the Chancery or the Court of Requests, might
tion (city of Manchester) above the main curtain of a "variety theater." Manchester
Corp., [1955] P. at 135-37.
60 B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 23.
61 Id.
62 Id.; see id. at 12-26. Moreover, civilian "practice" was by no means limited to
what we today would rigidly regard as "law courts." For example, they were
involved in Privy Council matters. See Dawson, The Privy Council and Private Law
in Tudor and Stuart Periods 1, 48 MICH. L. REV. 393, 408-09 (1950). Civilians were
regularly commissioned by the Privy Council to hear foreign merchants' arbitration
cases. "The motives of the [Privy] Council in such cases were well summarized in
1595, when it explained its desire to settle the matter in question 'without processe
and suite of lawe, the same being inconvenient for straungers not well acquainted
with the lawes of our nation, for the better expedicion and for the especiall regard we
have to dispatche the causes of straungers.' " Id. at 409 (quoting DASENT XXV 127
(1595)). For a description of the diplomatic role of the civilians, see M. PULMAN,
THE ELIZABETHAN PRIVY COUNCIL IN THE FIFTEEN-SEVENTIES 33, 160 (1971). In
1549, the foundation of a civil law college at Cambridge, to be called Edward's
College, was proposed. One reason for founding the college would have been to
provide "a college of civilians to attend on the council." W. SENIOR, supra note 14,
at 70.
63 See W. JONES, supra note 53, at 380-81; B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 27; R.
TITTLER, NICHOLAS BACON 77 (1976) (some masters in chancery had doctorates in
both civil and canon law).
64 B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 28-29; Hill, supra note 54, at lx.
65 B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 23. But see id. at 30.
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find his steps leading past St. Paul's Cathedral and down Great Knightrider
Street to consult with a civilian at Doctors' Commons.
The activities of the civilians did not escape the jealous attention of
common lawyers. The number of civilians was small. There were roughly
200 during the period from 1603 to 1641, as contrasted to approximately
2,000 common lawyers. 66 It is not clear that civilians ever constituted a
serious economic threat to their more numerous and powerful brethren. 67
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the common law writ of prohibition was
used by common lawyers to keep the civilian courts strictly within their
"proper" spheres. One common lawyer was moved to write of prohibition,
"Blest Writ! by which their [civilians] fees are stay'd and briefs into our bags
conveyed." ' 68 Particularly, however, in the years prior to the serious political
66 Id. at 21-22. The total number of civilians active at any one time in Doctors'
Commons rarely exceeded 20 or 25. The "proctors" who acted as the counterpart of
common law solicitors in Doctors' Commons varied from a high of 43, at the end of
the 17th century, to a low of 5. E. Nys, supra note 14, at 118. In 1696, their number
was fixed at 34. H. KIRK, PORTRAIT OF A PROFESSION 19-20 (1976). During the same
time periods, the number of practicing common lawyers in the Inns of Court was in
the range of 400, with as many as 200 or 300 full-time students also within the Inns of
Court. A. HARDING, THE LAW COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 119 (1973). The
total number of common law attorneys or solicitors at these times is hard to estimate
precisely, but there were more than a thousand. H. KIRK, supra, at 1-12; R. ROBSON,
THE ATTORNEY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 1-34 (1959).
67 "Thomas Wilson, himself a civilian, said in 1600 that the civil law had declined
very greatly in the previous half century; only a few made a good living and the
majority had to be content to 'take great pains for small gains' in the ecclesiastical
courts." D. VEALL, supra note 16, at 51 (citing T. WILSON, STATE OF ENGLAND
1600, at 25-26 (London 1600)). On the other hand, "Thomas Powell, an attorney,
writing in 1631, said it was more expensive and more difficult to qualify as a civil
lawyer, but once the civil lawyer was established he had greater opportunities ...
'because their number is less, their learning more intricate. And they admit few or no
solicitors to trample between them and the client, so that the fee comes to them
immediately and with the more advantage.' "Id. at 51 (quoting T. POWELL, TOM OF
ALL TRADES 22-23 (London 1631)).
68 J. ANSTEY, THE PLEADER'S GUIDE 19 (London 1796), quoted in 13 W. HOLDS-
WORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 461 (1952). The passage comes from a
humorous volume by a barrister, John Anstey. The poem's description of civilians is
extensive:
They set up shop at Westminster;
But of their practice were debarred,
And fairly kicked from Palace Yard,
Till thinking they had no intent
To hurt th' established Government,
O'er-rule the Laws and ride the Land
With Romish edicts contraband,
The Nation proud of the submission
Of men of birth and erudition,
Gave them a lodging, and in pity
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problems which led to the Civil War, there is evidence of practical coopera-
tion between civilian and common lawyers, not unlike the relationship
between general practicing lawyers and specialists today. 69 The internecine
jurisdictional battles between the common law courts themselves, particu-
larly between the Common Pleas and the Kings Bench, were far more
pronounced than any early tension between civilians and common law-
yers. 70 Moreover, the common lawyers of the central courts also attacked
their own minor common law courts, such as the Court of the Marshalsea,
with relish. 7' When serious hostility did develop between certain common
lawyers and the civilians, intellectual and juristic differences were as serious
a focus as any economic competition. 72
C. The English Civilians as Jurists: The "Bartolist Cause"
There was no question but that the English civilians did have important
ideological differences with the common lawyers. The rapid change of
English society in the late sixteenth century began to provoke and draw out
these differences. At first the conflicts were literary only, and the purpose of
the writers conciliatory. But then the lines hardened into jurisdictional
battles between common law and civilian courts. These battles ultimately
destroyed any possibility of coexistence.
1. The Proper Source of Law: The lus Gentium and Ius Naturale
The first, and most profound, category of disagreement between the
civilians and common lawyers concerned the proper sources of law. The
Sent them to settle in the City,
Begg'd them to gather up their alls,
And vend their drugs behind St. Pauls-
Provided always that if e'er
Said Quack or Quacks should interfere,
Or any Quack, in word or deed
presume his province to exceed,
Or take upon him as a Scholar,
Prohibitory writ should follow:
Blest writ! by which their fees are stay'd
And briefs into our bags conveyed.
J. ANSTEY, supra, at 17-19, quoted in 13 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra, at 461.
69 See generally Baker, supra note 10; Steckley, supra note 50; Yale, supra note
16.
70 See Dawson, Coke and Ellesmere Disinterred: The Attack on the Chancery in
1616, 36 ILL. L. REv. 127 (1941); Gray, The Boundaries of the Equitable Function,
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 192 (1976); Jones, Conflict or Collaboration? Chancery
Attitudes in the Reign of Elizabeth 1, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 12 (1961).
71 See generally Greene, The Court of Marshalsea in Late Tudor and Stuart
England, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 267 (1976); Jones, The Court of the Verge: The
Jurisdiction of the Steward and Marshall of the Household in Later Medieval
England, 10 J. BRIT. STUD. 1 (1970).
72 This thesis will be developed fully in the second Article in this series.
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English civilian, like the English canonist, looked-and often traveled-to
foreign sources to find and study the "best law." ' 73 Common lawyers would
later accuse civilians of doing this out of subordination to foreign religious or
political authority, but the true reason was intellectual, and rooted in Roman
jurisprudence. As the Digest and Institutes of Justinian demonstrate, the
Roman law taught the notions of ius gentium and ius naturale. 7 4 These terms
roughly stood for the idea that legal systems can be tested for validity by
natural reason, and that some legal precepts are universally valid. 75
The Romans themselves used these notions, through the different periods
in their own legal history, in at least three different ways. First there was the
ius gentium as the product of natural reason, naturalis ratio.76 This was
closely related to, but not identical with, the Greek notions of natural law. 77
73 See Mitchell, English Law Students at Bologna in the Fifteenth Century, 51
ENG. HIST. REV. 270 (1936). For example, one medieval English civilian and canon
lawyer named Richard of Wych studied at Oxford, took a degree at Paris, went back
and taught at Oxford, and then went for seven years to Bologna. He finally returned to
be Chancellor of Oxford about 1238. See H. LYTE, supra note 42, at 60-61. This
pattern continued through the renaissance. Thomas Smith, educated at Cambridge,
was awarded the first regius professorship in civil law there in 1540. Subsequently
Smith went abroad to improve his knowledge, studying in France and earning a
doctorate in law at the University of Padua. Maitland, Preface to T. SMITH, DE
REPUBLICA ANGLORUM viii-ix (L. Alston ed. 1906). There are countless less distin-
guished examples. Many early civilians were better traveled "intellectually" than
modem lawyers.
74 See DIGEST 1.1.1.4, 1.1.9, 1.1.llpr., 48.19.17; INSTITUTES 1.2pr., 1.2.1, 1.2.2.
75 See A. BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIAC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 528-29 (ius
gentium), 530-31 (ius naturale) (1953).
76 See DIGEST 1.1.9; INSTITUTES 1.2.1, 1.2.2.
77 In later writing, "natural law," ius naturale, was sometimes confused with ius
gentium. See H. JOLOWICZ & B. NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 102-07 (3d ed. 1972). But there was a clear distinction in
classical times. Natural law was "that which nature has taught all animals." See
DIGEST 1. 1. 1.3. This included breathing and mating. lus gentium, on the other hand,
was a function of man's reasoning. Thus slavery could be contrary to natural law,
i.e., it was not something "taught" by nature, but yet be part of ius gentium, as it is
found in all ancient societies. See DIGEST 48.19.17; INSTITUTES 1.2.2. For an account
of the "bewildering controversy" that inconsistent usage of the term "natural law"
has evoked in the context of international law over the centuries, see A.
D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 24-26 (1951); J. KOSTERS, LES FONDEMENTS DU DROIT
DES GENS 97-98 (E. Brill ed. 1925); A. NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW
OF NATIONS 21 (1947); P. VINOGRADOFF, Historical Types of International Law,
supra note 14, at 280-83. This controversy became really complex as a result of the
eighteenth century version of natural law, "which sought to deduce detailed univer-
sal rules from reason," an idea quite unlike the classical Roman concept. Dias,
Temporal Approach Towards a New Natural Law, 28 CAMB. L.J. 75, 95 n.50 (1970);
see ANON., A DISSERTATION ON THE LAW OF NATURE, THE LAW OF NATIONS, AND
THE CIVIL LAW IN GENERAL 1-38 (London 1723).
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As the classical jurist Gaius said, "[T]hose rules prescribed by natural
reason [naturalis ratio] for all men are observed by all peoples alike, and are
called the law of nations [ius gentium]." 7 8 In this usage, the ius gentium, later
known as ius omnium gentium to distinguish it from narrower usages, was
included as a part of the law of each nation-for example, in the Roman ius
civile proper. 79 Thus, it could be regarded as "incorporated" into the ius
civile of each nation. It could not by its definition conflict with the ius civile,
because it was part of the ius civile. The ius gentium, in other words, was that
part of each national legal system that was demanded by natural reason.8 0
2. The Aequitas Mercatoria and Conflict of Law Doctrine
There was also a second usage of the phrase ius gentium which, though
narrower, was no less important. This usage involved specific, factual ques-
tions as to existing foreign and mercantile law. 81 As the Roman state ex-
panded, its contacts with foreign territories and its commercial relations with
these territories likewise increased. There is some evidence that the praetor
peregrinus, the Roman magistrate [praetor] with authority over a foreigner
[peregrinus], had power to resolve disputes involving foreign transactions
not governed by the ius civile of the Roman state, applying instead the
78 DIGEST 1.1.9; see INSTITUTES 1.2.1. See generally A. BERGER, supra note 75,
at 528-29; INSTITUTES 1.2.2.
79 A. BERGER, supra note 75, at 528.
80 ".lus autem gentin omni humano generi commune est [The law of nations
is common to all mankind]." INSTITUTES 1.2.2. "Thus our ancestors distinguished
between the law of nations and the civil law. The civil law is not always the law of
nations, but the law of nations ought always to be the civil law." CICERO, DE OFFICII
iii, 17, quoted and translated in H. WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS
IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 27 (N.Y. 1845) (footnote omitted).
Maine has argued that the ius gentium became the ancestor of "international law"
in the modern sense through a misunderstanding of this broader concept of classical
ius gentium. "The early modern interpreters of the jurisprudence of Rome, miscon-
ceiving the meaning of Jus Gentium, assumed without hesitation that the Romans
had bequeathed to them a system of rules for the adjustment of international transac-
tions." H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 99 (London 1861) (emphasis supplied). "'Setting
aside the Conventional or Treaty Law of Nations, it is surprising how large a part of
the system is made up of pure Roman law." Id. at 97. Another possibility is that the
Roman influence was strong because, to the early civilians, the study of the Roman
law, including its incorporated notion of ius gentium, was simply "'the only science of
universal jurisprudence then known." H. WHEATON, supra, at 33.
8I See Yntema, The Historical Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J.
COMP. L. 297, 301 (1953); P. VINOGRADOFF, Historical Types of International Law,
supra note 14, at 269-72. According to Vinogradoff, this narrower, practical process
was what effectively broadened Roman law, not theories about "ius gentium."
"Roman law became international as a combination of various currents of national
laws." Id. at 272. But this combination of laws remained "a ius gentium and not a ius
civitatum." Id. at 273.
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custom of traders. 82 Thus, this narrower ius gentium would also lead civi-
lians to examine foreign sources to find the best rule.
The narrower usage of ius gentium gave rise in medieval times to two
concepts of critical importance to English civilians. First was the notion of a
"law merchant" which applied especially to mercantile transactions, ac-
cording to mercantile custom. This was called the aequitas mercatoria.83
Many disputes in later years between common lawyers and civilians turned,
in part, on whether the law merchant was a "special" law for merchants,
separate from the national law. The later English civilians argued that this
law was ius gentium in the sense of being a special transnational law for
merchants and it should, therefore, be handled by specialist jurists--i.e.,
themselves-rather than by common lawyers .84
A second concept that developed from the narrower ius gentium of the
praetor peregrinus was conflict of law doctrine. English common lawyers had
long regarded "conflict of law" as simply a matter of jurisdiction.8 5 If the
matter was appropriately in the court's jurisdictions, the law of the forum
[lexfori] applied. 86 Thus choice of law would depend on which court estab-
lished jurisdiction: the common law courts applied common law, the Admi-
ralty court applied maritime and civil law, and the ecclesiastical courts
applied canonical law. In England, therefore, issues that may best have
been resolved by deciding which set of legal principles would be the most
practical or appropriate were instead resolved by mechanical rules dividing
jurisdiction. By contrast, the civilians argued the need for an intelligent
application of foreign legal principles when appropriate. 87 This led to conflict
between the common lawyers and the civilians, with the common lawyers
permitting nontransversible fictions to expand common law jurisdiction,
particularly vis-ed-vis the Admiralty,88 and the civilians arguing for the ap-
propriate application of foreign legal principles, as to which they were the
best English experts.
3. The Ius Inter Gentes: Public International Law
The term ius gentium had a final usage that was even more specialized,
and of great interest to renaissance civilians. It was the ius gentium that
82 A. BERGER, supra note 75, at 528-29, 626-27; H. JoLOWlCZ & B. NICHOLAS,
supra note 77, at 48-49, 101, 104.
83 The notion that more attention in commercial transactions should be paid to the
equity" of intent, rather than to strict form, was critical in the later commercial law.
See J. JONES, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF LAW 16 (1940).
84 See, e.g., T. RIDLEY, A VIEW OF THE CIVILE AND ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 388-96
(4th ed. London 1676) (1st ed. London 1607).
85 See Sack, supra note 10, at 365.
86 Id. at 365-66.
87 See notes 198, 233-35 & 252 and accompanying text infra.
88 See L. KNAFLA, LAW AND POLITICS IN JACOBEAN ENGLAND 293-94 (1977)
(account of Lord Chancellor Ellesmere). This conflict will be analyzed in detail in the
second Article in this series.
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governed the relations of Rome with other states. The civilians sometimes
called this "ius gentium" by the name "ius inter gentes"; i.e., the law
("ius") between nations-tribes ("gentes") as opposed to "ius gentium"
("the law of all nations-tribes"). 89 This usage included the law of war, iura
belli, the law of diplomats, iura legati, and the law of the special early courts
of treaties and relations between Romans peregrini.90 The expertise of the
English civilians in these "public" international law subjects was unchal-
lenged by practicing common lawyers until a relatively late date. 9 1 But the
disputes between the civilians themselves, both in England and externally,
were fierce. Was this ius gentium to be determined by natural reason, as with
the law "common to all" [ius omni gentes]? Was it predetermined by the
"natural law" [ius naturale]? Or was it a matter not of ideals, but merely of
the actual custom and behavior of nations?
Each of the various aspects of ius gentium and ratio naturalis firmly
directed the English civilian's mind to foreign sources of law. Only through
extensive study of comparative rules and systems could the merits and
demerits of any law be ascertained. The development of scientific methods
of inquiry in the renaissance strengthened these civilians' notions. 9 2 It was
even irrelevant to the civilian whether a particular "system" of law pres-
ently existed. Led by the inquiries of Lodowick Lloyd, Gentili, Fulbecke,
Wiseman and others, English civilians pioneered in crude comparative legal
history. 93 If the ratio scripta of historical systems of law could be discovered
and deciphered, their lessons could be learned. The common lawyers were
certainly familiar with the use of historical records, but hardly with the
89 See Senior, Early Writers, supra note 14, at 323-35.
90 See A. BERGER, supra note 75, at 528-29, 669. See generally DIGEST 50.7.18
(legati); H. JOLOWICZ & B. NICHOLAS, supra note 77, at 102-07; G. SCELLE, LES
FONDATEURS DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1904). It was this area that was the focus of
one of the first major scholarly accomplishments of the English civilians. See A.
GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES (London 1585), discussed at notes 277-305
and accompanying text infra.
91 It could be argued that the first serious challenge to civilian "public" interna-
tional law expertise by a common lawyer was C. MOLLOY, DE JURE MARITIMO ET
NAVALI (London 1676). The effect of Molloy's book will be discussed at length in the
second Article in this series.
92 The Scientific Revolution affected common lawyers and civilians alike. See
generally Berman, supra note 3, at 941-43; Shapiro, supra note 13, at 761-62. Many
members of the Inns of Court, as well as civilians, congregated at Gresham College
to engage in scientific discourse. See Aikenhead, Students of the Common Law
1590-1615: Lives and Ideas at the Inns of Court, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 243, 254
(1977). But civil law tradition lent itself better than the common law to the new modes
of inquiry, particularly for the followers of the French legal humanists. See notes
130-31 and accompanying text infra. Indeed, it has recently been argued that the first
common lawyer "to demonstrate a thorough mastery of humanist sources and
methods" was John Selden, who did not publish his first major work until 1614.
Ziskind, supra note 16, at 28.
93 See notes 463-73 and accompanying text infra.
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notion of the study of foreign legal history. And it was one thing to use the
past to legitimize and then to establish the present order, as the common
lawyers often did, 94 and something else to use it as an ideological gold mine
of "external" ideas and standards against which the present order could be
tested and thus improved. 95 This, to a large extent, was the way of the
civilians.
4. The Ratio Scripta and the Flaws of the Common Law
The outgrowths of the civilian intellectual traditions of ius gentium, ratio
naturalis, and ratio scripta could threaten the common lawyers in a most
fundamental way. For by the tests of "external" reason and universality, it
was clear at least to some English civilians that the common law was flawed.
Juries, for example, may have been competent "memories for fact," but
as arbitrators of customary rules they were clearly without qualification.
The civilians doubtless suspected that juries were devices for saving com-
mon law judges labor-and possibly for saving the common law judges from
the responsibility of open and principled decisionmaking as well. Would not
law be best made and best applied by the most intelligent and educated?
Except for the "collective witnesses of fact" rationale, the basis for jury trial
seemed to be posited in terms of negatives: the common law courts lacked
money, skilled manpower, and power on the part of the judge to enforce a
decision without "community participation." 96 Worst of all, residual super-
94 See C. ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 30-37, 128-53 (2d ed. 1930). Probably the
best example of a common lawyer using the past to justify the present is provided by
Coke himself. See L. ABBOTT, LAW REPORTING IN ENGLAND 1485-1585, at 252-555
(1973); W. HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 124-32 (1938).
95 See Genzmer, A Civil Lawyer's Critical View on Comparative Legal History,
15 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 89 (1967).
96 Any civilian suspicions, at least as to the lack of skilled judicial manpower as an
incentive for jury development, have been confirmed by modern writers.
It seems clear that the road [to adopting the canonist inquest] was open, just as
open in England as it was in France. What was needed was extra zeal of
sustained curiosity on behalf of the English judges, inspired by a conviction that
determination of the facts on which the judgment must rest was an essential part
of the judge's task. But zeal and curiosity were both repressed. .
The answer seems to be that at the outset the crown had no choice.... Crude and
clumsy as it was, the early common law jury was an essential means of conserving
manpower in a government that had taken on new tasks of immense scope and
complexity.
J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 126-28 (1960) (footnotes omitted); see 2 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 626-28 (2d ed. 1898)
(commenting that the use of juries "saved the judges of the middle ages not only ...
moral responsibility, but also from enmities and feuds"). The advantages of jury trial
as a bulwark against centralized totalitarianism, rather than its tool, was a rationale
discovered centuries later, most notably by Fortescue. See J. FORTESCUE, DE
LAUDIBUS LEGEM ANGLIAE 57-67 (S. Chrimes ed. & trans. 1942) (1st ed. n.p. c.
1545-46). As Van Caenegem has observed, "[tihere are moments when archaic uses
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stition may have required an inscrutable factfinder as a substitute for the
newly disallowed ordeal and oath-helping. 97 Thus, English civilian courts
used inquisitorial procedures, written interrogaties, and depositions. They
subpoenaed witnesses, cross-examined the parties themselves, and requested
the advice of experts on relevant subjects, such as the Elder Brethren of
Trinity House on maritime questions. 98 With rare exception, they did not
use juries. 99
Furthermore, to the civilians the "common law" method of "shaping"
legal doctrine by incremental decisionmaking could hardly have appeared
ideal. What kind of notice did that method give the average citizen of
changes in the rules, and what opportunity did it give anyone for building a
systematized, harmonious legal system? Of course one could try to force the
raw dross of the common law, ex post facto, into some elegant jurispruden-
tial mold-as Englishmen from Bracton to Cowell had done-but it would be
like "crushing an Ugly Sister's foot, bunions and all, into Cinderella's glass
slipper." 100 As one civilian said of the Lombard customary law, "[N]on lex,
sed faex. "101
suddenly appear to have a value that nobody suspected .... " R. VAN CAENEGEM,
THE BIRTH OF ENGLISH LAW 84 (1973).
97 The Fourth Lateran Council (1215), which forbade clergy to take part in judicial
ordeals, was probably influenced by the revival of civilian learning at that time; there
was no affirmation of ordeal in the Corpus Juris. Evolution ofjury trial was promoted
in England to fill the resulting void. See T. F. T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 118-21;
Wells, Early Opposition to the Petty Jury in Criminal Cases, 30 LAW Q. REV. 97
(1913).
98 Trinity House Brethren were distinguished mariners charged with certain duties
as to navigation and lighthouses. They were called by civilian judges in admiralty
proceedings as "experts." The use of "expert" juries, closely associated with
civilian practices, is now being revived in the so-called "commercial list" in England,
as provided by the Administration of Justice Act, 1970, c. 3. See generally TRINITY
HOUSE (CHARTERS, CONFIRMATION, GRANTS, ETC.) (London 1768); R. WALKER,
WALKER & WALKER'S THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 303 (4th ed. 1976) (commercial
list); Hale, Considerations Touching the Amendment or Alteration of Laws, in
A COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 249 (F. Hargrave
ed. 1787).
99 There was one exception-jury trial under the Admiralty Courts' criminal
jurisdiction. These were held at the Old Bailey before two common law judges, with
the civilian Admiralty judge presiding. These exceptional proceedings were pursuant
to a statute, 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, which required that these offenses be tried before
"commissioners of oyer and terminer," i.e., common law judges, with trial by a petty
jury, after indictment by a grand jury. Blackstone observed that otherwise "a man
might be there deprived of his life by the opinion of a single judge, without judgment
of his peers." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 268.
100 Simon, Dr. Cowell, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 260, 263 (1968).
101 Id. at 262; F. MAITLAND, ENGLISH LAW, supra note 14, at 87 (roughly
translated as "Not law, but the dregs."). The civilians have been joined by modern
observers. "Of all the developed systems of law, the English common law is proba-
[Vol, 61: 1
EARLY ENGLISH CIVILIAN WRITERS
One solution, of course, would be to develop a written, systematic, cod-
ified body of law, setting out the rules clearly and publicizing them widely,
on the model of the Institutes. 102 The fragmented structure of common law
courts, with the Common Pleas and the King's Bench in rivalry and with a
complex substructure of local and feudal courts still in existence, would
have been to the civilian mind, primitive. Such a system lacked the virtues of
clarity, consistency, and structure, those virtues that were at least in theory
paramount to Justinian and-centuries later-to the Benthamite radicals. 10 3
Short of codification, the English civilians considered other possibilities
for reform of the English legal system. For example, the civilians attempted
to use specialized courts and special commissioners, such as the Court of the
Arches and the Admiralty, to remedy some abuses of the common law. This
was a stop-gap measure, but it was, for civilians, better than nothing. It was
particularly useful in those legal areas where English merchants and dip-
lomats had to deal with foreigners who were accustomed to the more
cosmopolitan legal culture of Europe. Such transactions, at least, could be
isolated from the rest through the special jurisdictions of the King, the
Admiral, and the Marshall. At least in those areas, as in the university,
learned men could still treat the law as a science and a humanity.1 0 4
5. Relations with the Crown: Quod Principi Placuit
Codification and specialized courts, both areas of particular civilian in-
volvement, required close association with the Crown. Major "law reform"
legislation remained a Crown prerogative throughout the Tudor period, and
those special courts that dealt with foreign trade and shipping were obviously
related to Crown diplomacy and Crown revenues. Indeed, civilian officials
of these courts regularly took on diplomatic missions for the Crown in which
their cosmopolitan legal learning proved important.1 05
Proud of such expertise, the English civilians must have regarded them-
selves as the modern equivalent of the great Roman jurists-men who
bly the least intellectual, the most pragmatically higgledy-piggledy, and the English
lawyers have always been trained to absorb the guidance of the 'authorities' rather
than attempt independent and reasoned appreciations themselves." G. ELTON,
ENGLAND, 1200-1640, at 181 (1969).
102 See F. BACON, Memorial, supra note 16, at 84-86; F. BACON, Proposition,
supra note 16, at 61-71; J. COWELL, INSTITUTIONES JURIS ANGLICANI (London
1605).
103 See J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 186-95 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970); J.
DAWSON, supra note 12, at 122-23; H. JOLOWICZ & B. NICHOLAS, supra note 77, at
479-96; B. NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 38-45 (1962); Harrison,
Introduction to J. BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT XV-XVi (W. Harrison
ed. 1967). Indeed, Bentham discussed Justinian's compilers, finding them all too
inconsistent: "they debate where they should decide: they quote, where they should
command ...... J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL, supra, at 303.
104 This was Sir Thomas Ridley's great thesis. See T. RIDLEY, supra note 84.
105 See E. Nys, supra note 14, at 128-38; F. WISWALL, supra note 20, at 79.
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achieved authority not through public office or judicial power, but through
the force of their learning and argument.1 0 6 This self-image may have been
comforting for a group of men who held few judicial positions in the growing
common law system. 0 7 It also drew them closer to the Crown. After all, in
light of the Byzantine texts, the most important audience of the Roman
jurists appeared to have been the Emperor. 10 8 Would not enlightened En-
glish monarchs similarly be the civilians' best avenue to power? 0 9
Whig historians, following the lead of Edward Coke, have long tarred the
civilians with the brush of royal absolutism. The famous Digest motto, quod
principi placuit, legis habet vigorem (what the Prince determines, has the
force of law),1 0 became an accusatory challenge to the civilians from men
who understood its qualifications not at all--or chose not to. 1 Civilian legal
science no more postulated absolutism than did the common law. " 2 Indeed,
the civilians' dedication to known abstract principles of justice, written laws,
and expert jurists was an obvious bar to tyranny. Some English civilians
might have favored a powerful royal executive over an entrenched squire-
106 See J. DAWSON, supra note 12, at 107-08; Schiller, supra note 6, at 25 & 32.
107 See Elton, supra note 32, at 78.
1o See H. JOLOWICZ & B. NICHOLAS, supra note 77, at 478-598.
109 See generally B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 81-85.
110 "Sed et quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem, cum lege regia, quae de
imperio eius lata est, populus ei et in eum omne suum imperium et potestatem
concessit." INSTITUTES 1.2.6, translated in THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (5th ed. J.
Moyle trans. 1913) ("Again, what the Emperor determines has the force of a statute,
the people having conferred on him all their authority and power by the lex regia,
which was passed concerning his office and authority."). The passage was originally
from the DIGEST 1.4.1.
The Roman state gave power not to the person, but to the office. The "Emperor or
his images" could wield the power absolutely, but only "for the interest of all and in
the name of all." E. MEYNIAL, THE LEGACY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 363-99 (1932);
see 2 H. BRACTON, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 305-06 (S.E. Thorne ed.
& trans. 1968) (1st ed. London 1569) (written c. 1220-1257).
VACARIUS, LIBER PAUPERUM (written c. 1149), the first English civilian text,
omitted the quod principi placuit maxim and played down its sister maxim, princeps
legibus solutus (DIGEST 1.3.31). Vacarius emphasized in his gloss that "the emperor
is subject to the laws, though it is true that no one can coerce him, so his submission
is voluntary." de Zuleuta, Introduction to THE LIBER PAUPERUM OF VACARIUS
lxxiv (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 44, F. de Zuleuta ed. & trans. 1927).
"l See generally Jolowicz, Political Implications of Roman Law, 22 TUL. L.
REV. 62-81 (1947).
112 H. NENNER, By COLOUR OF LAW 32-83 (1977). Bracton, who was strongly
influenced by Roman legal thought, has been said to have postulated that "the ruler
had a duty to obey the law but.., the fulfillment of the duty could be ensured only by
his will to adhere to its provisions, not by legal coercion." Tierney, Bracton on
Government, 38 SPFCULUM 295, 301 (1963); see D. HANSON, FROM KINGDOM TO
COMMONWEALTH 110-11 (1970); E. MEYNIAL, supra note 110, at 382-87.
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archy served by the common lawyers.II 3 Yet, other civilians, such as Isaac
Dorislaus, Walter Walker, Calibute Downing, and John Godolphin, were
fervent Parliamentarians, 1 4 and some later civilians, such as John Ayliffe,
were loyal Whigs.' 1
5
The vice most civilians would have feared was ministerial weakness and
ineffectiveness, for it could make a mockery of any "scientific" improve-
ments in the law. From the civilian viewpoint, arguments for decentralized
private power could too often masquerade as appeals for "freedom." Prog-
ress to the civilians demanded faith in human nature and the human intellect.
The enlightment of humanist learning showed the way. The object was a
strong central system that would give every citizen "his due," efficiently
and certainly. This, to some civilians' minds, was the precondition of real
freedom. 1 6
6. Bartolism
The English civilians were much aware of continental "advances" in
political theory, culminating in the writing of Jean Bodin. 1 7 The laiciza-
tion' 1 8 of English and French society was important in promoting the civilian
cause over that of the canonists. The rise of the national state and the
II3 B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 196-202; Jolowicz, Some English Civilians, 2
CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 139, 141-42 (1949). Approximately 83 civilians in Levack's
study survived to witness the Civil War. Of those, Levack has determined that 19
were active Royalists and three active Parliamentarians. Twenty-one were passive
Royalists, and 19 passive Parliamentarians. Some had distinguished careers under
the Commonwealth. In 1656, 18 active civilians remained. B. LEVACK, supra note 14,
at 196-99.
114 Id. at 196 (Dorislaus was a regicide; Walker was an advocate for the Parliamen-
tal fleet; Downing was a chaplain in Essex's army); I THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 794 (1975) (Godolphin was appointed Judge
of the Admiralty during the Commonwealth).
115 12 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 20, at 610-11 (Ayliffe was an "ardent Whig").
116 See B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 97-109.
117 See J. BODIN, THE SIX BOOKES OF THE COMMONWEALE (K. McRae ed. 1962
of R. Knowles translation London 1606) (1st ed. Paris 1576). Bodin's influence was
particularly strong on the leading English civilian theorist, Alberico Gentili. See A.
GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES 83, 156 (second volume of Carnegie En-
dowment edition) (J. Scott ed., C. Lang trans. 1924) (translation of edition published
in Hanover 1594) (lst ed. London 1585) [hereinafter cited as DE LEGATIONIBUS] (See
note 266 infra for bibliographical information). The first English translation of Bo-
din's Republique was published in the critical year of 1606, just before Ridley's major
defense of the civilian cause, A View of the Civile and Ecclesiasticall Law. T.
RIDLEY, supra note 84; see McRae, Introduction to J. BODIN, supra, at A38-A67.
118 "Laicization may be defined as the development of a society in which primary
allegiance is given to lay governments .... When society has laicized leadership has
passed from the church to the state." Strayer, The Laicization of French and English
Society in the Thirteenth Century, in CHANGE IN MEDIEVAL SOCIETY, EUROPE
NORTH OF THE ALPS 1050-1500, at 103 (S. Thrupp ed. 1964).
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Reformation did not diminish the idealism or the zeal of the civil lawyers,
and continental writers quickly found converts among the English civilians.
Bodin was especially popular, 1 9 possibly because his view of an effective,
rationalist, central state closely coincided with civilian convictions and
self-interest.
The practical need for English civilians to accommodate themselves to
what was, in their view, a parochial and backward legal system was aided,
ironically, by developments in Italy in the study of Roman law, particularly
the spread of the so-called "Bartolist School." Bartolism was a reaction to
the results of early civilian scholarship. The early civilians had regarded the
Byzantine text of the Corpus Juris Civilis with awe. They limited themselves
to the glossing of its passages-hence they were called "glossators." 120 Like
early biblical students, the glossators considered it their duty to "explain
and expound" the text, not to suggest that the text could be revised, or even
worse, that the text was imperfect. As Dawson has observed, however,
"[t]he intellectual environment in which the glossator worked was greatly
altered by the effects of his own teaching."' 121 The success of their students
in attaining positions of power, particularly in Italy, ensured a "reception"
of Roman law there, at least in part. Following this "reception," a new
breed of scholars led by Bartolo di Sassoferrato (Bartolus) 122 addressed
themselves to the inherent challenges of applying an ancient law to practical,
contemporary problems. The Bartolists began openly to use the Corpus
Juris as an instrument for organizing a modern system of Italian law.
123
i19 See B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 97-98. In particular, "Gentili's reliance upon
and imitation of Bodin was strong .... " Id. at 97. See also J. GOUGH, FUN-
DAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 53-54 (1935); G. VAN DER
MOLEN, ALBERiCO GENTILI AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 239
(1938); McRae, supra note 117, at A38-A52.
120 See A. BERGER, supra note 75, at 483; J. DAWSON, supra note 12, at 124-34; P.
VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW, supra note 14, at 43-69.
121 J. DAWSON, supra note 12, at 125.
122 Bartolus (1314-1357) was, in turn, professor of civil law at Bologna, Pisa, and
Perugia. See generally C. WOOLF, BARTOLUS OF SASSOFERRATO (1913).
123 "[Bartolus'] preoccupation was-What groups of relationships fall under a
given rule of law?' " C. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (1965)
(quoting WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2d ed. 1950)). Bartolus' follow-
ers applied this analysis to determine the proper sphere of application for legal rules,
particularly in statutory interpretation and in conflict of laws doctrine. See J. BEALE,
BARTOLUS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1938). The Bartolist ideas were particularly
developed by the "neo-Bartolists" of France, led by Dumoulin (1508-1566),
d'Argentu6 (1519-1590), and Gui Coquylle (1523-1603). See generally J. JONES, supra
note 83, at 15-17; J.A.C. SMITH, supra note 42, at 81-82; Hazeltine, supra note 42, at
xv; Hazeltine, supra note 14, at 139-71. The maxim of "Nemojurista si non Bar-
tolista [No jurists but they are Bartolists.1," expressed "the professional domination
of the Post-Glossatorical school even in the sixteenth century." Hazeltine, supra
note 42, at xxv. As Clarence Smith puts it, "Not everyone agreed with all [Bartolus]
said, but he could be called their spiritual domicile in the sense that it was from him
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In the attempt to organize current Italian law according to the Corpus
Juris, the Bartolists developed important attitudes toward customary law.
Some glossators had assumed that the Corpus Juris was still law in medieval
Italy. 1 24 But obviously it was inconsistent with the customary law of many
Italian principalities. Which should prevail? After considerable intellectual
agony, it became accepted that, when there was no conflict between the
Corpus Juris and custom, the custom could take on the validity of law,
particularly when not prohibited by the state. 2 5 Even when there was a
possibility of conflict, "special custom" could be established by common
consent of the users. 126 The Bartolists thus opened the way to compromise
with customary legal systems and greatly increased the attraction of
"applied" Roman law. In England, the writings of the Bartolists were found
in major libraries, and were obviously studied.2 7 Jean Bodin himself was an
they set out on their journey, and to him at the end of the day that they returned."
J.A.C. SMITH, supra note 42, at 82.
124 J. DAWSON, supra note 12, at 124; see authorities cited in note 120 supra.
125 That custom, even unreasonable custom, could be a source of law was recog-
nized by the Romans: "Non omnium quae a majoribus nostris constituta sunt ratio
reddipotest [A reason cannot be given for all the laws that have been established by
our ancestors]." DIGEST 1.3.20. There were rules established by ancient customs
'like a tacit agreement of citizens." DIGEST 1.3.35. "The unwritten law is that which
usage has approved: for ancient customs, when approved by consent of those who
follow them, are like statute." INSTITUTES 1.2.9. As Dawson points out, the problem
to the glossators was acute when the Corpus Juris conflicted directly with the
national custom, particularly since the Corpus Juris contained other statements,
usually Byzantine, which were less enthusiastic about custom. J. DAWSON, supra
note 12, at 128-29; see CODE 8.32.2 (Rescript Constantine) ("The authority of custom
and ancient usage is not contemptible but it will not carry weight so far as to
overcome either reason or statute."). Bartolism was one response to this conflict.
Somewhat similarly, a most interesting aspect of Bartolus line of inquiry, al least
from the viewpoint of commercial law, was the conceptual flexibility it permitted.
For example, Bartolus saw no harm in consulting merchants about mercantile cus-
tom before deciding the proper scope of a particular legal rule in a commercial case.
In this respect, he was "like Lord Mansfield after him." J. JONES, supra note 83, at
16.
126 "The general result of this process was that lawyers on the continent applied a
mixed legal system whose components were on the one hand local statutes and
customs and on the other hand the lawbooks of Justinian and the Canon Law."
Coing, The Roman Law as lus Commune on the Continent, 89 LAW Q. REV. 505,
514 (1973). Vacarius equated interpretations by custom of statutory language with
interpretation by the emperor himself, with the exception that, in the event of a direct
conflict, an imperial statute cannot be abrogated by popular comment as expressed in
custom. See de Zuleuta, supra note 110, at lxiii, lxxvi.
127 It is hard to determine the contents of these libraries. See G. ELTON, supra
note 101, at 194-95. Nevertheless, this fact seems clear from the limited evidence.
See Ker, supra note 41, at 47-48. It is also becoming clear that, to the extent that the
contents of common lawyers' libraries can be determined, there were many continen-
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acknowledged Bartolist, 12 8 as were such English civilians as the great Al-
berico Gentili, Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford, and his eccentric
disciple William Fulbecke. 129
It is most striking that these English civilians, led by the great Gentili,
rejected the attempts by the Frenchman Cujas 130 and the new continental
"humanist" movement to return to the study of the "pure" classical Roman
texts. Cujas and his colleagues had brilliantly introduced modern linguistics
and techniques of textual criticism to isolate and reject "interpolations" and
impurities in the Byzantine compilations. This permitted, for the first time, a
knowledge of what the classical Romans' texts actually said."' It was a
great achievement of the European renaissance. Yet, most English civilians
stoutly resisted this movement. For Gentili and his English civilian follow-
ers, the civilian cause in England was best served by Bartolism. The time
was hardly right for them to retreat to the ivory tower of the Corpus Juris. 132
Their struggle was to reconcile civilian enlightenment with the growing
challenge of the common law. The Bartolist dialectic, a constructive
dialogue between customary law and Roman legal science, provided a way.
tal and/or English civilian books. See, e.g., A CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF SIR
EDWARD COKE 38-41 (W. Hassall ed. 1950); Ives, A Lawyer's Library in 1500, 85
LAW Q. REV. 104, 107 (1969).
128 See Hazeltine, supra note 42, at xxv-xxvi.
129 See text accompanying notes 265 (Gentili) & 339 (Fulbecke) infra.
130 Jacques Cujas (1522-90), professor of civil law at various times at Cahors,
Bourges, Valence, and Turin, is said to have "secured the triumph of the historical
humanist school of jurists over the glossators and commentators." D. WALKER, THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 324-25 (1980). As to Cujas' relationship to Gentili, see
Nys, supra note 16, at 20a.
131 See generally D. KELLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN HISTORICAL SCHOL-
ARSHIP (1970); Kelley, Bud and the First Historical School of Law, 72 AM. HIST.
REV. 816 (1967); Jolowicz, Utility and Elegance in Civil Law Studies, 65 LAW Q.
REV. 322-36 (1949). The new "humanist" school was known as the mos gallicus
(French style) to distinguish it from the continuing influence of the Bartolists, the
mos Italicus (Italian style). The mos gallicus had the questionable distinction of
introducing pure invective into pure scholarship. "Here lively contempt [for con-
temporary rivals] was fashionable ...... J.A.C. SMITH, supra note 42, at 110.
132 See E. MEYNIAL, supra note 110, at 380 passim. As Meynial astutely ob-
served,
It is easy to understand the holy zeal with which the humanists set about the
destruction of this sacrilege, and the reknown achieved by those (of whom, in
France, Cujas is the chief) who made it their life's work to restore Roman
compilations to their original purity. But from our present point of view the
important fact is that the humanists in their single-minded restoration of the old
Roman Law in its classical framework have finally banished it from the present
to the everlasting calm of the past. They saved it from the distortion of everyday
life and practice; but they made of it for the future no more than a frigid work of
art . . . . The humanists, one might almost say, ended the popular destiny of
Roman Law in the West.
Id. at 380.
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It was at this fundamental juncture between the English civilians and the
classical civilian scholars of the continent that the English civilians began to
develop their own indigenous literature.
III. THE ENGLISH CIVILIAN WRITERS (1523-1607)
A. The Importance of the English Civilian Literature
The English civilian writers of the sixteenth and early seventeenth cen-
turies have been inadequately appreciated. It is not an exaggeration to say
that they represented the most important manifestations of both the Reforma-
tion and the renaissance in contemporary English legal culture. The ultimate
domination of English common lawyers has sanctified Littleton, Perkins,
Fortescue, Fitzherbert, Pulton, and the other early common law writers. 3
But compared with the civilian literature, the works of the common lawyers
were unadventurous, technical, and, above all, limited conceptually. If it
were not for the colossal presence of Edward Coke, the disparity between
the common lawyers and civilians would be only too clear.
Civilian writing during this period was a forceful attempt to reconcile and
synthesize English national law with the cosmopolitan legal science of
Europe. That this attempt ultimately failed was not due to its merits as legal
thought, but to the powerful common law profession and to English political
forces largely outside the civilian sphere of influence.
As noted before, the English civilians had a complete jurisprudential
worldview. Their later characterization as narrow "specialists" in mari-
time, probate, and ecclesiastical matters was symptomatic of their fail-
ure to achieve any intellectual leadership in English jurisprudence. Yet, in
earlier years-particularly after the Royal Injunctions and Commisioner's
Visitations Act of 15351 34-the civilians' august positions in the universities,
together with their belief in the "primacy of learned men" inspired by their
limited understanding of the nature of the Roman legal system,1 35 had
133 See, e.g., T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 7, at 277-84; P. WINFIELD, THE
CHIEF SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 302-30 (1925).
'34 Canon law instruction in the English universities ceased with the commission-
ers' Visitation and Royal Injunction Act, 1535, 37 Hen. 8, c. 17, which opened all
offices in the ecclesiastical courts to doctors of civil law. See generally 1 J. MUL-
LINGER, HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 630-35 (1911); Senior, The
Advocates, supra note 14, at 503.
135 By emphasizing the role of the jurists, Justinian's Corpus Juris obscured the
reality of the Roman judicial process, which, as Dawson has demonstrated, also
relied a great deal on the judex-the law judge-and the praetor-the elected
magistrate-who were "informed and responsible laymen," not jurists. J. DAWSON,
supra note 12, at 107. But the jurists gave the system doctrinal cohesion, and it was
their writing that survived. The result gave the medieval civilians a picture of the
judicial function in Rome which over-emphasized the importance of the jurists and
made the "primacy of the learned men" part of civilian faith to this day. Id. at 138-47.
See also H. DEVRIES, CIVIL LAW AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAWYER 64-67 (1976)
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naturally led them to seek such a leadership role in England. It was this
intellectual ambition that apparently threatened common lawyers such as
Coke, 136 despite the civilians' relatively confined professional work and
limited political influence. 137 Because the civilians constituted a small
minority of all English lawyers, their attempts to achieve this intellectual
leadership were fundamentally, although not exclusively, literary. 38 This
literary effort was not only the most interesting aspect of the English civil-
ians, but also, as I hope to demonstrate in this Article and the following
Articles in this series, the most persistent.
It is helpful, if not fully accurate, to regard this critical production of legal
literature as occurring in three distinct stages. 139 This Article will discuss the
first of these stages. This stage was marked by exciting but crude attempts at
comparative law, and by brave attempts to synthesize civil law, canon law,
and "common" national law. Under the influence of Christopher St. Ger-
man, Alberico Gentili, William Fulbecke, and John Cowell, English civilians
were outgoing and generous in their attitude toward the common law. These
English "Bartolists" went substantially beyond the continental civilian writ-
ers in their efforts to compromise with the "national" English common
law. 140 The English Bartolists also tried to open a dialogue with the common
(outlining the authoritative role of the French academic jurists in modern French
legal development and contending that this French emphasis on juristic elites, which
contrasts so strongly with American practice, led in France to "a higher degree of
abstraction, less procedural analysis, and a strong consciousness of the interrelation-
ship of the legal system as a whole").
'36 See notes 439-62 and accompanying text infra.
137 By 1607, Ridley would describe the financial condition of young civilians as
"beggary." T. RIDLEY, supra note 84, at 140. Their numbers were always a small
fraction of the total of common lawyers. See notes 66-67 supra. See also 1
W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 606 (rev. 7th ed. 1956); Jolowicz,
supra note 113, at 140.
138 The Engl ish civilians had little choice. There was a lack of significant published
reports in the civilian courts until a later period. There were relatively few civilians in
England, and these few were isolated in universities and Doctors' Commons. Liter-
ary influence was the best available means for wide influence. Nevertheless, direct
civilian influence-through their activities in governmental agencies, as Masters in
Chancery, as diplomats, or as commissioners and advisors to the Privy Council-
was not negligible. It would certainly reward future study. For examples of what
remains of early civilian court records, see PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, GUIDE TO THE
CONTENTS OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE 148 (Requests), 156-62 (Admiralty),
163-64 (High Court of Delegates) (1963); 1 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LIST OF AD-
MIRALTY RECORDS (PRO List & Index No. 18, 1904); 1 PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,
LIST OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURT OF REQUESTS (PRO List & Index No. 21,
1906).
139 For other variations on this theme, see 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 3-25 (3d ed. 1945); B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 124-50; E. Nys,
supra note 14, at 49-71; W. SENIOR, supra note 14, at 84-112.
140 As to the continental civilian writers, see notes 117-31 and accompanying text
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lawyers, and had some limited initial success, particularly with Francis
Bacon and his followers.'
4 1
B. The First Advocates: The Early Civilian Writers
The important early civilian writers were, in chronological order, Christ-
opher St. German (1457-1539), the pioneer of comparative legal writing; Sir
Thomas Smith (1513-1571), the first Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cam-
bridge; Alberico Gentili (1552-1608), Regius Professor of Civil Law at Ox-
ford; William Fulbecke (1560-1603), Gentili's student at Oxford; and John
Cowell (1554-1611), also a Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge. The
last three, Gentili, Fulbecke, and Cowell, worked at the same time and
knew each other.
St. German was the spiritual "grandfather" of the group. His seminal
work, Dialogues between a Doctor of Divinity and a Student of the Com-
mon Law,' 4 1 was the first effort by any Englishman for over two hundred
years to "integrate the doctrines of the common law either with those of the
academic learned laws or with political and moral theory." 43 It was also the
first work to analyze the principles of equity as applied by the Chancellor
and, arguably, the first serious English effort to undertake comparative legal
analysis.' 44 St. German was a common lawyer and a member of Inner
Temple,' 45 but his writing and vision transcended professional demarca-
tions. As will be seen, he had a clear impact on all the following civilian
writers, both in style and substance.' 46
Sir Thomas Smith, on the other hand, was a "pure" civilian academic and
supra. Some English civilians, most notably Sir Thomas Smith, emulated the "pure"
classical humanists rather than the Bartolists. See note 254 and accompanying text
infra.
141 See note 16 supra.
142 C. ST. GERMAN, DIALOGUES BETWEEN A DOCTOR OF DIVINITY AND A
STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAW (London 1523 (Dialogue I), 1530 (Dialogue II)).
143 Donahue, Book Review, 47 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIIEDENIS 182, 183
(1979) (reviewing C. ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT).
144 Id. at 183-86; see J. BARTON, ROMAN LAW IN ENGLAND 63 (Ius Romanum
Medii Aevi pars V. 13a 1971).
145 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
1841 (1975).
146 See id. St. German's work on equity could be described in Hill's terms as
"proto-civilian" (i.e., a precursor of later English civilian work). See Hill, supra note
54, at xxxii. Of the other notable early civilian writers, Fulbecke and Gentili were
also members of an Inn of Court, Gray's Inn. Gentili, however, was definitely a
doctor of civil law (University of Perugia), I THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 765 (1975), and Fulbecke " 'tis said, had the
degree of doctor of civil law conferred on him elsewhere [from Oxford]" but "at
what place, or by whom, I [Wood] cannot yet find," id. at 743.
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a notable diplomat. His great book, De Republica Anglorum, 147 contrasts
the English and French legal systems. Smith pioneered the English compara-
tive study of foreign legal institutions, just as St. German had pioneered the
comparative study of legal doctrine. 148 Smith also developed direct compari-
sons between English and Roman legal institutions. 149
Gentili, Fulbecke, and Cowell formed a "second generation" of civilian
writers. They all were influenced by St. German's and Smith's initial efforts
in comparative legal analysis.15 0 Gentili, the senior member of the group,
was a religious refugee from Italy and a committed Bartolist.15 Not only did
he write the first English treatise on public international law, De lure
Belli, 152 but as Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford he was in a position
to advocate the study and adaptation of Roman legal principles, particularly
in the area of international law. 153 His student and avid follower, Fulbecke,
actually attempted to relate the basic principles of the civil law, the canon
law, and the common law in one massive work, A Parallele or Conference of
the Civil Law, the Canon Law, and the Common Law of this Realme of
England.54 Cowell, the last of this generation, shared the Bartolist sym-
pathies of Gentili and Fulbecke and strove to relate civilian principles and
techniques to the common law. His efforts culminated in the famous law
dictionary, The Interpreter, 155 which, in defining English legal terms, drew
heavily on civilian doctrines. But, unlike the others, Cowell was brought by
his efforts directly into the eye of the gathering political storm between the
parliament and the Stuart monarchy. The Interpreter was publicly burned,
and Cowell died a year later, in 1611.156
Thus, what had begun with St. German's and Smith's pioneering efforts in
147 T. SMITH, Dr REPUBLICA ANGLORUM (London 1583).
148 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1950
(1975).
141 See, e.g., T. SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 71 (L. Alston ed. 1906) (1st
ed. London 1583) (comparisons between English "Chauncellor" and Roman
"Praetor").
150 See notes 266-73 & 319 and accompanying text infra.
'5' 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 52.
152 A. GENTILI, DE lURE BELLI LIBRI TRES (London 1588-89).
'51 See A. GENTILI, HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS LIBRI Duo 101-02 (second vol-
ume of Carnegie Endowment edition) (F. Abbott trans. 1921) (translation of 2d ed.
Amsterdam 1661) (1st ed. Hanover 1613) [hereinafter cited as ADVOCATIO His-
PANICA] (See note 268 infra for bibliographical information).
151 1 & 2 W. FULBECKE, A PARALLELE OR CONFERENCE OF THE CIVIL LAW, THE
CANON LAW AND THE COMMON LAW OF THIS REALME OF ENGLAND (London
1602).
'55 J. COWELL, THE INTERPRETER OR BOOKE CONTAINING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
WORDS (Cambridge 1607) [hereinafter cited as THE INTERPRETERI.
156 J. COWLEY, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ABRIDGEMENTS, DIGESTS, DICTIONARIES
AND INDEXES OF ENGLISH LAW TO THE YEAR 1800, at lxxxvi (1932); 1 TtuE COM-
PACT EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 453 (1975).
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comparative legal study, soon matured with the efforts of Gentili, Fulbecke,
and Cowell into a serious attempt to introduce the common law to foreign
legal science and to relate English national law to the cosmopolitan jurispru-
dence of Europe. That these early civilian efforts would eventually be swept
up in the English civil war'5 7 was surely a great loss.
1. The Doctor and Student: Christopher St. German (1457-1539)
St. German was the beginning. Of course, it could be argued that there
were attempts to reconcile English common law with both the canonical and
civilian intellectual tradition long before he wrote:' 5 8 the medieval treatises
Glanvill, 159 Bracton, 160 and Vacarius' Liber Pauperum 161 may be examples
of such attempts, 62 and there are also arguable attempts by later English
canonist writers. 163 But the first great English writer to attempt to bridge the
gap between disparate legal ideologies, at least in modern times, was Chris-
topher St. German.'
64
St. German's major book was the Dialogues Between a Doctor of Divinity
157 See notes 422-34 and accompanying text infra.
158 See J. BARTON, supra note 144, at 4-28; E. MEYNIAL, supra note 110, at
363-99; J.A.C. SMITH, supra note 42, at 81; R. VAN CAENEGEM, ROYAL WRITS IN
ENGLAND FROM THE CONQUEST TO GLANVILL 360-90 (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 77,
1959).
159 THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND
CUSTOMARILY CALLED GLANVILL (G. Hall ed. & trans. 1965) (1st ed. London 1554)
(written c. 1187-89) [hereinafter cited as GLANVILL].
160 H. BRACTON, supra note 110.
161 VACARIUS, THE LIBFR PAUPERUM OF VACARIUS (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 44,
F. de Zuleuta ed. & trans. 1927) (written c. 1149).
162 See, e.g., GLANVILL, supra note 159, at xxxvi-xl; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAIT-
LAND, supra note 96, at 120; P. VINOGRADOFF, ROMAN LAW, supra note 14, at 84;
Donahue, supra note 6, at 168; de Zuleuta, supra note 110, at xv-xvii. See also
Mitchell, supra note 73.
163 See generally F. MAITLAND, ROMAN CANON LAW, supra note 14, at 1-30;
E. G. MOORE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH CANON LAW 1-7 (1967); B. TIERNEY,
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCILIAR THEORY (1955); Berman, The Religious Founda-
tion of Western Law, 24 CATH. U.L. REV. 490 (1975); Jones, Relations of the Two
Jurisdictions: Conflict and Cooperation in England During the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Centuries, in 7 STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE HISTORY 77 (W.
Bosky ed. 1970); Keeton, The Canon Law and Its Influence, 19 Loy. L. REV. 1
(1972-73).
164 St. German was a man of immense learning. He was a member of Inner
Temple, but also sat as a Master of Requests in 1528, a position often held by
civilians. See J. BARTON, supra note 144, at 63; Donahue, supra note 143, at 183-86;
Thorne, St. German's Doctor and Student, in 10 TRANSACTIONS OF THE BIBLIO-
GRAPHICAL SOCIETY 421 (2d ser. 1930). But see Hogrefe, The Life of Christopher St.
German, 13 REV. ENG. STUD. 398, 402 (1937) (St. German may have belonged to
Middle Temple).
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and a Student of the Common Law. 165 The book is structured around a
"friendly" debate between a "Doctor of Divinity," the possessor of a
university training in canon law, theology, and Latin, and a "Student in the
Lawes of England," an English common lawyer fluent in Law French and
Year Book law. Thus, St. German emphasized how, both literally and
symbolically, the universities and the common lawyers were speaking dif-
ferent languages. Indeed, the Doctor cannot even understand the Student's
professional language, being "no thynge experte" in the "frenche tonge.' 1
66
St. German's "dialogue" format was designed to show how communication
could begin and how mutually valuable it could be.
This "language" symbolism makes it all the more striking that the Doctor
and Student was one of the first important law treatises to be printed in
English. 167 Even more remarkably, parts of the book may originally have
been written in Law French, and the first printing of the First Dialogue, in
1523, was in Latin. 1 68 By 1530 a second section, the Second Dialogue, was
printed in English, and by 1532 both sections were reprinted in English in a
new version. 169 Not only the book's dialogue format, but the key choice of
165 The definitive modern edition is C. ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT
(Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 91, T. Plucknett & J. Barton eds. 1974) (1st eds. London
1523 (Dialogue 1), 1530 (Dialogue II)). This edition translates all portions of the first
Latin version-the 1523 printing of the First Dialogue-and collates the texts of the
first three editions. Doctor and Student enjoyed over thirty printings. Early editions
followed the 1523 printing in 1528 (2 editions), 1530, 1531 (3 editions), 1532 (2
editions), 1554, 1556, 1569, 1580, 1593, 1598, 1604, 1607, 1613, 1638, 1660, 1668,
1671, 1673, 1687, 1709, 1721, 1740, 1751, 1815, and 1878. There have been several
modern facsimiles in addition to the 1974 Selden Society edition. J. BEALE, A
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EARLY ENGLISH LAW BOOKS 169-72 (1926 & Supp. 1943); P.
WINFIELD, supra note 133, at 321-24; Barton, Introduction to C. ST. GERMAN,
supra, at lxix-lxxvi.
166 A Doctoure of Dyvynytie that was of great acquayntannce and famylyarytie
with a student in the lawes of Englande sayde thus unto him I have had great
desyre of longe tyme to knowe whereupon the lawe of Englande is grounded but
because moche part of the lawe of Englande is wryten in the frenche tonge.
Theretore I can not through myne own studye atteygne to the knowledge
thereof: for in that tonge I am no thynge experte.
C. ST. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 7.
167 The first English edition of Doctor and Student, Beale No. T463, was printed
in 1531. Barton, supra note 165, at lxx-lxxi. The first Littleton's Tenures in English,
Beale No. T39, was undated, but was probably printed in 1532. It was printed by
Robert Redman in London. See J. BEALE, supra note 165, at 115, 300.
168 Plucknett translated the Prologue to indicate that the "larger part [of Doctor
and Student] was written in French." C. ST. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 3. Barton,
with justification, points out that St. German could simply be saying that the "larger
part" of the grounds of the laws of England were written in French, which is
consistent with the Doctor's remark to that effect in The Introduccyon. Barton,
supra note 165, at xviii-xx; see C. ST. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 7, quoted in note
166 supra. There is no compelling evidence of an earlier French version.
169 Barton, supra note 165, at lix-lxxvi. Thorne has argued that the first English
[Vol. 61: 1
EARLY ENGLISH CIVILIAN WRITERS
English for the Second Dialogue's printing, must be regarded as symbolic.
English was the language that English canonists, civilians, and common
lawyers had in common. It was also the language they shared with the
concerned English layman. Doctor and Student could bring all these groups
together, at least for the purpose of reasoned discourse.
Doctor and Student was of enormous importance. It appeared just before
the secularization of the Chancery by Henry VIII, and emphasized and
preserved those rules of equity derived from canon law in a format readily
understandable by common lawyers and all learned men. In so doing, it laid
the foundation for English equity jurisprudence. 17 0
Although St. German was technically a common lawyer, his work was
influenced by civilian ideas both through and apart from the obvious
canonist influences. 7 ' St. German may also have been influenced by the
continental Bartolists, who tested the rules of the secular civil law with cases
of'"conscience."' 7 2 He attempted to do the same, with the English common
law as the applicable "secular" law.173 The result was a pioneer excursion
into comparative law and a brilliant attempt to analyze the legitimate sources
of English law.
St. German was particularly concerned with those sources of English law
apart from the common law. Thus the Student requested that the Doctor
describe those laws which were not the "lawe of England" but that "per-
tayne most," and the Doctor listed in response "the lawe eternall," the
"lawe of nature [of reasonable creatures]," the "lawe of reason," the "lawe
of god," and the "lawe of man."'
174
The "lawe eternall" was defined by St. German as the "reason of gov-
ernment in the supreme governor [God]"-and "necessarily all reasons of
government in inferior governors must be derived from the reason of the
version of the First Dialogue was not written by St. German, and the second English
revision of the First Dialogue was St. German's effort to revise the earlier work. See
Thorne, supra note 164, at 421. Barton, however, disagrees. Barton, supra note 165,
at xvii.
170 See Donahue, supra note 143, at 183-88.
171 Proving the civilian influence on St. German, beyond the obvious jurispruden-
tial parallels, would be a difficult task. The main cause of this difficulty is St.
German's omission of most citations of authority. One explanation for this peculiar
omission might be that citations "would puzzle rather than enlighten the intelligent
non-lawyer." Barton, supra note 165, at xxi. Another explanation might be that St.
German, like Francis Bacon and later English legal writers under the influence of the
"new learning," revolted against the slavish recitation of authority in legal writing:
either the ideas were right on their own merits, as seen by natural reason, or they
were defective, and then no amount of "authority" could save them. See note 16
supra; cf. Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38, 40-41 (1936) (urging
a similar "revolution" in the twentieth century).
172 Barton, supra note 165, at xx-xxxix.
173 See generally id. at xx; Thorne, supra note 164, at 421.
174 C. ST. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 7.
1981]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
supreme governor." '17 5 The problem was, as the Student pointed out, that
no man can attain this "supreme eternal reason."' 176 The best a man's
intelligence could comprehend was "the lawe of reason." 177 The "lawe of
reason" was the "lawe of nature of creatures reasonable" (i.e., man). 178 It
was distinguished from "the law of nature," which included all animals, and
included the laws of physics and biology.179 This same distinction had been
drawn by the Roman jurists, such as Ulpian, between ius naturale and ius
gentium in the philosophical sense: ius naturale included the basic
"laws" of physics and biology, e.g., the universal "law of gravity," whereas
ius gentium represented the universal law recognized by men of reason, e.g.,
principles of universal justice. 8 s0 Like the Roman ius gentium, St. German's
"lawe of nature of reasonable creatures" was common to all men. Thus, the
Doctor stated that "this law ought to be kept as well among Jewes and
gentyles as among crysten men,"'' and the Student agreed, stating that
"the lawe of reason is wryten in the herte of every man.'
1 8 2
But because man had original sin and "evyll customes," the law of reason
was, in St. German's view, inadequate. 83 Thus there was a need for two
other kinds of law: the "lawe of god" and the "lawe of man." The "lawe of
god" could manifest itself in actual revelation by God, as through the
"Gospels delivered by Christ," 184 or in those laws that "are only deduced
as self evident consequences from the foregoing."' 18 The 'decisions of the
Church" could also be a source of the "lawe of god," 8 6 but St. German was
careful to point out that not all the canon law of the church was the "lawe
of god": "[A]II the lawes Cannon be not the lawes of God. For many of
them be made only for polytycall rewle and conversacyon of the people and
should be reckoned as human law rather than deviine."'187 The "lawe of
man"--also referred to as "human law" or "the lawe posityve"' 8 8 -was
"deryvyed by reason as a thinge whiche is necessaryly & probably folowy-
ing the lawe of reason & of the lawe of god, for the due end of human
nature."'18 9 Thus the "positive" law would include the national customary
17I ld. at 11.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 11, 13.
179 Id. at 15.
's0 See notes 74-78 supra.
181 C. ST. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 13.
182 Id. at 15.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 23.
185 Id.
186 Id. (italicized words omitted in the earlier English version).
187 Id. (italicized words omitted in the earlier English version).
188 Id. at 27.
189 Id. (italicized words omitted in the earlier English version).
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and statutory law. 190 Different nations could have different "positive" laws,
but they would still have to be tested by the universal laws of reason and
God which, by definition, were unchanging.
191
St. German then stated, through the Student, what constituted the
"groundes of the lawe of Englande." The first was the same "lawe of
reason" that the Doctor had given as his second kind of law, 92 the equiva-
lent of the Roman concept of ius gentium. The next was the "lawe of god,"
the Doctor's third kind of law. 193 The final grounds of English law were
aspects of the "lawe of man," in particular the "general customs" of the
realm (i.e., the common law)
used through all the realm:-which have been acceptyed and approvyd
by our soveraygne lorde the kynge and his progenytours and all theyr
subgettes. And bycause the sayd customs be neyther agaynst the lawes
of god nor the lawe of reason [they] have ben alwaye taken to be good
and necessarye for the common welth of all the realme.
194
The Student illustrated this "lawe of man" by the example of the ancient
courts of the fairs and traveling merchants, the courts "Pypowdres," whose
authority was largely a question of unwritten custom.19 Other examples of
the "lawe of man" in English law were particular customs and the stat-
utes. 1
96
The critical question, of course, was what happened when an aspect of the
secular "lawe of man" conflicted with the "lawe of god" or with the "lawe
of reason." This question took St. German into his famous discussion of
"What is Equytie," in which he had the Doctor make the famous statement
that
wherfore it apperyth that yf any lawe were made by man without any
suche excepcyon [of equity] expressyd or implyed it were manyfestly
unresonable & were not to be sufferyd for suche cases myght come that
he that wolde observe that lawe shuld breke both the law of god/ and the
laws of reason. 197
190 Id. at 29.
191 Id. at 27.
192 Id. at 31.
193 Id. at 39-40.
194 Id. at 45-47.
195 Id. at 47.
196 Id. at 57-75. St. German shared a belief with Fortescue that certain customary
maxims of English law were principia, "these being certain universals called
maxims, which are not demonstrable by reason." Id. at 67-71; Simpson, The Com-
mon Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 77-93 (2d ser.
A. Simpson ed. 1973). This Aristotelian notion was hardly new to English jurists.
See 2 FLETA 2 (Selden Soc'y Pub. No. 72, H. Richardson & G. Sayles eds. & trans.
1955) (1st ed. London 1647) (written c. 1290); see GLANVILL, supra note 159, at 2.
197 C. ST. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 97.
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St. German's position was that the English national law, whether based on
statute or on general custom, must, at least in special cases, be tested against
reason and the law of God. This would make English law by necessity an
open system. Later English civilian writers would be encouraged by this
spirit of the Doctor and Student to compare the English law with the
cosmopolitan legal culture of the Church and the continent. 198 Their pur-
pose, naturally, would be to ascertain what aspects of foreign legal culture
could be applied in England to make English law more reasonable and thus
more legitimate.
St. German also pointed to other legal cultures by mentioning the ius
gentium. The way he chose to use the term, however, was important. St.
German did not adopt the broad ratio naturalis usage of the Roman jurists
Ulpian and Gaius, which equated ius gentium with ratio naturalis, "natural
reason"; this usage would be equivalent to St. German's "lawe of rea-
son."' 199 Instead, St. German used the term "ius gentium" in a narrow
sense similar to the civilian idea of aequitas mercatoria, the international
customary law of traders' contracts, debts, and obligations. 20 0 For example,
the Student stated that contract law was related to the ius gentium: "after
the law of proprytie was ordayned the people myght not convenyently lyve
togyther without contractes and therfore it semyth that contractes be groun-
dyd upon the lawe of reason (or at the leste upon the lawe that is called lus
gentium.) ' ' 20 1 The Doctor replied, -[T]hough contractes be groundyd
upon that lawe that is called the ius gentium bycause they be so necessarye
and so generall amonge all people yet that provyth not that contractes be
groundyd upon the law of reason for thoughe that law called Ius gentium be
muche necessarye for the people yet it may be chaungyd. ' 20 2 Thus the
principles of contract law, in St. German's view, were grounded on an
'98 See notes 233-35 & 319 and accompanying text infra.
199 See notes 178-82 and accompanying text supra. The words 'ius gentium" are
used once in the original Latin text of Doctor and Student in the broad conceptual
sense of Gaius and Ulpian, i.e., as an equivalent of ratio naturalis. C. ST. GERMAN,
supra note 165, at 13 (De Lege Rationis section, Dialogue I, ch. ii). The early English
versions carefully suppressed this usage in the English texts, as Plucknett and Barton
must have noticed, and used instead the words 'lawe of reason." See id. Barton
argues that this change looks "uncommonly like author's corrections." Barton,
supra note 165, at xviii. He thus attempts to refute Thorne's argument that the first
English versions of the First Dialogue were not written by St. German. See Thorne,
supra note 164, at 421; note 169 supra.
200 See notes 81-84 and accompanying text supra.
201 C. ST. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 133.
202 id. at 133-34. In the critical section on "What is a nude contracte or a naked
promyse . . ." the Student says: "First it is to be understande that contractes be
grounded upon a custome of the realme and by the lawe that is called (Jus gencium)
and not dyrectly by the lawe of reason for whan all thynges were in common: yt
neded not to have contractes .. " Id. at 228; see A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 375-405 (1975).
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international law of obligations which was ius gentium and "muche neces-
sarye for the people," but not required by an immutable law of reason. This
notion of a specialized ius gentium, which was narrower than that which the
"lawe of reason" ordained for all legal systems, would later be critical to the
thought of the "new school" civilians who followed Sir Thomas Ridley.
It is revealing to contrast Doctor and Student with the other great English
legal treatise of the period, Littleton's Tenures.20 3 Littleton's Tenures first
appeared in English simultaneously with the second English version of
Doctor and Student, although there had been many previous editions in Law
French.2 0 4 Littleton's book was certainly admirable for its concise statement
of the common law of property, tenures and estates, but to the civilians the
book would appear hardly better than a modern law school "nut shell." Not
one rule was analyzed as to origin, rationale, or effect. Nor was there any
attempt to compare English customary law with anything else. Littleton's
Tenures was a very narrow book, at least when compared with Doctor and
Student.
But Littleton's Tenures became a kind of sacred relic for the common
lawyers, particularly in disputes with civilians. When the French civilian
Hotman attacked Littleton's book as confused and inelegantly written, 2
0 5
and the English civilian John Cowell quoted Hotman's remarks in his law
dictionary in 1607,206 there was.an uproar of protest from the common
lawyers. 20 7 Coke wrote, "it is a desperate and daungerous matter for Civilians
and Canonists ... to write either of the common lawes of England which
they professe not, or against them which they knowe not." ' 20 8 Even more
extraordinary, Littleton's Tenures was chosen by Coke as the structure for
the first massive attempt to do for the English common law what Justinian
had done for the Roman law-to create an Institutes, a systematic compila-
203 T. LITTLETON, LES TENURES (London 1604) (1st ed. n.p. n.d.).
204 Littleton's Tenures was probably the first book about English law ever printed:
an undated Littleton's Tenures (Beale T3) was printed by Johannes Letton and
William de Machlinia in London about 1482. See J. BEALE, supra note 165, at 11. A.
POLLARD & G. REDGRAVE, SHORT TITLE CATALOGUE OF BOOKS PRINTED IN EN-
GLAND, SCOTLAND & IRELAND . . . 1475-1640, at 345-55 (1950), lists 70 editions
before 1641, in addition to 14 editions of E. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTI-
TUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (London 1628) (popularly known as "Coke on
Littleton"). The almost incredible popularity of Littleton's Tenures was doubtless
due to its concise organization and reputation for accuracy.
205 F. HOTMAN, DE FEUDIS COMMENTATIO TRIPARTITA 661 (Cologne 1573); see
Simon, supra note 100, at 269; note 415 and accompanying text infra.
206 THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, entry on Littleton.
207 Simon, supra note 100, at 269-70.
208 Coke, To the Reader, in 10 Coke Rep. (21st page, unpaginated) (London 1614).
In the same section, Coke also says of "Hotoman and his Author," "'let us leave
them among the number of those qui vituperant quae ignorant," possibly in refer-
ence to Ignoramus, the satirical play with pro-civilian sentiment. Id.; see note 434
infra.
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tion of the law. Coke's First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, 2 0 9
commonly called "Coke on Littleton," was a prodigious treatise on English
common law. It included subjects far removed from Littleton's narrow
focus, but the entire effort was literally "hung" on Littleton's text, which
was set out in the center of the page, with the vast discussive commentary
surrounding it-a style distinctly reminiscent of the glossators and their
treatment of the "sacred" Roman texts.2 10 In his introduction to the book,
Coke states of Littleton's Tenures: "[T]his Booke is the ornament of the
Common Law, and the most perfect and absolute Worke that ever was
written in any humane Science . . . . [I]t is a Worke of as absolute perfec-
tion . .. as any Booke that I have knowne to be written of any humane
learning ..... 211 -
Coke's attitude toward Littleton would obviously offend those civilians,
such as the Bartolists, who were already reacting against the Roman "sacred
text" worship of the glossators. 212 It would also offend the new civilian
humanists, such as Cujas and Hotman, who took a critical look at any
romantic use of history. 213 But, most of all, this attitude reflects poorly on
the English common lawyers, who allowed Littleton's insular Tenures, not
St. German's inquisitive and analytical Doctor and Student, to become their
standard and the structure for their advances; for by almost any test, Doctor
and Student was the greater book. 2 14 St. German was firmly patriotic,
209 E. COKE, supra note 204.
210 See notes 120-21 and accompanying text supra.
211 E. COKE, Preface to E. COKE, supra note 204, at 8th unpaginated page.
212 See notes 120-21 and accompanying text supra.
213 See notes 130-31 and accompanying text supra.
214 It is also instructive to contrast Doctor and Student with J. FORTESCUE, supra
note 96. This book, unlike Littleton's Tenures, made an effort-but hardly a sus-
tained effort-to compare English law with civilian doctrine. Written in France in
about 1470-1471, while Fortescue was in exile with the Lancastrian party, De
Laudibus was ostensibly for the guidance of the young Prince Edward of Lancaster.
Fortescue, a sergeant-at-law, was openly hostile to civilian legal doctrine; he de-
fended jury trial and idealized limited monarchy and the Inns of Court. Many of the
false generalizations about civilian use of torture and quod principi placuit may have
originated with Fortescue's De Laudibus. See note 7 & notes 110-15 and accompany-
ing text supra.
Some writers, such as Hazeltine, regard Fortescue as "the true founder of the
English school of comparative law and comparative politics." Hazeltine, Preface to
J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUs LEGEM ANGLIAE xxxii (S. Chrimes ed. & trans. 1942).
Others have had a different view. Winfield regards Fortescue as a "eulogizer" who
"would have maddened any contemporary Bentham." P. WINFIELD, supra note 133,
at 316. Schlatter calls Fortescue a "fifteenth-century English advocate of the middle
class." R. SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY 72 (1951), quoted in C. HILL, supra note
16, at 59.
The truth, of course, lies in between these poles. Fortescue did make a serious
effort to describe foreign legal ideas. On the other hand, he made no pretense of
impartiality or synthesis. He lambasted the barbarism of French torture, while
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anti-clerical, and conservative, but unlike Littleton he boldly and critically
analyzed the sources of the English national law. His object was mutual
reinforcement between custom and reason, nationalism and learning. 2 I" His
true heir would be Francis Bacon.
ignoring the harsh reality ofpeine forte et dure (the pressing to death of those who
refuse to plead) in England. See J. FORTESCUE, supra note 96, at 47-53. He eulogized
the jury, and even defended such archaic procedures as essoins (formal "excuses"
causing vast delay) on the ground that things were worse in France. "Delays in the
King's courts are necessary and reasonable," he contended. Id. at 131-35. Fortes-
cue's prose speaks for itself: "0! what horrible and detestable result often en-
sues from the method of proceeding by the [civilian] deposition of witness!" Id. at
77. "Do you not see now, most excellent prince, that the more you criticise the laws
of England, the more they shine?" Id. at 79. Fortescue actually defended the fact
that there was a deep division in England between the universities and the practice of
law on the ground that "since the laws of England are learned in these three
languages [Latin, French, and English], they could not be conveniently learned or
studied in the Universities, where the Latin language alone is used." Id. at 117.
The contrast with St. German's efforts to explore conflicting ideas and overcome
superficial language and intellectual barriers is obvious. In the abstract, however,
Fortescue did recognize a potential in the civil law to become a universal law of
nations, and he spoke of "[tjhose illustrious Civil Laws, which have so long been, as
it were, the laws of all the world." J. FORTESCUE, Natura Legis Naturae, in I THE
WORKS OF SIR JOHN FORTESCUE 214-25 (T. Clermont ed. London 1869); see Mosse,
Change and Continuity in the Tudor Constitution, 22 SPECULUM 18, 20 n. 13 (1947).
Although Fortescue wrote long before St. German, his book was not printed until
about 1545-46. But it became immensely popular, appearing with an English transla-
tion in 1567, 1573, 1575, 1578, 1598, 1599, and 1609. Another translation with notes
by Selden occurred in 1616, and was printed again in 1660 and 1672, with yet another
translation appearing in 1737, 1741, and 1775. There have been many modern edi-
tions. Chrimes, Introduction to J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGEM ANGLIAE XCV
(S. Chrimes ed. & trans. 1942).
215 Elton described Doctor and Student as "at heart a rather tendentious piece of
propaganda for the excellence of English law and its superiority to the law of Rome."
G. ELTON, supra note 101, at 185. On the other extreme, Doctor and Student has
been praised as a "master philosophical and legal justification of ... the equitable
jurisdiction," which favored neither "royal despotism" nor "the church," but
sought "a well-ordered and peaceful society in which the dictates of reason and
conscience would prevail ...." S. PRALL, supra note 16, at 5 & n.2. Neither view
really describes accurately the work of St. German, a toughminded pamphleteer and
political theorist who earned the wrath of Sir Thomas More, and whose jaundiced
view of the misuse of canon law equaled his ready application of its better principles.
See J. GOUGH, supra note 119, at 23-24; D. HANSON, supra note 112, at 256-57,
262-63; L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 64-67 (1968).
The fairest assessment of St. German is that he achieved a link between medieval
notions of divine justice, and the renaissance concept of positive human law as
something that can be tested and perfected by being conceived in substantive terms
in which justice should be rationally manifest. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 80-81 (1969). This was a great achievement,
and, in itself, provided a considerable inspiration to English civilians and common
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It has been argued that St. German's approach required "total incorpora-
tion" of the civil law into the English law. 21 6 But it would be equally
accurate to say that St. German "incorporated" English national law into
the cosmopolitan legal culture of intelligent men. To St. German, the ques-
tion was not of conflicting jurisdiction or binding authority, but of the
universal validity of principles, derived as they may have been from the law
of custom, of the Church, or of Rome. By opening the English legal system
to appropriate foreign influences, this approach created the constructive
tension between reason, justice, and the enacted "lawe posytyve" which,
in St. German's view, made "equity" possible and necessary. 2 17
Yet, there were important areas in which St. German's thought was
incomplete. One example was his hesitation about the nature of some canon
law principles and the propriety of their incorporation into English law.
Some aspects of the canon lawe were hardly the "law of god," as when such
law was "made only for the polyticall rewle ... and should be reckoned as
human law rather than divine. ' ' 218 Considering some canon law this
way-as human law-would lead to its "secularization" and selective "in-
corporation." But St. German also recognized that truly "revealed" reli-
gious law was quite a different thing from national law, the law of men. 21 9 As
to how all this law should be treated, he was unclear. St. German was also
very uncomfortable with the traditional signification of the ius gentium as
constituting a higher universal law required by natural reason. He seemed to
recognize that there were some laws, including some laws related to interna-
tional commerce and property, that were neither religious nor absolutely
compelled by natural reason.22 0 Nevertheless, these laws had a universal
international acceptance and were rightly called international law, ius gen-
tium. St. German's theories did not fully explain why this should be so, but
his implication of a secular basis for international law was a fundamental
idea.
Henry VIII's dramatic break from the Roman Church, which ended the
Church's external authority over England, and the subsequent suppression
of canon law studies reinforced a growing secularization in the sources of the
moral and political legitimacy of law, a trend that was evident throughout
Europe. 221 It also reflected the growing importance of an international
lawyers alike who, a century later, struggled to maintain a link between national law
and a cosmopolitan, scientific humanism, based on a strong secular government.
216 D. HANSON, supra note 112, at 264.
217 C. ST. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 95, 97.
238 Id. at 23 (italicized words omitted in the earlier English version).
2 9 Id. at 21-25. " [Man may only make a lawe of such thynges as he may Iuge upon
and the lugement of man may not be of inwarde thynges, but only of outwarde
thynges .... Therefore it was necessary to have the lawe of god the whiche shuld
ordre a man as well of inwarde thynges as of outwarde thynges." Id. at 25.
220 See note 197 and accompanying text supra.
223 See generally J. GREEN, The Revival of Learning, 1485-1514, in 2 HISTORY OF
THE ENGLISH PEOPLE 67 (1880); Stone, The Educational Revolution in England,
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culture based more on Mammon than Jehovah. Against this backdrop, St.
German's struggling initial efforts to define a customary, secular basis for
the ius gentium were of particular importance.
2. The English Humanist: Sir Thomas Smith (1513-1577)
It was appropriate that Sir Thomas Smith was the initial appointee to
the new Regius Professorship of Civil Law at Cambridge in 1540.222 He was
determined to be a "true" civilian, and his reaction to the appointment was
to go immediately to Europe, where he studied in Paris and obtained his
doctorate in civil law at Padua in 1541.223 In his inaugural lecture, Smith
praised the new French school of humanist civilians and their leaders Alciat
and Zasius. 224 He was "incorporated" as a D.C.L. at Cambridge in 1542 and
taught until 1549.225 He joined The College of Advocates, Doctors' Com-
mons, in 1574.226
It was during one of his frequent periods of diplomatic service, as
Elizabeth I's ambassador to France from 1562 to 1565, that Smith wrote his
most important book, De Republica Anglorum. 227 The book was not printed
until 1583, six years after Smith's death. 228 It was deliberately written in
1560-1640, in 28 PAST AND PRESENT 41 (1964); Thorne, Tudor Social Transformation
and Legal Change, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 10 (1951); Trimble, Early Tudor Historiog-
raphy, 1485-1548, 11 J. HIST. IDEAS 51 (1950).
222 Maitland, supra note 73, at ix.
223 Id.; 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
1950 (1975).
224 See E. Nys, supra note 14, at 54-55; 1 C. SHERMAN, ROMAN LAW IN THE
MODERN WORLD 369 n.156 (3d ed. 1937).
225 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY
1950 (1975). Part of the cosmopolitanism of the civilians is reflected in the policy of
"incorporation of doctorates," i.e., the recognition of legal doctorates earned at
foreign universities not only by English universities but by the College of Advocates
as well.
226 See J.A.C. SMITH, supra note 42, at 118; G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 160;
Maitland, supra note 73, at xii.
227 T. SMITH, supra note 147. Mary Dewar has recently argued that the book A
Discourse of the Commonweal of This Realm of England was also "unmistakably"
from Smith's pen. Dewar, Foreword to A DISCOURSE OF THE COMMONWEAL OF
THIS REALM OF ENGLAND xxii (M. Dewar ed. 1969). If so, it makes Smith all the
more remarkable as, according to Dewar, the Discourse was "the brilliant and most
enduring" of the Tudor economic pamphlets. Id. at ix. It was also a powerful early
argument for liberal education, even for those who want to be lawyers. A DISCOURSE
OF THE COMMONWEAL OF THIS REALM OF ENGLAND 24 (M. Dewar ed. 1969) (Ist
ed. London 1581). Smith's acknowledged works cover subjects ranging from the new
pronunciation of Greek, a treatise on Roman money, poems, and a book of propa-
ganda for his planned colonization of Ireland. Dewar, supra, at xxi-xxii.
228 It is not entirely clear why Smith did not publish the book during his lifetime. It
may have been due to his governmental positions of Secretary of State, after 1572,
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English, although soon translated into Latin. 229 It had an extraordinary
success, at home and abroad. 230
In a letter he wrote in Bordeaux to his friend, Walter Haddon, Smith said:
I have put together three books here . . . . I have furnished fruitful
argument for those who would debate after the fashion of philosophers
on single topics and raise nice points as to justice and injustice, and
whether what is held yonder in England as law be the better, or what is
held here and in those regions which are administered in accordance
with the Roman law. 2 3 1
Smith then apologized for a characteristic he shared with both St. German
and Francis Bacon: he used no legal citations, "because I brought with me
not a single book and no men of law to consult." 232 Smith's book was thus
written purely through empirical observation, combined with Smith's rea-
son.
De Republica Anglorum was an explicitly comparative work. In describ-
ing the English laws and constitution, Smith wished to
sette before your eies the principall pointes wherein it doth differ from
the policie or government ... in Fraunce, Italie, Spaine, Germanie and
all other countries, which doe followe the civill lawe of the Romanes
compiled by Justinian into his pandects and code: in that sort as Plato
made his commonwealth ... nor as Syr Thomas More his Utopia being
feigned common wealths, such as never was nor never shall be .... 233
Thus, the book was an empirical comparison, based on fact, of "common
wealthes, which be at this day in esse [being], or doe remaine discribed in
true histories, especially in such pointes wherein the one differeth from the
other .... ,,234 But Smith's purpose was also normative, "to see who hath
the righter, truer, and more commodious way to governe the people as well in
warre as in peace. ' ' 231
De Republica Anglorum was not only a detailed comparative view of the
English legal system, but also contained some important and characteristic
and member of the Privy Council, after 1571. See 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE
DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1950 (1975).
229 The first Latin version was undated, but it was probably published in 1610. T.
SMITH, supra note 149, at 145 (Appendix A).
230 There were English editions in 1583, 1584, 1589, 1601, 1609, 1612, 1621, 1633,
1635, and 1640. There was a Latin version in London in 1610, and in Leyden in 1625,
1630, and 1641. There was a Dutch version in 1673, and a German edition in 1688. Id.
at 146-47 (Appendix A).
231 Alston, Introduction to T. SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM xiv (L. Alston
ed. 1906) (quoting Smith's letter).
232 Id. (quoting Smith's letter); see notes 16 & 171 supra.
233 T. SMITH, supra note 149, at 142.
234 Id. at 142-43.
235 Id. at 143.
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civilian analysis of that system. First, Smith was deeply concerned with the
need for a central, positivist authority. "To rule, is understoode to have the
highest and supreme authoritie of commaundement," he said.23 6 His de-
scription of Parliament as "the most high and absolute power of the
realme," 23 7 while gratifying to parliamentarians, also raised the specter of
alleged civilian absolutism and the heritage of quod principi placuit.238 But
Smith was not an absolutist: although he used the word "absolute," he used
it solely in terms of comparison between the powers of the King in Parlia-
ment and the power of the lesser courts.2 3 9 He did not anticipate the debate
of the next century between King and Commons, and certainly did not agree
with Bodin that mixed government was a logical absurdity. 240 There was
nothing to indicate that Smith's civilian training had led him to a theory of
government more lawless than the carefully limited conceptions of
sovereignty that already existed in both the Tudor constitution and the
Corpus Juris 241
Smith did share the civilian respect for defined authority, however, and he
relied far less on custom than did common lawyers such as Fortescue. 242 But
236 id. at 9.
237 Id. at 48. Smith compared Parliament's power to that of Justinian. Id. at 126.
238 Jean Bodin's great De la Republique was published in French in 1576 and in
Latin in 1586, long after Smith wrote De Republica Anglorum. But because Smith's
book was first published in 1583, contemporaries and historians alike have linked
them. The two writers' actual connection, both personal and intellectual, has been
the subject of continuing controversy beyond the scope of this Article. It is clear,
however, that Bodin's conception of state sovereignty was very much more closely
defined and analytical than Smith's, and that the two men described the actual form
of English government in very different ways: Bodin regarded it as having absolute
sovereignty in the monarch; Smith, as having absolute sovereignty in the monarch in
Parliament. See J. BODIN, supra note 117, at 91-94; S. PRALL, supra note 16, at 12;
Alston, supra note 231, at xli-xliii; Hinton, English Constitutional Theories from Sir
John Fortescue to Sir John Eliot, 75 ENG. HIST. REV. 410, 424 (1960). Bodin's real
impact on English legal thought occurred at the time of the first English edition in
1606, translated by Richard Knolles. McRae, supra note 117, at A52-A67.
239 See Hinton, supra note 238, at 410, 423.
240 See id. at 418-21 & 424.
241 See A. D'ENTRVES,supra note 77, at 66-68; notes 112-16 and accompanying text
supra. Smith's French contemporary, the civilian humanist Francois Hotman,
explicitly defended this civilian outlook in his Francogallia, first published in 1573.
"[A] boundless and unlimited power was not allowed the kings of Francogallia by
their subjects and they cannot be described as free from all laws." F. HOTMAN,
supra note 42, at 459, quoted in Berkowitz, Book Review, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 74,
77 (1975).
242 Both types of monarchy [the king ruling 'regally' and the king ruling 'politi-
cally'], Fortescue thought, originated under natural law. The law of nature was a
divine law arising from the very earliest beginnings of human nature; under it
and by it the dignatas regia originated and has ever since been ruled. All rights
of kings ('ura regum) were ultimately derived not from the prince's authority,
but from the law of nature. This law not only established the royal dignity, but
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Smith's arguments for this tendency were strictly practical. Thus, it has
been said of Smith's views: "Constitutions may be likened to shoes, and
each nation must get what fits best .... There is a curiously modern strain in
all this: ... a certain contentment in relativity and a distrust of the absolute
.... Civilian though he [Smith] is, he is remarkably unjuristic in his meth-
od.' 243
Smith also was concerned with equity. He identified the English Chancery
with civilian antecedents, particularly the Romah praetor, who "might...
mitigate the exactness . . . of the lawe written, give exceptions, as metus,
doli, mali, minoris, aetatis, etc., for remedies, and maintain alwaies aeguum
& bonum." 24 4 Moreover, Smith regarded Chancery procedure as being
basically civilian:
in this court the usuall and proper forme of pleading of Englande is not
used, but the forme of pleading by writing, which is used in other
countries according to the civill lawe and the tryall is not by xii men, but
by the examination of witnesse as in other courtes of the civil lawe.
245
For all of Smith's familiarity with civil law and Roman law terms and
analogies, he used them primarily for descriptive, expository purposes.
2 46
Indeed, there are instances when a bit of chauvinism shows. For example,
Smith spoke as though torture were absolutely unknown in England.
247
Furthermore, although Smith apologized for such archaic English procedures
and institutions as benefit of clergy, wardship, and trial by battle, 24 he
emphasized that English villainage was better than Roman slavery. 249 Nev-
ertheless, Smith was remarkably fair in describing civilian alternatives to
jury trial and inquisitorial procedures.2 5 0 There was none of the strident
nationalism and defensiveness of Fortescue, or, for that matter, Coke. Nor
was there the kind of elitest praise of civil law expected from a Regius
Professor of Civil Law. Smith's tolerance for differing systems founded on
also-since there is less virtue in ruling than in creating-governed it. Both the
ius tantum regale and the ius regale et politicum were subject to natural law.
S. CHRIMES, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY 311
(1936) (citations omitted).
243 Alston, supra note 231, at xxxv.
244 T. SMITH, supra note 149, at 71.
245 Id.
246 See, e.g., id. at 72-75 (description of English trials), 65-66 (description of
judgments).
247 "Likewise, torment or question which is used by the order or the civill lawe...
to put a malefactor to excessive paine . .. is not used in England, it is taken for
servile." Id. at 105.
248 Alston, supra note 231, at xxxix.
249 "[The villains] were not used with us cruelly not in that sort as the bondsmen
of Romane civill law, as appeareth by their Comedies." T. SMITH, supra note 149, at
132.
250 See id. at 78-80.
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different principles, and his intellectual curiosity, made his work seem very
modern and liberal.
But what was truly peculiar about Smith was not his empirical descrip-
tions or his laudable effort to be objective, comparative and factual; rather, it
was his disregard of any medieval notions of natural law or law of reason.
For Smith, foreign law, past or present, seemed useful solely for its com-
parative value in tinkering with existing national law. It had no intrinsic
validity or superiority except as so incorporated. This was even true when
Smith discussed issues-such as that of "bondage"--that had been a tradi-
tional forum for discussing natural law issues, 25 1 and it was true despite
Smith's own avowed purpose of describing comparative institutions so that
normative judgments can be made as to the "righter, truer, and more
commodious way to governe." 25 2 In Smith's view, each nation might be best
suited by uniquely different laws and a unique and different constitution. 2 3
Was this view a product of Smith's association with the "new humanist"
school of civilians in France? There was no question about Smith's al-
legiance to the humanists and his enthusiasm about their "scientific" meth-
ods. 254 Their purpose in discovering and studying only "true" classical
Roman texts, rather than medieval "corruptions," was to be "scientific"
and empirical.255 They made no special claims for intrinsic authority or
normative relevance, any more than do the modern schools of scientific and
historical scholarship which are their intellectual heirs. 256 Smith, it is true,
acknowledged that others could make normative judgements about his
"data," but he himself did not.25 7 He left one with a sense of his own
conviction that the "truths" to be gained from such a comparative study
251 For example, under the heading 'Of the question what is right and just in everie
commonwealth," Smith approached the classical problem of whether men should
obey the laws of a tyrant. Id. at 13. After pointing to a few instances of rebellion
against tyranny in classical literature-" Thrasibulus against the xxx tyrants and
Brutus and Cassius against Caesar"-Smith continued, "Certaine it is that it is
alwayes a doubtful and hasardous matter to meddle with the chaunging of the lawes
and government, or to disobey the orders of the rule or government, which a man
doth finde alreadie established." Id.
252 Id. at 143.
253 "And as all these iii kindes of commonwealthes are natural, so when to ech
partie or espece and kinde of the people that is applied which best agreeth like a
garment to the bodie or shoe to the foote .... Id. at 28.
254 See 2 J. MULLINGER, THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 129 (1884); F. Mait-
land, English Law and the Renaissance, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LEGAL HISTORY 168,176, 178 nn. 16, 18 (1907); note 224 and accompanying textsupra.
255 See 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 42, at 225-28; Hazeltine, supra note 42, at
xxv-xxvi; Maitland, supra note 254, at 171-76.
256 See, e.g., E. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 3-35 (1961); F. GILBERT, HISTORY:
CHOICE AND COMMITMENT 442-53 (1977); Gilbert, Introduction to HISTORICAL
STUDIES TODAY xvii-xxi (1971).
257 T. SMITH, supra note 149, at 142-43.
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may indeed be completely relative, differing from nation to nation, man to
man.
But was there to be no external or international standard of justice? St.
German had posited a universally valid "lawe of eternall" of God.258 Smith, on
the other hand, viewed the canon law applied in the English church courts
entirely as a species of the English national law. Because Smith viewed the
English national law as having incorporated the canon law, he viewed the
canon law's civil aspects as just a kind of English law for certain special
proceedings. Accordingly, Smith considered it clearly unfair for English
common law courts to threaten English church courts with writs of praemu-
nire, which prevented obedience to an alien process. Despite the Church
courts' extensive use of civilian doctrines, the church courts, in Smith's
view, still derived all their "force, power, authoritie, rule, and jurisdiction,
from the royall majestie and the crowne of England. ' 2 9
Thus, Smith did not directly address the tough questions left open by St.
German. As to whether there was an external test of reason or justice to
which English national law must be subject, or whether there was a substan-
tive secular international law, Smith's comparative study of legal institutions
gave little guidance.2 6
0
3. The Refugee: Alberico Gentili (1552-1608)
In contrast to Smith, another English civilian writer did try to resolve the
questions left by St. German. This writer was Alberico Gentili. Gentili,
like Smith, held one of the Regius Professorships of Civil Law: he had
the chair at Oxford from 1587 to 1608.261 Beyond that similarity, however,
258 C. ST. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 9-13.
259 T. SMITH, supra note 149, at 141.
260 There is one last puzzle. For whom was De Republica written? It is primarily a
description of English institutions and laws, often going into elementary details-such
as how English women change surnames when they change husbands. Id. at 125.
Surely the appropriate audience for this would be intelligent foreigners. Then why did
Smith write De Republica in English, when he was fluent in Latin and probably in
French? See Alston, supra note 231, at xliii-xliv. Despite Smith's initial choice of
tongue, there were later foreign Latin editions, some of which were bound with
topographical descriptions of England, definitely for tourists.
Of course, Smith himself never published the book; it was published after his death.
My thesis is that Smith wrote it for the reason he gave to his friend Haddon: to provide
empirical data "for those who would debate after the fashion of philosopher.., and
raise nice points as to justice and injustice." Id. at xiv. Also, Smith was homesick in
France, "[aind... in my absence I feel a yearning for our commonwealth." Id. at xiii.
This might explain the use of English. In any event, providing empirical grist for future
conceptual mills has remained a legitimate function of "pure" humanist scholarship.
Why was De Republica so popular? As Alston suggests, even a knowledgeable
Englishman might find the book a relatively clear explanation of complex institutions, a
virtue of the comparative method. Id. at xliii-xliv.
261 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 765
(1975).
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the two men were very different. Gentili did not travel to the Continent to
become a cultured humanist, as Smith had done. Indeed, Gentili had fled the
Continent, leaving his native Italy in 1579 with his father and brother to
avoid persecution as heretics. 262 Unlike Smith, Gentili held the heroes of the
new civilian humanism-Cujas, Alciat, and Zasius-in open contempt, at-
tacking them viciously for selling out the hope of the civil law tradition in
exchange for a comfortable, pedantic scholarship.2 63 Far from engaging in
the descriptive relativism of Smith, which fit legal systems to people like
"shoes, ' 2 6 4 Gentili saw in the civil law tradition the key to building an
international order, respected by all men and nations.
Most importantly, Gentili, unlike Smith, was a Bartolist. He regarded the
Roman law as useful primarily in its application to customary law. Gentili
did not focus on customary national law, however. Rather, he focused on
the ius gentium, and wrote about it particularly in the narrower sense of ius
inter gentes, the customary law between nations. 26 This was the customary
law governing embassies, ambassadors, treaties, delegates, and diplomatic
immunities. Gentili became a pioneer in the modern "factual" treatment of
this customary law between nations, which is now called the "public inter-
national law."
But Gentili did owe an unspoken debt to Smith, or at least to the
new humanist learning. Gentili's important books, De Legationibus Libri
Tres, 266 De lure Belli Libri Tres, 267 and Hispanicae Advocationis Libri
262 The classic descriptions of Gentili's life are T. HOLLAND, Alberico Gentili,
supra note 14, at 1-40; Holland, Preface to A. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES
(T. Holland ed. 1877). For other biographical material on Gentili, see 5 W.
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 52-54; E. NYs, supra note 14, at 59-62; Nys, supra
note 16; 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 765
(1975).
263 -[IJ def~ndait ... Bartole contre Alciat; il refusait ce dernier et Cujas le
titre de jurisconsulte [He defended... Bartolus against Alciatus, and refused to give
to the latter and Cujas the title of jurist]." E. Nys, supra note 14, at 61. See A.
GENTILI, DE IURIS INTERPRETIBUS DIALOGI SEX 77 (G. Astuti ed. 19371 (London
1582) [hereinafter cited as DE IURIS INTERPRETIBUS]; Nys, supra note 16, at 19a-20a.
264 See note 253 supra.
265 Gentili acknowledged a broader definition of ius gentium as "[w]hat all nations
agree upon, or rather, the 'maior paris orbis.' " T. HOLLAND, Alberico Gentili, supra
note 14, at 22-23. But Gentili's books are primarily concerned with a narrow concept of
ius gentium. In the context of free international trade he called this body of law "sort of
a law of nations." ADVOCATIO HISPANICA, supra note 153, at 102.
266 A. GENTILI, supra note 90. This book arose from the famous case of Don
Bernardino de Mendoza. When he was Spanish ambassador to England, de Mendoza
took part in the Throckmorton conspiracy against Queen Elizabeth. Upon the discov-
ery of the conspiracy, de Mendoza was summoned by the Privy Council, which
consulted Gentili and Jean Hotman, who was in England at the time, as to what it
should do. See Nys, supra note 16, at 21a-22a; notes 300-05 and accompanying text
infra. Out of Gentili's consultation came De Legationibus. There were many foreign
editions.
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Duo, 268 were remarkable for their narrow, objective approach. They fo-
cused on factual data about customary law, not on hypotheticals, ideals, or
academic theories. Smith would have approved.2 69 Gentili's work included
none of what Smith would have termed "vaine imaginations, phantasies of
Philosophers. ' 270 Instead, they contained only descriptions of the actual
customary dealing between nations. 27' Gentili distinguished this customary
international law from religion, and for that matter from justice. 272 As
Holdsworth remarked, there was something very modern about Gentili's
I am using the Carnegie Endowment edition of De Legationibus. This edition
consists of two volumes. The first volume, A. GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBus LIBRI
TRES (Hanover 1594) (1st ed. London 1585), is a facsimile of an early edition. The
second volume, DE LEGATION]BUS, supra note 117, is an English translation. For the
sake of convenience, I shall usually cite the translation.
267 A. GENTILI, supra note 152. De lure Belli was first published in three parts in
London from 1588-89. It subsequently went through many foreign editions. That it was
placed on the Index in 1603 comments on its utility, however limited, for theologians.
I am using the Carnegie Endowment edition of De lure Belli. This edition consists of
two volumes. The first volume, A. GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRi TRES (Hanover
1612) (1st eds. London 1588-89), is a facsimile of an early edition. The second volume,
A. GENTILI, DE IURE BELLI LIBRI TRES (J. Rolfe trans. 1933) (translation of
Hanover 1612) (1st eds. London 1588-89) [hereinafter cited as DE lURE BELLI], is an
English translation. For the sake of convenience, I shall usually cite the translation.
268 A. GENTILI, HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONis LIBRI Duo (Hanover 1613).
This book was first published under the auspices of Gentili's talented younger brother
Scipio, who had escaped with him from Italy. It contains much material on interna-
tional maritime law-including Gentili's famous discourse on the protection of sea
territory-derived from his experience as Advocate to the Spanish Embassy in Lon-
don. See the English translation of ADVOCATIO HISPANICA, supra note 153, at
35-38.
I am using the Carnegie Endowment edition of Advocatio Hispanica. This edition
consists of two volumes. The first volume, A. GENTILI, HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS
LIBRI Duo (2d ed. Amsterdam 1661) (1st ed. Hanover 1613), is a facsimile of an early
edition. The second volume, ADVOCATIo HISPANICA, supra note 153, is an English
translation. For the sake of convenience, I shall usually cite the translation.
269 See T. SMITH, supra note 149, at 142.
270 Id.
271 Like most post-Bartolists, and, for that matter, most English common
lawyers of the time, Gentili was not particularly rigorous in his use of history, classical
or modern. Although he praised the study of history by ambassadors, see DE
LEGATIONIBUS, supra note 117, at 154, Gentili considered historical studies nones-
sential for lawyers. See DE IURiS INTERPRETIBUS, supra note 263, at 77; J. JONES,
supra note 83, at 42-43. Other Bartolists were roundly criticized by the new humanists
on the continent for their uncritical use of the Corpus Juris and other classical history.
Cf. 4 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 42, at 225-27 (expressing the differences in the
respective approaches of the Bartolists and the new humanists).
272 See DE LEGATIONIBUS, supra note 117, at 126. Gentili's greatest achievement
was the nontheological basis for the law of warfare that he presented in De lure Belli.
See T. HOLLAND, Early Literature, supra note 14, at 40-58.
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work, as there was about Smith's work-more than there was about the
work of Grotius or many of the later proponents of natural law.273
Yet, despite this realistic approach, Gentili did attack in De lure Belli
those who had relied too much on "bare recital[s] of history," "nudam
historiarum recitationem. "274 He attempted to replace the old discussions of
the Catholic theologians with a secular, universal doctrine, and to find this
doctrine he looked to the reipublicae sed omnium, the "great common-
wealth of mankind. ' 275 Moreover, although Gentili defined ius gentium
broadly, as being close to the law of nature-or certainly to the Roman
naturalis ratio, "natural reason"--he also looked for guidance to something
akin to the Roman aequitas mercatoria, the "equity of merchants," based
on the concrete custom and practice of private international law or the law
merchant. 276
Gentili's treatment of the issue of what law should bind ambassadors
residing in foreign nations illustrates this approach. In De Legationibus,
Gentili observed that "[i]t is well established that if ambassadors are to be
tried [by their host nation], they can only be tried under ius gentium." 277 Of
course, sometimes it would be better, from an ambassador's own point of
view, if he were to be tried under the national civil law of his host nation: the
national rule of law might be more favorable to the ambassador than the
corresponding rule of the customary ius gentium. But, said Gentili, an
ambassador should not be able to pick and choose his law:
It would be contrary to all the principles of international law [ius
gentium] that he [the ambassador] should have the power to play fast
and loose with legal procedure; and undoubtedly an ambassador would
have an unparalleled opportunity for doing so, if this privilege were
granted him, since many things which could not be done under one code
could be done under the other. 278
Characteristically, Gentili used a concrete example to illustrate this point.
There were, he observed, many transactions which, at national law, re-
quired more than two witnesses. But "in international law more than two are
never required." 279
Therefore in accordance with what has been said above, if an ambas-
sador evades a contract to which only two witnesses have been sum-
moned, although by civil [national] law more are required, judgment will
273 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 54.
274 See DE 1URE BELLI, supra note 267, at 4 (English translation); T. HOLLAND,
Alberico Gentili, supra note 14, at 22.
275 T. HOLLAND, Alberico Gentili, supra note 14, at 22.
276 See ADVOCATlo HISPANICA, supra note 153, bk. 1, ch. 21; T. HOLLAND,
Alberico Gentili, supra note 14, at 22; notes 83-84 and accompanying text supra.
277 DE LEGATIONIBUS, supra note 117, at 97.
278 Id.
279 Id. at 98.
1981]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
justly be given against the ambassador on the basis of international law,
because he would be able to get judgment against his adversaries on
similar grounds. Otherwise, would you not consider it a glaring example
of injustice? 2 0
This analysis, however, led inexorably to a tougher question. If one adopted
the rule that an ambassador's contracts should be ruled by ius gentium, and
not by national law, what if the outcome under ius gentium was unjust?
Could this, theoretically, occur? Or was ius gentium, by definition, the
"just" resolution?
This problem may also be illustrated by Gentili's treatment of ambas-
sadorial contracts. First he observed that "a sort of agreement" existed that
ius gentium should govern such contracts. 28 1 Moreover, Gentili argued that
contracts "entered into during [an ambassador's] embassy" should always
be subject to the rules of the ius gentium, even after the ambassador steps
down from his post and leaves the host nation to return home to another
state and another legal system. 282 Even though this "home" state's law
might not recognize or enforce the ambassador's obligation to pay back a
debt or fulfill a bargain made in the host country, Gentili contended that the
ambassador still be bound.28 3 Gentili gives two reasons for such a rule, both
derived from the Digest: (1) that if it were not followed, then "the ambas-
sadors would be unjustly enriched and carry home someone else's proper-
ty," 28 4 and (2) that if it were not followed, then ambassadors would be
barred from commerce because no one "would be willing to make a contract
with them." 285 The first reason, according to Gentili, was "especially clear"
and was derived from "natural law, which prescribes that it is in the interest
of justice that no one's increase in wealth should involve loss and injury to
another." 286 Thus, this blanket rule was clearly a universal "natural law"
proposition of the traditional ius gentium type. 87
Having established that a transnational ius gentium exists, Gentili then
went to the critical question of whether the ius gentium should completely
displace applicable national law in certain cases. 2 8 8 Gentili's answer was
"yes," and he concluded with the startling proposition that, in the case of
transactions with foreign ambassadors, the result reached under interna-
tional law-the ius gentium-could never be unjust. 289 This was because
280 Id. (citing DIGEST 2.2. 1) (I added the word in brackets; Gentili is using ius civile
in the sense of the national law.).
281 Id. at 106.
282 Id. at 97, 106.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 106 (citing DIGEST 5.1.25).
285 Id. at 106 (citing DIGEST 4.4.24, 16.1.11, 26.7.12).
286 Id.
287 See generally notes 73-80 and accompanying text supra.
288 DE LEGATIONIBUS, supra note 117, at 106-07.
289 Id. at 107.
[Vol. 61: 1
EARLY ENGLISH CIVILIAN WRITERS
"[hie who makes a contract with another either is or ought to be aware of his
status." '2 90 Thus, a citizen should know when he contracts with an ambas-
sador subject to international law.
Gentili advanced another reason, however, for always applying ius gen-
tium to ambassadorial contracts: "the royal [sovereign] power, as it is
called, will itself give judgment in every business and law suit in which
ambassadors are concerned, for royal power is the [ius gentium]. '" 29' But
the meaning of this statement is ambiguous. Using Gentili's example, sup-
pose that an ambassador entered into a contract while abroad that, under the
national law of his home country, required three witnesses to be valid. After
returning home, he seeks to evade his obligations under the national law on
the ground that there was only one witness. Under Gentili's formulation that
the "royal power is the ius gentium," however, it is unclear which rule the
national courts should apply. They could apply the national rule, or the rule
of the host country in which the contract was made. They could look to
agreements between the host country and the home country concerning
ambassadorial privileges. They could apply Gentili's rule that "an ambas-
sador should be subject to legal procedure on every contract which he enters
into during his embassy, ' 29 2 or the conventional rule of the ius gentium that
"more than two [witnesses] are never required. ' 293 Finally, the national
courts could just do whatever is required by "equitie and soundness of
reason," presumably in the name of natural law.2
94
Gentili's conceptual problem was that he was using the term ius gentium
in too many ways: first, as a manifestation of ius inter gentes, the public law
of treaties and customary relations between nations ;295 second, as a specific
body of private international legal doctrine with ascertainable, private cus-
tomary rules, not unlike the law merchant; 296 and third, as a form of natural
reason, a ratio naturalis common to all. 97 What Gentili's De Legationibus
finally recommended as the appropriate law to govern ambassadors' con-
tracts was ius gentium of the second category: a special body of private
international legal doctrine with specific and ascertainable customary
rules. 29s These rules for special international transactions such as ambas-
sadorial contracts were to be "incorporated" by the sovereign national
power, for special purposes, into the court proceedings of each nation, even
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 106.
293 Id. at 98.
294 These are the terms of Fulbecke, Gentili's student. See Fulbecke's treatment of
ambassadors' contracts in 1 A PARALLELE, supra note 5, at 5. The quoted words are in
reference to international recognition of "pyrats' " contracts. Id. at 6.
295 See, e.g., DE LEGATIONIBUS, supra note 117, at 99 (need to examine embassy's
reception by host nation).
296 See id. at 98, 106-07.
297 See id. at 98.
298 See, e.g., id. at 98 ("two witness" rule).
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though the rules could be very different from the "common" national law for
ordinary transactions usually applied by the same courts. 299 The implica-
tions of this reasoning for other "special" laws-particularly Gentili's no-
tion of an international law merchant, the ius commercium-are striking. By
extension, Gentili could be read to advocate the establishment of a "special
law" for soldiers, or for shipowners and sailors.
At a later point in De Legationibus, Gentili again approached the difficult
question of whether the ius gentium was a body of substantive customary
international law, or a concept of justice and reason incorporated by
definition in the application of any national law. This time, he reached no
definite solution. The context, however, revealed the need of the new
"nation" states of Europe for a customary, specialized ius gentium. The
question was tough-what law governs when a diplomat commits a serious
crime against a host nation-and it was no hypothetical puzzle. The Privy
Council had sought Gentili's advice as to the treasonous activities of Don
Bernadino de Mendoza, the Spanish Ambassador. °0 0 The issues presented
were several: Could de Mendoza be seized? Should a diplomat who plots the
death of an enemy sovereign be tried under the law of the host nation or the
law of his home state? Should one look to the customary international law of
legate immunity? Or should one look to abstract principles of natural justice,
as illustrated centuries later by the Nuremburg trials and Israel's trial of
Adolph Eichmann? 30 1
Gentili backed away from a clear solution. Looking for classical authority,
Gentili presented a quotation allegedly from the Roman historian Sallust that
seemed to distinguish between the ius gentium and "principles of jus-
tice.'"302 According to Gentili, Sallust reported that the Romans had seized a
similar conspirator who had come to Rome as part of a foreign envoy and
tried him in a Roman tribunal according to "principles of justice," or the
"law of nature," even though the conspirator would have enjoyed a dip-
lomatic immunity under established international law.30 3 Gentili suggested
that the English might "cling . . . to the authority to decide vested in the
magistrate," as did the Romans when they seized and tried this conspirator
"who under the established law of nations was inviolable. ' 30 4
299 ADVOCATIo HISPANICA, supra note 153, at 101-02.
300 See note 266 supra.
301 For a perceptive analysis of the problems of applying abstract principles of
natural justice to concrete situations, see the account of the chief American counsel at
the Nuremberg trials, T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY 19-94 (1970).
302 DE LEGATIONIBUS, supra note 117, at 126.
303 "Bomilcar [a conspirator] was put on trial in accordance with principles of
justice rather than in conformity with [ius gentium], as he was a member of the suite of
one who had come to Rome under a national guarantee." Id. at 126. This passage does
not appear in at least one leading modern translation of the extant works of Sallust. See
SALLUST, THE JUGURTHINE WAR & THE CONSPIRACY OF CATALINE (S. Handford
trans. 1963).
304 [W]e must in this whole matter cling to that which we set forth touching the
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Perhaps reflecting the ambiguity of Gentili's advice, the English au-
thorities were more cautious than the Roman tribunal. Without conceding
a right to try de Mendoza under natural law, Elizabeth I gave him two weeks
to leave England. At the same time, however, she reportedly said that "in
vain he appeals to the immunity of the nations who violates the Law of
Nations."30 5 Yet, despite the Queen's statement, the fact remains that de
Mendoza had plotted a terrible crime contrary to English common law and
to natural law, but had escaped under the customary ius gentium of legal
immunity. The existence of this problem-and of Gentili's resultant theoret-
ical struggle-demonstrated the need that emerging European nationalism
created for a customary, specialized ius gentium. Serious problems of incor-
poration, both diplomatic and commercial, would inevitably arise, but a
secular substitute for the laws of the crumbling international Church, so
carefully examined by St. German a generation before, was an increasing
necessity.
In assessing Gentili's influence, it is significant that he was neither En-
glish, nor English-trained. Like Smith, he was "incorporated" as a D.C.L.
at Oxford, in 1581, but he was trained in Perugia.10 6 Throughout his life,
Gentili kept in contact with his younger brother, Scipio, who had settled as a
jurist in Germany. Under Scipio's supervision, he often published abroad; in
fact, Gentili published abroad almost as much as he did in England. 07 And
he always wrote in Latin, not in English. Although Gentili's advice was
sought by the English Privy Council in critical matters, such as the de
Mendoza case, he had also served as Advocate to the Spanish Embassy. 30 8
Most peculiarly, Gentili, though a civilian through and through, never joined
the College of Advocates and Doctors' Commons-nor apparently sup-
ported them. Instead, in 1600, eight years before his death, he joined Gray's
Inn, one of the common lawyers' Inns of Court.30 9
authority to decide vested in the magistrate, and which the Romans may be
observed to have adhered to in the indictment of Bomilcar, a member of Jugur-
tha's suite, who under the established law of nations was inviolable [iure hoc
gentiun sanctium constituto].
DE LEGATIONIBUS, supra note 117, at 125-26 (Latin interpolated).
30 J. HOTMAN, DE LA CHARGE ET DIGNITE DE L'AMBASSADEUR (4th ed. 1616)
(1st ed. Paris 1603), quoted in Nys, supra note 16, at 21a-22a. According to Hotman,
both he and Gentili advised the Queen that de Mendoza's immunity could be
abrogated, at least provided that de Mendoza's sovereign was notified: "We told them
that the most expedient and customary method and the one most salutary for the state
was to advise his sovereign and to await his approval or disapproval [of the seizure and
proposed punishment]." J. HOTMAN, supra, quoted in Nys, supra note 16, at 22a.
306 Nys, supra note 16, at 18a.
307 For example, Scipio supervised the initial publication ofAdvocatio Hispanica in
Hanover, see note 268 supra, and Hanover also became the city of origin for early
editions of all Gentili's major works, see notes 266-67 supra.
308 Ostensibly "honorifico salario constituto." T. HOLLAND, Alberico Gentili,
supra note 14, at 12-13.
309 Nys, supra note 16, at 28a.
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The explanation for this apparent avoidance of the organized English
civilians probably lies in Gentili's religious background. A Protestant, he had
fled a Catholic country for England. Victim of the Inquisition, he was
violently opposed to the canon law of the established religion, whether
English or Catholic-and he said so, in no uncertain terms.31 0 To the
members of Doctors' Common, with their close ties to the religious law of
the Court of Arches and the Archbishop of Canterbury, this might have
been just too much. In any event, Gentili apparently never bothered to try to
join. Perhaps this same Protestantism was the driving force behind Gentili's
desire to secularize the ius gentium.
Gentili was also a political absolutist. 311 He was concerned with funda-
mental law, but only in the context of conflicts between sovereigns. As a
matter of positive law, he believed in the absolute right of kings, and
wondered whether even the Kings of France and Spain were truly sovereign,
since they recognized the Pope. 31 2 This belief cut him off from more mod-
erate Englishmen, and was to have a tragic repercussion on Cowell.
Not surprisingly, Gentili's most significant impact was on public interna-
tional law. The great Grotius was in his debt.31 3 In England, his influence
was more limited, but, as will be seen, his secular Bartolist philosophy had
an important effect on Fulbecke and Cowell.
Maitland said that the later English civilians were unlike Gentili. "They
were no refugees: they were easy Englishmen, and year by year they were
becoming more English and less cosmopolitan.1 31 4 Maitland's statement,
however, is not completely accurate. It was true that the later English
310 As to canonical sources, Gentili wrote, Flammis, Flammis libros spurcissimos
barbaroruni, non solum impiissimes antechristi. Flammis, omnes flammis! [Into the
fire with the detestable books of the barbarians; into the fire with the impious books of
the Anti-Christ.]" A. GENTILI, DE NuPTIS LIBRI TREs bk. 1, ch. 19 (2d ed. Hanover
1614) (lst ed. Hanover 1601),quotedin Nys,supra note 16, at 36a. See F. MAITLAND,
ROMAN CANON LAW, supra note 14, at 95. See generally authorities cited in note 262
supra.
3 Gentili was deeply impressed by Jean Bodin, whom he cites constantly. See,
e.g., DE LEGATIONIBUS, supra note 117, at 83, 159. In De potestate, Gentili quotes
Bodin's description of state sovereignty, that "absolute and perpetual power which
the Latins called majestas." A. GENTILI, De potestate Regis absoluta, in REGALES
DESPUTATIONES TRES 9 (London 1605) (quoting J. BODIN, supra note 117, at 125),
quoted in B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 97. But Gentili was not really "the theoretical
founder of absolutism in England." G. VAN DER MOLEN, supra note 119, at 239.
It was Bodin himself who was first published in English, with Richard Knolles'
important translation in 1607. See McRae, supra note 117, at A52-A67. Furthermore,
Gentili did believe that, although the Prince was above all positive law, he was
conceptually under a sanctionless natural law. See A. GENTILI, supra, at 17; A.
D'ENTREVES, supra note 77, at 68.
312 Nys, supra note 16, at 35a-36a.
313 See id. at 31a.
314 F. MAITLAND, ROMAN CANON LAW, supra note 14, at 95.
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civilians became increasingly concerned with strictly national matters. Yet it
was not by free choice. Rather, it was because after 1600 they had to defend
their future role in England against sustained attack from certain powerful
common lawyers, particularly Sir Edward Coke.
4. The "Bartolist Bee": William Fulbecke (1560-1603)
William Fulbecke idolized his teacher, Gentili. According to Fulbecke,
Gentili had "by his great industrie ... quickened the dead bodie of the Civil
Law written by the ancient Civilians .... Learning in him hath shewed all
her force. ' 3 5 But Fulbecke chose a method and a format that were quite
different from those used by his teacher. Fulbecke's major works, unlike
Gentili's, were entirely in English. In addition, Fulbecke's most important
work, A Parallele or Conference of the Civil Law, the Canon Law and the
Common Law of this Realme of England,3 6 was directed at the English
315 W. FULBECKE, A DIRECTION OR PREPARATIVE TO THE STUDY OF LAW 26(b)
(London 1600) [hereinafter cited as A DIRECTION].
316 1 & 2 W. FULBECKE, supra note 154. A Parallele was first printed in two parts.
For the first part, I shall cite to the second edition: I A PARALLELE, supra note 5. For
the second part, I shall cite to the first edition: 2 W. FULBECKE, A PARALLELE OR
CONFERENCE OF THE CIVIL LAW, THE CANON LAW AND THE COMMON LAW OF
THIS REALME OF ENGLAND (London 1602) [hereinafter cited as 2 A PARALLELE].
A Parallele was sometimes bound with Fulbecke's treatise on international law, W.
FULBECKE, THE PANDECTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (London 1602) [here-
inafter cited as THE PANDECTES]. This book was directed toward -[g]iving great light
to the understanding and opening of the principall objects, questions, rules, and cases
of the Civill Law, and Common law of this Realme of England." Id. at title page.
A Parallele and The Pandectes were not, however, Fulbecke's most successful
books. Rather, Fulbecke's biggest success was a guide book for law students, A
DIRECTION, supra note 315. This book was printed in 1600 and 1602, and in a revised
edition in 1829; a facsimile of the 1600 edition was published by Garland Publishing,
Inc., in 1980. A Direction contained advice to law students and included a suggested
reading list, as well as a compendium of "certain [legal terms] ... whereof the common
law of this Realme and the Civill Law do seeme to agree." A DIRECTION, supra note
315, at 62. This compendium may have inspired Cowell's famous dictionary. See note
155 and accompanying text supra, notes 403-21 and accompanying text infra. Ful-
becke praised Bartolus in A Direction, ranking him over the humanists, and "yea
above, these, him whom I lately named, Albericus Gentilis." A DIRECTION, supra
note 315, at 26b.
A Direction remains famous mostly for its arguments why law students should not
eat a lot: "A fat and full belly yeeldeth... grosse spirits, by which the sharp edge of the
mind is dulled and refracted .... " A DIRECTION, supra note 315, at 12b, quoted in P.
WINFIELD, supra note 133, at 333 n.l. Also celebrated is its explanation of why law
students should not study after supper: "if a man studie soone after supper, the
nourishment is resolved into grosse vapours which doe fill the bodie and are verie
noisome obstupatives to the senses." A DIRECTION, supra note 315, at 18b, quoted in
P. WINFIELD, supra note 133, at 333 n.l.
Fulbecke was also a great joker, and his jokes were usually at the expense of
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national law, not at the law of nations. Furthermore, Fulbecke chose a
format for A Parallele completely unlike any used by Gentili, a set of
dialogues between four representative characters: Nomomathes (a rich and
"liberally minded" sponsor), Canonologus (a canon lawyer), Codicgnostes
(a civilian), and Anglonomophylax (a common lawyer).3 t7 Finally, and most
importantly, Fulbecke's works did not attain the depth and sophistication
displayed by the works of Gentili.
Fulbecke's objective was clear. He purported to discuss "the agreement
and disagreement of these three lawes [canon, civil, and common], and the
causes and reasons of the said agreement and disagreements."'", Fulbecke
was thus following the lead of St. German's dialogues in Doctor and Stu-
dent; 3 9 his purpose was to compare and to synthesize canonist and civilian
principles with the principles of the common law.
Of course, the "dialogue format" was not original with either Fulbecke or
St. German. Fortescue and a score of other early English writers on law and
politics had used it. 3 2 0 In politically sensitive times, a dialogue could be safer
than more direct formats: the author of a dialogue never had to firmly
common lawyers, jurors, and litigious neighbors, "who are so full of Law-points, that
when they sweat, it is nothing but Law ... when they dreame it is profound law." W.
FULBECKE, Introduction to 2 A PARALELLE, supra, at 11 th unpaginated page. As to
his neighbors, " [tlhe booke of Littleton's tenures is there breakfast .... their supper,
and their rere-banquet," id., and as to legal jargon, "there is a vengeance deale of
Latin in it, which put mee to the cost to buy a Thomases Dictionarie, but it is no great
matter for that, for it wil serve my sone Reginold, when he shall bee tenne yeares
olde ... ." Id. at 13th unpaginated page.
117 W. FULBECKE, Introduction to the Dialogues, in I A PARALLELE, supra note 5,
at 20th unpaginated page.
318 1 A PARALLELE, at title page.
319 See notes 165-69 and accompanying text supra.
320 See J. FORTESCUE, supra note 96 (a dialogue between "The Chancellor" and
"The Prince"); note 214 supra. Only a few years before Fulbecke published A
Parallele, a writer identifying himself as "W.S." (William Stafford?) published a
five-way "dialogue," A COMPENDIOUS OR BRIEFE EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN ORDI-
NARY COMPLAINTS OF DIVERS OF OUR COUNTRY MEN IN THESE OUR DAYES: WHICH
ALTHOUGH THEY ARE IN SOME PARTE UNJUST & FRIVOLOUS, YET THEY ARE BY WAY
OF DIALOGUE THOROUGHLY DEBATED & DISCUSSED BY W.S. GENTLEMAN (London
1581). This work featured a "knight," a "merchant," a "farmer," a "hatmaker,"
and a "doctor of law." St. German himself had also employed a dialogue format in
his dispute with Sir Thomas More on religious matters. C. ST. GERMAN, A DIALOGUE
BETWIXTE TWO ENGLISHMENM, WHEREOF ONE WAS CALLED SALEM AND THE
OTHER BIZANCE (London 1533), noted in 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE DICTIO-
NARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1841 (1975). In 1572, a civilian, Thomas Wilson,
published a similar type of work. T. WILSON, A DISCOURSE UPPON USURYE, BY WAY
OF DIALOGUE AND ORACIONS, FOR THE BETTER VARIETYE AND MORE DELITE OF ALL
THOSE THAT SHALL READE THYS TREATISE (London 1572). Wilson undoubtedly
chose the usually inoffensive dialogue format because usury was such a hotly con-
tested intersection between canon law and common law.
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commit his opinion to one side or the other. Earlier civilians, such as
Thomas Martin, had discovered that unqualified attack provoked retalia-
tion. 321 Dialogues, on the other hand, suggested reasonable discourse and a
resolution of differences.
The popularity of such "discourse" and "dialogue" as literary devices
among educated Elizabethans was a mark of the Elizabethans' dynamic,
optimistic attitude. The Elizabethans had a faith that a "cosmic order" was
inherent in all existence, both physical and abstract; this faith was manifest
in Hooker's theology; in the art of Marlowe, Spencer, and Shakespeare;
and in the philosophy of Bacon and Raleigh. 322 Synthesis of the old with the
new, of the religious with the secular, and of the law with reason and
science, was more than possible-for the Elizabethans it was natural and
right. The speed with which radical change was actually occurring in Tudor
society3 23 placed a very high premium on such a faith, because the faith
implied that apparent opposites could be reconciled. It was a necessary faith
in a progressive synthesis.
This faith had already encouraged some attempts by English jurists to
synthesize the substantive law into what St. German called "maxims," 3 24 or
at least to superimpose on legal rules something more than the chronological
or topical order typical of many medieval texts. Thus, books such as Ab-
raham Fraunce's The Lawyers Logike, published in 1588, attempted to
"exemplify the praecepts of logike by the practise of the common lawe." 325
Fraunce proceeded to reduce the complex Earle of Northumberland's case
to an elaborate structured diagram, 326 with only mixed success. He also
"diagrammed" a popular law text, Stanford's Pleas of the Crown,3 2 7 and
even a section of Virgil! 328 The result was hardly enlightening.
Lodowick Lloyd tackled an even more astonishing task in his A Briefe
Conference of Divers Lawes: Divided into certaine Regiments, 329 published
321 See T. MARTIN ("Doctour of the Civile Lawes"), A TRAICTISE DECLARYNG
AND PLAINLY PROVYNG, THAT THE PRETENDED MARRIAGE OF PRIESTS AND PRO-
FESSED PERSONES IS NO MARRIAGE (London 1554) (Beale T414). Martin's treatise
was answered in kind by ANON., A DEFENSE OF PRIESTES MARRIAGE, STABLYSSHED
BY THE IMPERIALL LAWES OF THE REALME OF ENGLANDE, AGAYNST A CIVILIAN,
NAMYING HYMSELFE THOMAS MARTIN DOCTOUR OF THE CIVILE LAWES & C.
(London 1565) (Beale T263). Martin, a member and generous patron of the College of
Advocates, got his D.C.L. at Catholic Bourges, whence may have come his canoni-
cal views of priest marriage. See G. SQUIBB, supra note 14, at 63, 65, 81, 151.
322 See generally E. TILLYARD, THE ELIZABETHAN WORLD PICTURE 1-15
(1944).
323 See Thorne, supra note 221, at 10.
324 See note 196 supra.
325 A. FRAUNCE, THE LAWYERS LOGIKE, at title page (London 1588).
326 Id. at 125-39.
327 Id. at 139-51 (diagramming W. STANFORD, LES PLEES DEL CORON (London
1560)).
328 Id. at 123-24.
329 L. LLOYD, A BRIEFE CONFERENCE OF DIVERS LAWS: DIVIDED INTO CER-
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in 1602. This book swept the Old Testament, the classic literature, the civil
law, and whatever else Lloyd knew about "old Gaules," "Egiptians,"
"Israelites," "Athenians," and others into broad generalizations. 330
Lloyd's purpose was to "prove" propositions such as, "The choice of wise
Governours [is] to governe the people, and to execute the lawes among all
Nations, and also the education and obedience of theyr children to their
Parents and Magistrates." ' 33 ' Lloyd was convinced that an examination of
"divers lawes," for all their imperfections and faults, would, in toto, make
clear the cosmic order which all laws, as well as all nature, ultimately
reflected.33 1
The same faith that motivated Fraunce and Lloyd motivated Fulbecke.
But like their works, Fulbecke's Parallele was an intellectual disappoint-
ment. Fulbecke had neither the insights of a St. German nor the massive
knowledge of a Gentili. He incorrectly described the development of canon,
civil, and common law as if they were "unrelated systems of separate
growth." 33 3 Yet, at the same time he paradoxically underestimated the
actual differences between the three systems doctrinally.334 Fulbecke failed
to even acknowledge the problems that synthesis would present.
Fulbecke's failure is illustrated by his treatment of contract law. Contract
law loomed large both in Fulbecke's book and in the legal world in which he
lived. But that law was in a period of transition. As Thorne has observed,
Tudor "[c]ommercial transactions were handled by means of self-executing,
medieval forms ingeniously adapted to post-medieval enterprises" 33 -- i.e.,
defeasible bonds or the processes available under the Statutes Staple. Be-
cause relief against these bonds in the case of abuse was to be had in
Chancery, contract law remained theoretically vestigal, even though there
was a large and growing amount of commercial activity. To the extent that
this activity was international-and a good deal was-fascinating questions
could and did arise. Thus, the more sophisticated civilian contractual theory
found itself, through mishap, tested in the English courts.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that when Fulbecke set out to
provide "diverse repast" to "the severall students of the Canon lawe, the
TAINE REGIMENTS (London 1602). Garland Publishing, Inc., published a facsimile
edition, edited by Professors David S. Berkowitz and Samuel E. Thorne, in 1978.
330 See, e.g., id. at 44.
3 Id.; see id. at 53-56.
332 Id. at 1-10. This spirit of comparative study was not limited to lawyers. See, e.g.,
T. GODWYN'E, ROMANAE HISTORAE: AN ENGLISH EXPOSITION OF THE ROMAN
ANTIQUITIES; WHEREIN MANY ROMAN AND ENGLISH OFFICES ARE PARALLEL'D,
AND DIVERSE OBSCURE PHRASES ARE EXPLAINED 204-05 (rev. ed. Oxford 1661) (1st
ed. Oxford 1614). Godwyn was a Bachelor of Divinity.
333 Stibbs, Sir Walter Raleigh's Discourse of Tenures, 22 TUL. L. REV. 273, 275
(1947).
334 See Jolowicz, supra note 113, at 139, 146.
135 Thorne, supra note 221, at 21.
[Vol. 61: 1
EARLY ENGLISH CIVILIAN WRITERS
Civill law, and the Common lawe" according to "their disagreeing appe-
tites, ' 3 3 6 he devoted his first chapter to "Contract ' 3 3 7 and his third to
"Bargaining and Sales." ' 338 If one were a good Bartolist, and Fulbecke so
aspired, one would find "in the garden of the Common-weale, some lawes
like to weeds, others like to flowers; as a diligent Bee he extracted a good
juice out of the better lawes." 3 3 9 In Fulbecke's view, a good law survived
"because other nations with whom wee have commerce, & entercourse, doe
not find their commodities or liberties to be impeached by this Lawe. "340
Contract and commercial law, therefore, was an obvious place for Fulbecke
to start.
But Fulbecke, as the "Bartolist Bee," simply did not rise to the challenge.
Instead, he flitted from legal system to legal system and topic to topic,
avoiding both the doctrinal conflicts and the tough questions. For example,
he had his character Codicgnostes (the civilian) state that "the chiefe ground
of contracts is consent, consent groweth of knowledge and from a man's free
will." ' 34 1 But he then shifted the discussion to the contractual capacity of
"Monkes & Friers," about which Canonologus (the canonist) spoke at
length. 342 Then he made Nomomathes (the sponsor) raise the issue of infant
contracts, on which Anglonomophylax (the common lawyer) continued at
great length, comparing the capacity of infants and monks. 343 This continued
as to servants, wives, etc., until finally Nomomathes raised the tough ques-
tion: "I would have you proceed to declare now by the material causes of
contracts, they may stand or fall?" ' 344 The answer was from Codicgnostes,
336 W. FULBECKE, To the Courteous Reader, in 1 A PARALLELE, supra note 5, at
5th unpaginated page. Fulbecke continued, "It seemed straunge unto me, that these
three lawes, should not as the three Graces have their handes linked together, and
their lookes directly fixed the one upon the other, but like the two faces of Janus, the
one should be turned from the other .... Id. This Fulbecke found most regrettable,
because "these lawes are the sinewes of a state, the Sciences of government, & the
arts of a comon weale .... ." Id.
337 1 A PARALLELF, supra note 5, at la.
338 Id. at lib.
339 W. FULBECKE, supra note 336, at 7th unpaginated page. Fulbecke was speak-
ing of King Edward the Confessor.
340 Id. at 18th unpaginated page. According to Fulbecke, the other two reasons
why much of the law of England "flourished long in this good estate" were "that
there is nothing in it which to the Law of God is crosse or opposite" and because it is
"rather popular, then peremptorie, rathere accepted, then exacted, and rather em-
braced, then perswaded." Id. The primary position accorded canon law is consistent
with Fulbecke's view that, of the three, the canon law was the "more auncient, then
the other twaine, and of greater continuance." Id. at 13th unpaginated page. Ful-
becke, like Lodowick Lloyd, included examples such as "ancient Egiptian[ ] priests
[that] were judges" and "Druidae" judges. Id. at 13th-14th unpaginated pages.
341 1 A PARALLFLE, supra note 5, at Ia.
342 Id. at 2a.
143 Id. at 2a, 4b.
144 Id. at 4b (misnumbered -3b" in the 1618 ed.).
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who replied that a contract had a "materiall substance whereof it is made"
and that "in contracts and covenants as well these which are determinable
by the Law of Nations, as these which are sentenced by the Civil Law and
other Lawes .... some material cause is requisite. ' 3 45 Thus Fulbecke had
developed the dialogue into a critical contrast between "consideration" at
common law and the "causa" required by the canon and civil law-a
contrast not unlike the one developed in St. German's discussion of nudum
pactum. 3 46
At this critical point, however, Fulbecke allowed Nomomathes to change
the subject: "Why," he interposed, "are any contracts ordered by the Law
of Nations?" '347 Codicgnostes responded by raising Gentili's favorite ex-
ample, the contracts of ambassadors. Fulbecke simplistically described
these contracts as subject to the "Law of Nations"a 4 8-and that was all.
There was no serious analysis of what the "Law of Nations" was, despite
Gentili's excellent analysis in De Legationibus.3 49 Fulbecke defined the
basic principles of the ius gentium as deriving from the "civil law," which
was "not ... any otherthen ius Romanum, or ius antiquei Romanum. "350
But he went on to include "that which hath beene commented thereupon, or
added thereunto." 3 5 Did these additions include the contemporaneous
substantive law specifically governing ambassadors' contracts? In fact, the
bulk of Fulbecke's cited authority was from the Roman Digest.312 Gentili's
exhaustive research concerning the actual customary international law of
Europe was almost completely ignored.
In the end, Fulbecke was less helpful than Gentili. Although Fulbecke's
dialogue format provided a perfect opportunity for analysis, he shied away
whenever the opportunity arose. Fulbecke's closest approach to any coher-
,ent theory of ius gentium was in his analysis of the contracts of "Pyrats and
robbers." Is one bound by a contract to supply goods to a pirate ship, or to
pay a debt to an outlaw? "The question is not what may be done unto [pyrats
345 Id. at 5a.
346 See C. Sr. GERMAN, supra note 165, at 301-07; note 149 supra.
347 1 A PARALLELE, supra note 5, at 5a.
348 "Yea, for by that law an Embassador may be impleaded ..... Id. Fulbecke did
not discuss Gentili's hard question of whether an ambassador should always be free
from obligation if, under customary international law, he would not be bound, and
whether there also should be a "natural law" based on mutuality or unjust enrichment.
See notes 281-94 and accompanying text supra. Fulbecke touched on the unjust
enrichment question, see I A PARALLELE, supra note 5, at 5a, but reached no
resolution.
149 See notes 275-305 and accompanying text supra.
350 W. FULBECKE, supra note 336, at 15th unpaginated page.
351 Id.
352 All of Fulbecke's cited authority as to ambassadors' contracts came from civil
law sources. See I A PARALLELE, supra note 5, at 5a.
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and robbers] ... but how by the rule of equitie and soundness of reason they
ought to be dealt with. For to dispute of Law is to dispute of a publike bond
whereby wee are bound . . . but we are not bound to such lawless people
. . . by anie common respect." '353 Thus, while such men apparently might
have contract rights under a particular national law, in Fulbecke's view they
should have none under the ius gentium, because their activities put them
beyond the protection of the international community of law abiding
people.35 4 Furthermore, although his language is not clear, Fulbecke may
have distinguished this ius gentium from "the rule of equitie and soundness
of reason," which could be applied by national courts to the contracts of
"pyrats and robbers." '3 55
Thus, the old, tough theoretical problem was again encountered. The ius
gentium apparently had some specific substantive rules, quite distinct from
vague postulates of ratio naturalis, "natural reason." But Fulbecke gave no
sustained analysis of how these rules were to be dealt with, particularly
vis-h-vis national law, in terms of contract law or anything else. 35 6 At least
311 Id. at 5b-6a.
114 Id. at 6a.
355 Id.
356 In The Pandectes, Fulbecke developed a "consent" theory which is similar to
the Roman ius inter gentes. See THE PANDECTES, supra note 316, at 82; notes 89-90
and accompanying textsupra. "[T]he Law of Nations" is defined as "nothing else but
the communion and league of Nations." THE PANDECTES, supra note 316, at 82.
Thus, Fulbecke's discussion of this law consisted of "several discourses of the
questions, points, and matters of Law, wherein the Nations of the world doe consent
and accord." Id. at title page (emphasis supplied). Fulbecke added that these areas of
consent would give "great light" to both the "Civill Law" and "Common law of this
Realme of England." Id. But, in fact, all of his specific categories involved either great
principles "respected of all Nations"--including rules of "time" and "seasons," and
"'consent" in marriage, id. at 22-28, "that by the practice of all Nations Democracie
hath been sette down, and Monarchie established," id. at 28-33-or matters based on
the general consent of nations, i.e., treaties, safe conduct guarantees, rules of war, etc.
Id. at 33-51. Thus Fulbecke either chose areas where the ius gentium was, by his
definition, fully part of all national laws, or where the parties were nations themselves.
This neatly avoided the critical area of controversy in England: whether there was a
private, customary ius gentium, neither part of the national law nor pertaining to
relations between nations as states, which should be applied in the Admiralty or in
other national courts instead of the common law in special transnational cases involv-
ing merchants or other private parties.
Fulbecke did state that private civil law should be used in matters involving heral-
dry. "I doe respect the good of the civilian, who in these matters is verie often
employed. And of the professors of common Law, who shall not doe amisse, in
considering ... the Statute of 13 Rich. 2 cap ... [which states that matters of arms] can
not be determined, nor discussed by the Common Law." Id. at 33b. As to the critical
area of contracts with foreign merchants, Fulbecke merely observed that they deserve
the special protection of the Prince. Id. at 71b-72b.
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Gentili had seen the issue.3"7
Fulbecke's book continued in this frustrating, unfocused way through
many doctrinal topics, avoiding or misunderstanding the tough questions,
usually in a manner which minimized the doctrinal distinctions between the
three rival systems of law. 318 The Paralleles was a wonderful piece of
wishful thinking. Fulbecke shared, with Lodowyck Lloyd and Abraham
Fraunce, the great Elizabethan faith. A cosmic consensus must be out there,
somewhere .319
This faith was predicated on a view of the ius gentium as old as Ulpian. 360
Man was basically a reasonable creature. This fact meant that there must be
a "law of all men," common to allthe differing but reasonable peoples.
Thus, Fulbecke's major premise was that common legal principles must
have united the differing but reasonable legal cultures of the civilians,
canonists, and common lawyers. This was an Elizabethan dream. A Paral-
lele was published in the last year of Elizabeth's reign. The terrible irony
was that within five short years that dream would be an irreparable wreck,
and English civilian literature would have taken a new and bitter turn,
prescient of civil war.
36 1
117 See notes 300-05 and accompanying text supra.
358 For example, take the section on Bargains and Sales. 1 A PARALLELE, supra
note 5, at I lb. The section began with "what things are forbidden to be sold," i.e.,
"evill poisons." Id. It focused on the difference between an "evill" and a "good"
poison, rather than on questions of legal doctrine. Id. at 12a. And so it went. The
remaining passage of the section, which was structured around the Roman law of
mistake, duress, and fraud, has Anglonomophylax arguing that the common law
"differeth verie little, or nothing from yours [civil law]," id. at 15a, and citing, among
other things, the doctrine of non est factum for deeds and grants. Id. at 15a-b.
There were some superior sections on contracts, at least in terms of insight into
contemporary legal developments. Id. at 6a-7a (implied consideration); id. at 54b-57a
(civil and English law of delivery, bailment); 2 A PARALLELE, supra note 316, at 18a-b
(mutuality); id. at 21b-22b (remedies, forms of action).
359 Fulbecke's analytical shortcomings raise questions about his credentials. He
was not a member of the College of Advocates. He did receive the Oxford B.A. and
M.A., apparently in civil law study. He claimed to have received a doctorate in civil
law "at an undesignated continental university," but he was never "incorporated" as
a D.C.L. at Oxford or Cambridge, and modern writers are skeptical. See B. LEVACK,
supra note 14, at 136. He was a member of Gray's Inn, like Gentili, and he praised
Gray's Inn: "I pray God this s[h]ining pot [Gray's Inn] may still continue her silver
of Learning and Law." THF PANDECTES, supra note 316, at 56b. But I question
Levack's conclusion that "Fulbecke's lack of association with Doctors' Commons
detracts from the significance of his pioneering efforts." B. LEVACK, supra note 14,
at 137. Rather, it was his lack of resolution and clarity of analysis that marred his
work.
360 See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
361 Despite his good intentions and Gray's Inn associations, Fulbecke had some
civilian doctrinal traits that would have been unwelcome to common lawyers. Thus
Fulbecke's section on" Monarchie" in THE PANDECTES, supra note 316, ch. 6, started
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5. The "Interpreter": John Cowell (1554-1611)
For all his failings, Fulbecke's valiant efforts appear to have inspired
another English Bartolist to try his hand at reconciliation and synthesis. This
was a more ingenious and subtle jurist, John Cowell.
Cowell, like Smith, was Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge;
Cowell held the chair from 1594-1611. As a student, he had distinguished
himself in civil law, earning an LL. D. from Cambridge in 1588. He early
came under the patronage of the powerful Bishop Bancroft, for whom he
later acted as vicar-general.3 62 Cowell joined the College of Advocates,
Doctors' Commons, in 1589 or 1590, became Regius Professor in 1594, and,
in 1598, became Master of Cambridge's Trinity Hall, the stronghold of civil
law and the landlord of Doctors' Commons.3 63 There was no doubt that he
was a man of prominence and learning, a thorough civilian and a Bartolist.
Cowell gave careful thought to his choice of a "vehicle" for his views.
Unlike St. German and Fulbecke,3 64 Cowell did not try a dialogue. Nor did
he try a descriptive treatise like Smith's.3 61 Instead, Cowell "invented" two
vehicles that no English civilian had yet employed. First, he created an
Institutes of English law, 366 following the headings of Justinian's Institutes.
Next he wrote a law dictionary, perhaps the most famous law dictionary in
English legal history, the great Interpreter. 3 67 These vehicles were brilliant
out with the royal absolutism of Gentili. "If any man be so straitly minded, that he
thinketh this Royal prerogative to be too large and ample for an absolute Monarchie:
let him think withall that himselfe is so base minded that he cannot sufficiently judge of
the great worth and demerit of so high an estate." Id. at 9a-b. Concededly, Fulbecke
did repeat the classical limitations on the King's power under the law of nations:
'[t]hat by the law of nations Kinges have no such an indefinite power over their
subjects as fathers by the civill law have over their children: for by the law of nations
kinges were chosen ... for the safeguard ... of the lands, good & persons of their
subjects .... Id. at 13a-b. But Fulbecke was a true civilian elitest when it came to
popular democracy. [For the heele can not stand in place of the head, unlesse the
bodie be destroyed and the anatomie monstrous: it is against the nature of the people to
beare rule .... Id. at 29.
362 For biographical information on John Cowell, see 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra
note 139, at 20-22; B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 4-5, 55, 221; G. SQUIBB, supra note 14,
at 164; 1 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1300
(1975); Simon, supra note 100, at 260-72. It is particularly appropriate that Sir Jocelyn
Simon be one of these authorities, as he was President of the Probate, Divorce, and
Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, the "incorporated" civilian jurisdic-
tions that are now part of the Family Division of the High Court of Justice.
363 See note 35 supra (relationship of Trinity Hall to Doctors' Commons).
364 See notes 166-69 (St. German) & 317-20 (Fulbecke) and accompanying text
supra.
365 See notes 233-35 and accompanying text supra.
366 J. COWELL, supra note 102.
367 THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155. European Bartolists had already used both
"Institutes" and Dictionaries. For contemporaneous examples, see J. IlVIBFRTO,
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ideas, and there is every reason to believe that Cowell chose them because
they were inherently noninflammatory. For example, Cowell could have
argued that his Institutes was not advocating Roman or civil law, but was
simply setting out English national law in a particular structure . 68 Similarly,
Cowell could have argued that The Interpreter was simply intended to help
with difficult legal words.3 69 True, some of these words would have civil law
roots, or meanings that could be clarified by reference to civil law counter-
parts, but such civil law references could be justified as being helpful to the
reader. If Cowell incidentally pointed out how much the common law had in
"common" with civil law, or what the relevant rule would be in other
European countries, or if he incidentally conveyed some information about
the ius gentium, or even some limited comparative criticism of the common
law, so much the better.
There is no reason to suspect Cowell of any ulterior purpose other than
Fulbecke's: to "educate" both civilians and common lawyers about their
differences and their common ground-with an emphasis on the latter.
Apparently, Cowell hoped to find a literary vehicle that would, at least,
encourage a thoughtful, low-keyed reception of civilian ideas. If this be true,
ENCHIRIDION IURIS SCRIPTI, MORIBUS & CONSUETUDINE FREQUENTIORE GALLIAE
(Utrecht 1647) (a French civilian dictionary with an alphabetical structure built
around terms of French law); F. ZYPAFO, NOTITIA IURIS BELGICI (Arnheim 1642) (a
Belgian "Institutes"). There are more, and earlier, examples. For discussion of
Dutch examples, see R. FEENSTRA & C. WAAL, SEVENTEENTH CENTURY LAW
PROFESSORS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CIVIL LAW
18-44 (1975).
368 This was certainly the implicit argument of his translator when the book was
reprinted in 1651, during the Commonwealth. See "W. G.," Preface to J. COWEL
[sic], THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND ("W.G." trans. London 1651).
The translator represented that Cowell's prior unpopularity was due to his "too much
crying up Parliament Priviledgeg, rendred him not so much a favorite of those former
times as his worth merited; nor his Bookes so vendible as they have been since these
late changes in England .... "Id. at 3d unpaginated page. He added, "I hope, for the
Authors sake it will find no less acceptance in the English World, then if he had lived
to mayntaine what he in that Age durst avow; and thereby appeared in his owne
naturall and proper coulours." Id. at 4th unpaginated page.
369 See THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, "[wJherein is setfoorth the true meaning
of all, or the most part of such Words and Termes, as are mentioned in the Lawe
Writers, or Statutes of this victorious and renowned Kingdome .... A Worke not
onely profitable . . .but necessary .... " Id. at title page.
The civilians of other nations ... raised this kinde of worke ... to an inexpected
excellencie .... Lastly one Caluinus a Doctor of Heidelberge, like a laborious
Bee, hath gathered.., the best iuyce of their flowers, and made up a hive full of
delectable honie. And by this example would I gladly incite the learned in our
common lawes and antiquities of England ....
J. COWELL, To the Readers, in THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, at 5th unpaginated
page. Note Cowell's reference to the "'laborious Bee" as a symbol of Bartolist
efforts, a page out of Fulbecke's book. See note 339 and accompanying text supra.
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Cowell was, for all his originality, a spectacular failure. The Interpreter was
suppressed, almost at once, by royal proclamation. 70 It produced a parlia-
mentary outcry. The Institutes became one of the truly rare books of English
legal literature. It appeared only once in English-and that was during the
Commonwealth, when it was translated pursuant to the act of the Rump
Parliament that abolished Latin and French in law books.3 7' For Cowell, all
of this would have been the ultimate irony.
Cowell had, besides his Institutes and his dictionary, a third idea for a work
that would bring together the civil and common law. He intended to publish
a tract called De Regulis Iuris, "wherein my intent is, by collating the
cases of both lawes, to shewe, that they both be raised of one foundation,
and differ more in language and termes than in substance, and therefore were
they reduced to one methode (as they easily might) to be attained (in a
manner) with all one paines." 371 In 1607, Cowell said that he had the tract in
"some towardness," but apparently he never finished it. "[M]y time im-
ported to these studies, being but stolne from mine emploiments of greater
necessitie," he explained, "I cannot make the haste I strive, or perhaps that
the discourse may deserve. ' 373 Perhaps the manuscript still exists. This
work could have been the fulfillment of the promise of a great comparative
work, worthy of St. German. It would undoubtedly have surpassed Ful-
becke's efforts.
Cowell's first attempt at such a work was The Institutes or Institutiones
Juris Anglicani.374 It was published in 1605, just three years after Fulbecke's
Parallele. Unlike Fulbecke's books, The Institutes was published in Latin.
This, in itself, would seem peculiar for a book designed to give an organiza-
tional structure to a national English law still written in an archaic profes-
sional tongue, Law French. It was reprinted, once again in Latin, in 1630. 311
In 1651, in the middle of the Commonwealth and within two years after
Charles I's execution, it was finally translated into English and printed for
the last time .376
370 See note 426 and accompanying text infra.
371 An Act for turning the Books of the Law, and all Process and Proceeding in
Courts of Justice, into English, ACTS & ORDS. INTERREGNUM 455 (1650) (repealed 12
Car. 2, c. 3, § 4 (1660)); see J. COWEL [sic], THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND ("W. G." trans. 1651) (1st ed. London 1605) [hereinafter cited as COWELL'S
INSTITUTES]; note 376 and accompanying text infra.
372 J. COWELL, supra note 369, at 6th unpaginated page.
171 Id. Levack states that the tract never appeared. B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at
138 n.4. The manuscript would be a magnificant find!
174 J. COWELL, supra note 102.
375 J. COWELL, INSTITUTIONES JURIS ANGLICANI (2d ed. London 1630) (1st ed.
London 1605).
376 COWELL'S INSTITUTES, supra note 371. The words "according to Act of Par-
liament" on the title page of the 1651 edition must refer to the act of the "Rump"
Parliament abolishing the use of Latin and law French in law works. An Act for turning
the Books of the Law, and all Process and Proceedings in Courts of Justice, into
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It was certainly a most peculiar book. As Sir Jocelyn Simon observed,
"Not surprisingly, it was unsuccessful .. .. 137 The English law was fairly
faithfully set out, and there were extensive citations, largely to English
sources. But the legal sources were heavily weighted toward the great
medieval treatises-particularly Bracton3 78 and its "imitators," Britton3 79
and Fleta38 0-and these works were themselves strongly influenced by the
civil law. Thus, Cowell advanced civilian ideas while citing English common
law sources.38 For example, he began The Institutes with the motto, "Jus-
tice is a constant and perpetual will of sending unto everyone their Due." 382
This he cited to Bracton "1.1.c.4, num. 2."383 Bracton was a good English
English, ACTS & ORDS. INTERREGNUM 455 (1650) (repealed 12 Car. 2, c.3, § 4 (1660)).
See Mathew, Law French, 55 LAW Q. REV. 358, 364 (1938). See also 6 W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 571 (2d ed. 1937). According to Francis
North, "" "[D]ivers books were translated, as the great work of Coke's Reports, etc.,
but upon the revival of the law [Restoration], those all died and are now but waste
paper.' " Id. at 571 n.3 (quoting F. NORTH, DISCOURSE ON THE STUDY OF THE LAW
12).
377 Simon, supra note 100, at 263 (Simon's statement continued, "it was rather
like crushing an Ugly Sister's foot, bunions and all, into Cinderella's glass slipper.").
378 H. BRACTON, supra note 110.
379 BRITTON (F. Nichols ed. & trans. 1865) (1st ed. n.p. c. 1530) (written c. 1290);
see P. WINFIELD, supra note 133, at 263-65.
380 FLETA (Selden Soc'y Pub. Nos. 72 & 89, H. Richardson & G. Sayles ed. &
trans. 1953, 1972) (1st ed. London 1647) (written c. 1290); see P. WINFIELD, supra
note 133, at 263-65.
381 Thus, in a typical section-Title IX, "Of Paternal Jurisdiction" (Legal Power of
Parents Over Children)-there were roughly thirty-four citations. COWELL'S INSTI-
TUTES, supra note 371, at 16-18. Of these, thirty-three were technically to English
sources; the remaining one was to Justian's Institutes. Id. at 18. But of these "En-
glish" citations, all but nine were to Bracton or to Bracton's imitators, Britton and
Fleta. Id. at 16-18. Of the remaining nine citations, one was to Glanvill, and one was to
Doctor and Student. Id. at 18. Only seven citations were to contemporary "common
law" sources. Id. at 16-18.
Elsewhere in Cowell's Institutes, there were also citations to Cujas "on civil
marriage" and "Biblical parallels to Roman Law." Id. at 20-21; see Ziskind, supra
note 16, at 22, 27. But there was a good deal more Roman doctrine included, as Cowell
systematically reproduced those passages in Bracton, Britton, and Fleta that were
derived directly from the Digest orJustinian's Institutes. There were also citations to
Hotman, COWELL'S INSTITUTES, supra note 371, at 73, 85, & 90, together with direct
citations toJustinian's Institutes, usually by indicating "institut-Imperiales eod. tit."
or just "Inst. eod." in the margin. The parallel construction of Cowell's Institutes to
Justinian's Institutes, a very common student book in the 17th century, made it simple
for any student to cross-reference any part of English law to Roman law even without
explicit citations. See, e.g., id. at 17 ("cross-cite" on Roman adoption), 131 ("cross-
cite" on substitution). There were other citations to continental civilians. See, e.g., id.
at 102, 105 (custom).
382 COWELL'S INSTITUTES, supra note 371, at 1.
383 Id.
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source, but, as Cowell knew, Bracton at that point was quoting the Roman
Justinian's Institutes, book I, title 13 84-the corresponding title to Cowell's
Institutes. Cowell repeated throughout the book this process of citing
Roman law "'in disguise" by citing sections of medieval English sources
which in turn were quoting Roman law. 38 Moreover, Cowell also cited
extensively to such civilian-oriented sources as St. German's Doctor and
Student, 38 6 to Hotman, 387 and to Swinburne, the leading civilian practitioner
in York. 3
88
The Institutes was not a success. Perhaps it was in the wrong language to
reach the common lawyers or, as Holdsworth speculates, it was in too
unusual or radical a form. 389 Civilians could probably have learned little new
about English law from it, since such law could be found in the standard
common law texts already included in most civilian libraries.3 90 But it is
striking that the book was translated and reprinted during the Common-
wealth, when radical schemes of codification and simplification of the law
were being seriously discussed. That a work by the conservative Cowell
could provide a potential blueprint for radical reform was an ironic by-prod-
uct of his attempt to apply civilian principles of structure to English law.
His attempt may have had an impact on Francis Bacon and Jeremy
Bentham. 3
9 1
The Institutes had other important aspects. According to Cowell's origi-
nal "Epistola Dedicatoria" in the Latin edition, omitted in the English
"Commonwealth" edition, one of the objectives of The Institutes was to
promote the union of the legal system in Scotland and England. 392 For years,
384 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 110, at 23; INSTITUTES 1.1 pr.
385 E.g., COWELL'S INSTITUTES, supra note 371, at 77, 82, 108, 132, & 144.
386 Id. at4,6, 18, 33, 58,80, 107,108,125,140,146,150,155,156, 157, 171,172,187,
188, 192, 193, 194, 195, 200, 202, 203, 205, 206, 212, 226, 227, 230, 231, 250, & 251.
387 Id. at 73 & 85.
388 Id. at 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 138, 143, & 149. Henry Swinburne of York
was a brilliant civilian lawyer. London had no monopoly on civilian talent. There was a
substantial number of civilian lawyers in the English provinces, particularly those
"humble part-time civilians" who acted as judges in the northern ecclesiastical courts.
See J. DERRETT, HENRY SWINBURNE, CIVIL LAWYER OF YORK 6 (Barthwick Papers
No. 44, 1973). Swinburne was the first Englishman to write a manual of canon law.
Id. at 1. Like Cowell and Fulbecke, he admired Bartolus. Id. at 2.
389 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 21.
390 Id. For an example of an English civilian's knowledge of common law at the
time, see J. DERRETT, supra note 388, at 47-48 (setting out an extensive list of
Swinburne's sophisticated common law sources).
391 The impact of the works of such early civilian writers as Cowell on such later
common law jurists as Bacon and Bentham will be discussed in detail in the third
Article in this series.
392 J. COWELL, supra note 102, at 10; see 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at
21 & n.3; B. Levack, English Law, Scots Law, and the Union, 1603-1707 (unpub-
lished paper delivered at 1977 meeting of American Society of Legal History).
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the civilian influence in Scotland had been far stronger than in England.
Scottish law students studied on the continent in large numbers: for exam-
ple, at Leyden, from 1601 to 1700, nearly 351 Scots matriculated for civil law
studies, the largest foreign group except for the Germans. 393 English civil-
ians, including Cowell, would have regarded themselves as well-suited
intermediaries between Scotland and England, particularly after the union of
the crowns in 1603. Cowell doubtless hoped that his Institutes would assist
in this important process. 394
The Institutes also made Cowell a rival of the powerful Sir Edward Coke,
who, as noted before, was preparing his own Institutes of the English law.
The first volume of Coke's Institutes was to be structured around the
Tenures of Littleton39 5-the same Littleton that Cowell had subjected to
derision in his Interpreter. Coke was not pleased. "Thenceforward, in his
amiable and elegant way, Coke referred to the Master of Trinity Hall
[Cowell] as 'Dr. Cowheel.' ",396 Indeed, it is very likely that Cowell's
Institutes spurred Coke forward both in his efforts to complete his own
massive Institutes and in his attack, to commence only two years after the
appearance of Cowell's Institutes, on the civilian Admiralty stronghold.3 97
Paradoxically, Cowell's law dictionary, The Interpreter,3 98 enjoyed an
entirely different fate from his Institutes. Although The Interpreter initially
met an intense storm of protest and was suppressed in 1610, 3 9 9 it became
extremely popular. In fact, The Interpreter went on to become one of the
most popular of all the early English law books, going through more than
twelve editions before 1727.400
When The Interpreter was first published, the "air was thick with con-
troversy."401 The year was 1607. One year before, Richard Knowles had
393 R. FEENSTRA & C. WAAL, supra note 367, at 82 n.405.
194 See note 392 supra. Three years earlier, in 1603, Sir Thomas Craig (1538-1608),
the Scottish jurist, published his lus Feudale, patterned on Cujas' De Feudi of 1566.
T. CRAIG, lus FEUDALE (London 1655). One of his objects was to encourage the
unification of the Scottish law and the English common law. See Stibbs, supra note
333, at 297.
191 Coke's First Institute ("Coke on Littleton") was published in 1628. E. COKE,
supra note 204. The other three Institutes were published after his death; one was
published in 1642, and two in 1644. See P. WINFIELD, supra note 133, at 336-37. For
Cowell's derision of Littleton, see notes 414-16 and accompanying text infra.
396 Simon, supra note 100, at 263.
391 See notes 457-58 and accompanying text infra.
398 THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155.
"I See notes 422-26 and accompanying text infra.
400 It was published in the "unexpurgated" version in 1607, and reissued, some-
times in expurgated form, in 1637, 1638, 1672, and 1684, and edited by Kennet in 1701,
1709, and 1727. 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 21 n.2; B. LEVACK, supra note
14, at 104 n.1. It remains today "most useful, but prescientific." P. WINFELD, supra
note 133, at 17-18.
401 J. DERRETT, supra note 388, at 27.
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translated Bodin's controvertial Republique into English. 40 2 This made Bo-
din's absolutist views of royal sovereignty easily available in England for the
first time. In 1607, Sir Thomas Ridley published his aggressive A View of the
Civile and Ecclesiastical Law, 40 3 which responded in kind to Coke's attack
on the civilian Admiralty jurisdiction, an attack which peaked in 1607. All in
all, it was a hot year. Nevertheless, the massive outcry against Cowell's
Interpreter was unprecedented, and must have been a surprise. Senior's
theory is that Coke and the common lawyers were already incensed at
Cowell. Cowell had, at Bishop Bancroft's request, drafted the complaints of
the clergy against the common law prohibitions, hardly an endearing ges-
ture. Coke may have already been concerned about the rivalry presented by
The Institutes, and decided that now was the time to stop this spokesman for
absolutism and alien learning. 40 4 But, as Chrimes rightly pointed out, there
was no hard evidence that Coke personally played any part in the suppres-
sion. 40
5
What was so offensive about Cowell's Interpreter? The critical "offend-
ing definitions" were "King," "Parliament," "Prerogative of the King,"
and "Subsidy." Also offensive were the sections on "Praemunire," "Pro-
hibition," "Martiall Law," "Litleton," and even "Admirall," which gave a
particularly early origin for the embattled civilian Admiralty jurisdiction.
For example, in defining "King," Cowell stated that the King "is aboue
the Law by his absolute power" and only consents "for the beter and equall
course in making Lawes [to the three estates of Parliament] . .. yet this, in
divers learned men's opinions, is not of constreinte but of his owne benig-
nitie, or by reason of his [coronation oath] .... -406 In defining the "Preroga-
402 Jean Bodin's Republique was translated into English and published in the critical
year of 1606 under the title The Six Bookes of the Commonweale. J. BODIN, supra note
117. The translator was Richard Knolles (c. 1548-1610). Knolles was a Fellow at
Lincoln College at Oxford, and had close connections to the English Roman Catholic
College at Douay, but very little is known about Knolles himself. He left Oxford in
about 1572, and "the next twenty years of his career are blank." McRae, supra note
117, at A57. He turned up as a schoolmaster in Sandwich, where he translated Bodin
under the encouragement of the school's patron, Sir Peter Manwood. Id. at A60.
403 T. RIDLEY, supra note 84.
404 W. SENIOR, supra note 14, at 86-88;see 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at
22; Simon, supra note 100, at 269. It is clear that Coke had read part of The Interpreter,
and did not like it. See Coke, supra note 208. But personal relations between
Cowell and Coke, although sensitive, did not seem bitter. Indeed, Cowell was said "to
have brought dishonor both to Cambridge University and the civilians by relinquishing
the place of the Vice-Chancellor at dinner to Sir Edward Coke during a visit of the
justice there in 1604." B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 141.
405 Chrimes, The Constitutional Ideas of Dr. John Cowell, 44 ENG. HIST. REV.
461, 465 (1949). But see Simon, supra note 100, at 260-69.
406 THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, entry on King (Rex). Cowell thus gave an
indicative short shrift to the medieval lex regia texts, which could be read to base
royal authority on the subjects' consent. See, e.g., 2 H. BRACTON, supra note 110, at
304-05 (providing a basis for royal authority in the coronation oath, and apparently
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tive of the King," Cowell also declared that it was an "especial power...
that the King hath in any kind over and above other persons, and above the
ordinary course of the common law .... ,,407 As to "Subsidie," it was a tax
"assessed by Parliament," but it was not "granted" by Parliament-it was
the King's absolute right, and the King "doth of favour admit the consent of
his subjects therein." '40 8
Seen in a civilian context, there was little question that Cowell did not
perceive the King personally as above the law. It was only the King's
sovereign power that was, by necessity, above the law: no one could be the
King's equal if the King was to be sovereign. 40 9 This reasoning was shared
by Gentili, and certainly Fulbecke was equally adamant. 41 0 Obviously, the
King should obey the positive law, except where to do so would injure his
trust to the people. This trust was ordained by the higher law of God, or by
natural reason, the ratio naturalis-a point made by Fulbecke. 41 Thus,
under "Martiall lawe," Cowell gave the following definition:
[T]he law that dependeth upon the voice of the King, or the King's
lieuetenant in warres. For how be it, the King for the indifferent and
equall temper of lawer to all his subjects, doe not in time of peace make
any lawes but by the consent of the three estates in Parliament: yet in
warres by reason of great daungers rising of small occasions, he useth
absolute power: in so much as his word goeth for law. 41 2
Cowell's authority was no less than his civilian predecessor, Sir Thomas
Smith. 41 3 Cowell added insult to injury with his dictionary entry on "Little-
presenting the lex regia-the law that binds the king-as flowing from below-the
subjects-rather than from above), cited in THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, entry
on King (Rex). I owe this insight to Charles Donahue.
407 Id., entry on Prerogative of the King (emphasis supplied).
408 Id., entry on Subsidie.
409 Id., entries on Prerogative of the King & Subsidie.
410 THE PANDECTES, supra note 316, at 9-14, 28-33; A. GENTILI, supra note 311,
at 9.
41' THE PANDECTES, supra note 316, at 28-33.
412 THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, entry on Martiall lawe.
413 Id. (citing T. SMITH, supra note 149, bk. 2. ch. 3). There is no question but that
Cowell read and was influenced by Jean Bodin's Republique. See B. LEVACK, supra
note 14, at 97-98; Chrimes, supra note 405, at 473-81. But there is no evidence that
Bodin was more influential than Thomas Smith or the classical sources, on which
Cowell relied far more heavily. Moreover, Smith's writing predated Bodin. See note
238 supra. In any event, recent scholarship has demonstrated that Bodin's own debts
to the older, medieval notions of authority are a good deal greater than Bodin
acknowledged. See McRae, supra note 117, at A16-A17. Bodin's major innovation,
an emphasis on the Sovereign's power to make law rather than on the traditional
prerogatives of the crown, id. at A14, is not particularly marked in Cowell. See THE
INTERPRETER, supra note 155, entries on King (Rex) & Prerogatives of the King;
notes 406-07 and accompanying text supra.
The civilian distinction between the King's royal power and his royal duty may not
be completely dissimilar from the Hohfeldian "right" vs. "power" distinction so
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ton," the common lawyers' saint. 41 4 The entry did acknowledge that Little-
ton "wrote a booke of great accompt," but then quoted the civilian Hot-
man's Commentaries De Feudis Commentatio Tripartita, which charac-
terized Littleton's Tenures as "incondit, absurde, & inconcinn scriptum
[confusedly, discordantly, and inelegantly written].1 41 1 It can only be imag-
ined how this struck Coke, who was at that immediate time preparing to
arrange his grand First Institute around Littleton as the "sacred text.
' 4 16
But Coke's greatest concern would be with the definitions of "Prohibi-
tion" and "Praemunire. ' 41 7 These writs were the powerful common law
weapons for restricting the competing jurisdictions of the ecclesiastical
courts and the conciliar courts, including the Admiralty.4"8 Cowell, how-
ever, observed that these writs were no longer necessary, now that papal
authority and the King's authority were united:
For they [prohibition and praemunire] were helpers to the King's inher-
itance and Crowne, when the two swords were in two divers hands.
Whereas now both the Jurisdiction being settled in the King, there is
small reason of either, except it be to wearie the subject by many
quircks and delayes, from obtaining his right.4 19
For his authority on "praemunire," Cowell again turned to his predecessor,
Smith: "Sir Thos. Smith saith very rightly, and charitablely, that the uniting
of the supremacie ecclesiasticall, and temporall in the king, utterly voideth
the use of all those [praemunire] statutes. Nam cessante ratione, cessat lex
[when the reason ends, so does the law]." '420
In light of these major constitutional issues, Cowell's definition of "Ad-
mirall" would seem relatively harmless. But Cowell defined the legal juris-
dictions under the "admirall," i.e., the Admiralty court, to include "all
causes of Merchants and mariners, and things happening within the flood
familiar today. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS 36-53 (W.W.
Cook ed. 1964). According to the civilians, the "King" had no legal right to disregard
the higher law which made him King, and which set upon him responsibilities to
protect his subjects and to deal with them justly. But he had an unlimited legal power.
In the civilian view, the "ordinary course of the common law" could not, and should
not, control this royal power, "for otherwise were he [the King] a subject after a sort,
and subordinate." THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, entry on King (Rex). Cowell's
common law critics, of course, made little effort to appreciate this distinction, and
tarred him as an absolutist.
414 See THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, entry on Littleton.
415 Id. (quoting F. HOTMAN, supra note 205, at 611).
416 See notes 209-11 and accompanying text supra.
417 THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, entries on Prohibition, Praemunire.
418 See F. WISWALL,supra note 20, at 16-17; Mears, The History of the Admiralty
Jurisdiction, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 353-64
(1908).
419 THE INTERPRETER, supra note 155, entry on Prohibition.
420 Id., entry on Praemunire (citing T. SMITH, supra note 149, bk. 3, ch. 9).
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mark" since "the dais of Ed. the first, but also King John."' 421 This was a
serious assertion which set forth a particularly expansive jurisdiction for the
civilian-dominated Admiralty courts, and in 1607, this cut close to the
common lawyers' bone-as close as did Cowell's attack on prohibitions.
For all, or some, of these reasons the dictionary proved intolerable to a
powerful group within the House of Commons. The Journal of the Commons
accused Cowell of "Rashly, Dangerously and Perniciouslly asserting cer-
tain heads to the overthrow and destruction of Parliaments, and the Funda-
mental Laws and Government of the Kingdom. ' 422 The Lords were as
"equal wounded. ' 423
The uproar forced James I himself to intervene. The King promised to
condemn Cowell and The Interpreter by proclamations. According to
Petyt's Miscellanea Parliamentaria, the King agreed that the positions in
Cowell's books were "mistaken" and "absurd. '424 According to the par-
liamentarians, Cowell's "principles with evident Inferences from them were
this:"
1. That the King was solutus a Legibus, and not bound by his Coro-
nation Oath.
2. That is was not ex necessitate, that the King should call a Parlia-
ment to make Laws, but might do that by his absolute Power; for
voluntas Regis (with him) was Lex Populi.
3. That it was a favour to admit the consent of his subjects in giving of
Subsidies.
4. The Doctor draws his arguments from the Imperial Laws of the
Roman Emperors; an Argument which may be urged with as great
reason ... for the reduction of the State of the Clergy of England to
the ... Polity and Laws in the time of those Emperours; as also to
make the Laws and Customs of Rome ... to be binding and
obligatory to the cities of London and York. 4 25
The Royal Proclamation of March 25, 1610, read rather differently, how-
ever:
[A] Book written by Dr. Cowell called The Interpreter: for he being
only a civilian by profession... by medling in matters above his reach,
he hath fallen in many things to mistake and deceive himself: In some
things disputing so nicely upon the Mysteries of this our Monarchy, that
it may receive doubtful interpretations: yea in some points very de-
rogatory to the supream power of this Crown: In other cases mistaking
the true state of the Parliament of this Kingdom, and the Fundamental
421 Id., entry on Admirall.
42 H. C. JOURNAL, anno. 7 Jacobi (1609), quoted in Kennet, Preface to J. COWELL,
THE INTERPRETER OR BOOKE CONTAINING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WORDS (7th page,
unpaginated) (Kennet ed. 1701); see 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 21 n.2.
423 Kennet, supra note 422, at 7th unpaginated page.
424 Id. at 7th-8th unpaginated pages (quoting W. PETYT, MISCELLANEA PAR-
LIAMENTARIA 64-66 (London 1680)).
425 Id. at 8th unpaginated page (quoting W. PETYT, supra note 424, at 64-66).
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Constitutions and Privileges thereof: And in some other points speaking
unreverently of the Common Law of England. . . it being a thing utterly
unlawful to any Subject, to speak or write against the Law ... which we
are sworn and are resolved to maintain. Wherefore .... upon pain of
our high displeasure [copies of the books are to be delivered to the Lord
Mayor of London or to the Sheriff of the appropriate country] ... to the
intent that further order may be given for the utter suppressing thereof.
And because there shall be better oversight of Books . . .we have
resolved to make choice of Commissioners, that shall look more nar-
rowly into . ..all those things that shall be put to the Press, either
concerning our Authority Royal, or concerning our Government, or the
Laws .... 426
Whether these words reflected James' true sentiments or not, Cowell felt
disgraced. He retired completely from public life, and lived in seclusion at
Trinity Hall. 4 27 He died the next year, on October 11, 1611, during an
operation for removal of a kidney stone. 42 8
Why was there so much hostility to The Interpreter? It could be argued
that the offending definitions, in the light of civilian doctrine, did not support
the four charges in the Miscellanea Parliamentaria. "But, alas, when a
suspected Book is brought to the torture, it oftens confesses all, and more
than All it knows. ' 429 It has been argued that James suppressed the book
because he believed it went too far in limiting his authority.4 30 That argu-
ments appears to be borne out by the words of the Proclamation; i.e.,
"disputing to nicely upon the Mysteries of this our Monarchy... in some
points very derogatory to the supream power of this Crown. ' 43' As Kennet
observed, The Interpreter may have offended both sides: "It is natural
enough to imagine, that by giving offence to both Parties, he meant no harm
to either. Nothing can displease two opposite sides, but moderation. '432
James' true intent was probably to exploit the inevitable suppression of
Cowell's book by using a Royal Proclamation. By so doing, he could at one
time accomplish three objectives: first, to use a means to support the Par-
liamentarians that in other contexts would be very offensive to them; 433
426 id. at 8th-9th unpaginated pages (quoting Royal Proclamation of March 25,
1610) (emphasis supplied).
427 Id. at 9th unpaginated page; Simon, supra note 100, at 270.
428 Kennet, supra note 422, at 9th unpaginated page; Simon, supra note 100, at
270.
429 Kennet, supra note 422, at 8th unpaginated page.
430 "[R]oyal prerogative was of such a sacred and mysterious quality that unneces-
sary discussion of it was to be avoided. Queen Elizabeth had repeatedly reminded her
parliaments of this, and James I objected to Cowell's Interpreter on the same
grounds." B. LEVACK, supra note 14, at 98. See also Chrimes, supra note 405, at 473.
431 Kennet, supra note 422, at 9th unpaginated page (quoting Royal Proclamation
of March 25, 1610).
432 Id. at 7th unpaginated page.
433 When measures like these were not only allowed by a House of Commons,
famous for its championship of the subject's liberty . . . but welcomed with
gratitude and applause as the fit retribution... we cannot wonder that exception
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second, to permit the King to confuse the actual issues and to even suggest
that Cowell had threatened the Royal Prerogative; and third, to suggest that
a Royal Commissioner be named to supervise the publishing of law books,
another discomforting thought for the King's opponents. There was, in fact,
some evidence that James' actual sympathy for Cowell was strong. 43 4
was occasionally taken by the Council to opinions supposed to be derogatory to
the Prerogatives of the Crown ....
4 J. SPEDDING, THE LETTERS AND THE LIFE OF FRANCIS BACON 345, 346 (London
1868), reprinted as I 1 THE WORKS OF FRANCIS BACON (J. Spedding, R. Ellis & D.
Heath eds. 1868), reprinted in 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 139, at 22 n.6.
414 See J. COWLEY, supra note 156, at lxxxiv-lxxxvi. According to Cowley, James'
intervention "saved Cowell from probable impeachment [by the Commons]." Id. at
lxxxvi. But see D. WILLSON, KING JAMES VI AND 1 260-64 (1956).
Following the" Cowell affair" came "a curious aftermath which has given a word to
the English language." Simon, supra note 100, at 270. The King visited Cambridge in
1614. This was the first royal visit in many years. The King was shown a play,
apparently put on by civilian students, that mocked the common lawyers. Its author
was one George Ruggle (1575-1622), and it was called Ignoramus. The title Ig-
noramus came from a grand jury endorsement meaning "we know nothing about it"
which was put on a "not true" bill. Ever since the play the word -ignoramus" has
been a popular term for a stupid person.
The "star" character, Sir Ignoramus, was, according to John Aubrey, "dressed...
like Chief Justice Coke and cutt his beard like him and feigned his voyce . I.." d. at 27
(quoting AUBREY'S BRIEF LivEs 163 (Dick ed. 1957)). "Ruggle's play was an enor-
mous success with the King, who was already to have the common lawyers ridiculed:
he actually came back to see a second performance." Id. Coke was apparently very
much put out.
The lawyers in London resented Ruggle's sharp satire. [John] Chamberlain,
writing on 20 May 1615 of the king's second visit "to Cambridge to see the play of
" 'Ignoramus,' " related that the piece "hath so nettled the lawyers that they are
almost out of all patience; and the lord chief-justice [Coke], both openly at the
king's bench and divers others places, hath galled and glanced at scholars with
much bitterness; and there be divers inns of court men have made rhymes and
ballads against them, which they have answered sharply enough; and to
say truth it was a scandal rather taken than given; for what profession is there
wherein some particular persons may not be justly taxed without imputation to the
whole?"
2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1822
(1975). Another contemporary noted:
The King comes to Cambridge in a sharp Winter, when all the world was nothing
but Aire and Snow. Yet Scholars Wits did not Freez with the Weather, witness th
pleasant Play of IGNORAMUS, which they presented to His Majesty. Yet
whilst many laughed aloud at the mirth therof, some of the graver sort were sad to
see the Common Lawyers made ridiculous therein. If Gowns begin once to abase
Gowns, Cloaks will carry away all. Besides, of all wood, the Pleaders Bar is the
worst to make a Stage of.
10 T. FULLER, THE CHURCH-HISTORY OF BRITAIN; FROM THE BIRTH OF JESUS
CHRIST, UNTIL THE YEAR MDCXL VIII, at 70 (London 1655).
Although primarily an attack on the common lawyers, Ignoramus also mocked
some of the definitions in Cowell's Interpreter, and may originally have been written
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The hostile characterizations made of The Interpreter were parodies of the
true objectives and nature, and of the principles of English Bartolism as
developed through the prior century. 43 Cowell may have overreached him-
self, but his brutal suppression marked a fundamental shift in the intellectual
climate of English jurisprudence. To flourish, Bartolism required more re-
laxed, temperate, fertile conditions. This lesson was not lost on a new breed
of English civilians. Led by the brilliant Sir Thomas Ridley, they adopted an
entirely different approach to achieving a modus vivendi with the common
lawyers. Abandoning the essential ends of Bartolism, most particularly the
desire to achieve a constructive influence of civil law principles on the
English common law, they focused instead on the existing strongholds of
Doctors' Commons-the ecclesiastical courts, the universities and, most
critically, the Admiralty Court. Instead of seeking a synthesis of civilian
principles and methodology with the common law, they argued for a strict
separation of English civil law and common law courts and for the utility of a
separate legal elite that served the specialized needs of these civil law courts,
particularly in those areas of English law that related to the outside world. 43 6
This narrower focus of civilian thought required a redefinition of ius
gentium. Because they had to separate themselves from the common law
to satirize the counsel for the Cambridge mayor, Francis Braken, who had earned
Ruggle's dislike in a protracted precedence dispute. See 2 THE COMPACT EDITION OF
THE DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 1822 (1975). But Sir Jocelyn Simon was
nevertheless right that this play was good evidence that the "Cowell affair" was
remembered with bitterness at Cambridge, and that it was most indicative of royal
support for civilians that the King visited the university so shortly after the "Cowell
affair" and chose to see this particularly symbolic play twice. See Simon, supra note
100, at 270.
In the wake of the "Cowell affair," in 1637 and possibly again in 1638, The
Interpreter was illegally reprinted in uncensored versions at Doctors' Commons, in
violation of the Proclamation of Suppression. See J. COWLEY, supra note 156, at
lxxxvi-lxxxvii. William Laud was accused of complicity with the civilians in this, and
there was again a large outcry from the common lawyers. See B. LEVACK, supra note
14, at 104 n.1.
411 Take, for example, the tone of Sir Walter Raleigh's attack on Cowell in
Raleigh's Discourse of Tenures:
Plainly, by the common law, in lands or goods, several men by several titles,
cannot lawfully have interest, possession, or freehold; the dominium utile, and
dominium directum (as the actual estates of inheritance) are as inseparable, and
twined together, as English . . . twins. The error of Dr. Cowell is so gross and
dangerous, insomuch that it may be questioned whether every subject of England,
that hath any land of inheritance, may not bring an action of the case against him, if
he were alive, for his strange assertion in print; as that the subjects of England in
their land have only utile dominium, and not dominium directum.
W. Raleigh,A Discourse of Tenures, in 8 THE WORKS OF SIR WALTER RALEIGH 613
(London 1829) (emphasis supplied); see Stibbs, supra note 333, at 276.
436 This change in the focus of English civilian thinking will be examined in the
second Article in this series.
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system, the later civilian writers had to move away from Ulpian's classical
concept of ius gentium as an inherent part of any national system, 437 and
toward a narrower concept. Building on Gentili's foundation, they chose
that view of the ius gentium which emphasized a specialized customary law
adopted between nations or between and among mariners and merchants.
This narrowing process might indicate that the English civilians eventually
gave up on their quest for general intellectual leadership in English jurispru-
dence. One authority, Alan Harding, has even stated that '[i]f there had
ever been any danger from the civilians, by 1600 the common lawyers were
triumphant.' '438
Yet, the matter seems to have looked differently at the time to the leaders
of the common lawyers, including Sir Edward Coke. Coke's serious literary
attacks on civilians had just begun in 1605. 4 19 His first target was the
ecclesiastical jurisdictions. He first attacked these jurisdictions in the pref-
ace of 5 Coke's Reports in 1605.440 As a pamphleteer, Coke chose his initial
target excellently. An attack on the ecclesiatical courts permitted an appeal
to popular anti-Catholicism, and tainted the civilians by association. More-
over, Coke's language was not mild:
Error (Ignorance being her inseperable twynne) doeth in her proceeding
so infinitely multiply herselfe, produceth such monstrous & strange
chimeraes, floateth in such and so many incerteinties, and sucketh
downe such poyson fr6 the contagious breath of ignorance, as all such
into wh6 she infuseth any of her poysoned breath, she dangeroulsy
infects or intoxicates .... 441
The most fervent response to the first attack came from what Coke must
have viewed as a perfect source. "A Catholiche Devyne" wrote An An-
swere to the Fifth Part of Reportes Lately Set-Forth by Sir Edward Coke442
in 1606. The author was, in fact, an English Jesuit named Robert Parson,
who had published the equally controversial Conference About the Next
Succession to the Crown of England443 in 1593 under the name "Dol-
man." Parson's arguments, supporting the "Kinge's Bench of Christ on
Earth, ' 444 could be expected to receive a thoroughly jaundiced hearing by
an anti-Catholic English majority . 44
431 See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
438 A. HARDING, supra note 7, at 261.
419 See Coke, To The Reader, in 5 Coke Rep. (7th-llth pages, unpaginated)
(London 1605). Although Coke was the leader of the common lawyers in this attack
on the civilians, he was by no means alone. See Steckley, supra note 50, at 137.
440 Coke, supra note 439.
441 Id. at 7th unpaginated page.
442 [R. PARSON], AN ANSWERE TO THE FIFTH PART OF REPORTERS LATELY
SET-FORTH BY SIR EDWARD COOKE, BY A CATHOLICHE DEVYNE (London 1606).
443 [R. PARSON], CONFERENCE ABOUT THE NEXT SECCESSION TO THE CROWN OF
ENGLAND, BY DOLMAN (London 1593).
444 [R. PARSON], supra note 442, at 3.
441 Ironically, the arguments of the English Jesuits were not absolutist. Instead,
they espoused a political theory that split Church and State authority. Id. at 47-91.
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Coke continued his attack in his Preface to 7 Coke's Reports in 1608.446 In
that essay he lumped civilians and Catholics together under the apt term
"Romanist," and threatened both with praemunire447 for importing a "for-
eign authority":
And sure I am that no man can either bring over those bookes of late
written (which I have seene) from Rome or Romanists, or read them,
and justifie them ... but they rune into desperate dangers and downe-
fals; for the first offense is a praemunire . . . and they, that offend the
second time therein, incurre the heavie danger of high Treason. These
bookes have glorious and goodly titles . . . but there is mors in olla:
They are like to Apothecaries boxes ... whose titles promise remedies,
but the boxes themselves containe poyson.4 48
Having accused his rivals of being both foreign and disloyal, Coke then
claimed they were impotent: "I am not afraid of gnats that can pricke and
cannot hurt, nor of drones that keep a buzzing, and would but cannot
sting." '449 He clearly did not intend these barbs for foreigners; they were
directed to "my deere countrie men of what persuasion in religion soever
they be. ' 45 0 Civilians such as Cowell, whose Interpreter had just been
published the year before, fit that description nicely.
There was no question but that Cowell himself was the target of Coke's
next attack in the prefatory section of 10 Coke's Reports in 1614; 4 51 Coke
referred directly to The Interpreter, singling out Cowell's quotation of Hot-
man under the definition of "Littleton." Coke wrote,
Of Hotoman and his author I may justly say, and will say no more,
volentes esse legis doctores, non intelligentes neque quae loquuntur
neque de quibus affirmant, and therefore let us leave them among the
numbers of those qui vituperant quae ignorant. It is a desperate and
dangerous matter for Civilians and Canonists (I speak what I know, and
not without just cause) to write either of the common lawes of England
which they professe not, or against them which they knowe not.4 11
Coke's final attacks on civilian influence were contained in his Second,41 3
Third,41 4 and Fourth Institutes4 5 and some later volumes of his reports,
446 Coke, supra note 1.
147 See text accompanying notes 259 & 417-18 supra (praemunire).
441 Coke, supra note I, at 8th unpaginated page.
449 Id.
450 Id.
451 Coke, supra note 208, at 42d unpaginated page.
452 Id.
453 E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND
(London 1642).
454 E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(London 1644).
411 E. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
(London 1644).
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which were published posthumously. 45 6 The Admiralty jurisdiction became
a special area of his concern.4 17 Accordingly, Coke and the other common
law judges attempted to narrow the definition of the civilian Admiralty
jurisdiction. Through fictional pleading and the use of prohibitions, they
tried to remove most of the Admiralty's law merchant business.4 58
Coke's instincts were right. A legal elite that controlled both the univer-
sities and the foreign relations of Englishmen, particularly with respect to
commercial transactions, would have become a force to deal with. Its ideas,
incubated in such specialized sanctuaries, could spread again at times when
the common law would be more vulnerable. For the common lawyers, the
area of particular danger was the Court of Admiralty as it related to the law
merchant. Yntema has observed the civil law doctrines "provided a more
flexible basis to satisfy the needs of international commerce than either the
primitive regime of [common law] personal laws or the system introduced by
feudalism, in which the law of the land was paramount. ' 459 This was
particularly true in the fields of contracts, insurance, joint partnership,
complex multi-party commercial litigation, allocation of risk in investment
456 The posthumous nature of these publications may have been related to the
controversial nature of some passages. Coke died in 1634. The Second Institute, which
includes the famous commentary on the Magna Carta, was published in 1642.
E. COKE, supra note 453. The Third and Fourth Institutes were both published in 1644.
E. COKE, supra note 455; E. COKE, supra note 454. The Twelfth and Thirteenth Reports
were published in 1658 and 1659 respectively. Winfield regards the Thirteenth Report
as "very likely spurious." P. WINFIELD, supra note 133, at 189.
457 [Tihe Lord Admiral his Officers and Ministers [i.e., civilians] ... for want of
learned advice have unjustly incroached upon the Common laws of this Realm,
.... And they now wanting in this blessed time of peace causes appertaining to
their naturall jurisdiction [i.e., prize law], they now incroach upon the jurisdic-
tion of the Common law, lest they should sit idle and reap no profit. And if a
greater number of prohibitions (as they affirm) hath been granted since the great
benefit of this happy peace, then before in time of hostility, it moveth from their
own incroachments upon the jurisdiction of the Common law. So as they do not
only unjustly incroach, but complain also of the Judges of the Realm for doing of
Justice in these cases.
E. COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND * 136.
In The Case of the Admiralty, 77 Eng. Rep. 1461, 1461-62 (Star Chamber 1610),
similar sentiments are expressed: "by the common law the admirals ought not to
meddle with any thing done within the realm, but only with things done upon the sea.
... [t]he admirals and their deputies encroach to themselves divers jurisdictions and
franchises more than they ought to have ...."
458 For a good account, see Steckley, supra note 50, at 143-46. For an economic
interpretation of the shift from civil law to common law authority in the mercantile
area, see D. NORTH & R. THOMAS, THF RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD 146-48 (1973).
Steckley, however, demonstrates conclusively that the purely economic analysis
cannot explain the changes. Steckley, supra note 50, at 138.
459 Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 2 VOM DEUTSCHEN ZUM EUROPAISCHEN RECHT
65, 69-70 (1963), reprinted in A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 26-27 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
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ventures, and negotiability. 460 Some of this "civil law" was from the Corpus
Juris, but most was part of the new ius commune of European merchants,
developed by hard Bartolist labor throughout the 16th century.4 6' The Ad-
miralty, with its traditional jurisdiction over law merchant and maritime law,
could be the door by which these ideas entered England, and the English
civilians would have the exclusive importer's franchise.
Such civilian hopes were narrower and more limited than the Bartolist
dreams of Cowell and Fulbecke. But they nevertheless presented a serious
intellectual challenge, which the common lawyers also perceived. The law
merchant would be the ultimate battleground on which would be determined
whether the English civilians would survive as a serious force in English
jurisprudence or be "specialized" into safe insignificance. 462
IV. CONCLUSION:
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE EARLY CIVILIAN WRITERS
Before St. German and Sir Thomas Smith, no Englishman had deliberately
and seriously compared foreign legal doctrines and legal institutions with
their English counterparts. The primary contribution of the early civilian
writers lay in their great efforts in developing English comparative legal
studies.
Comparative law, as a legal methodology, assumes some basic principles,
particularly that such a comparison is possible (i.e., that different legal
systems can be adequately described in common terms), and that such an
exercise is useful. 463 But is it useful? St. German, Smith, Gentili, Cowell,
and Fulbecke all believed that comparative studies were useful because they
could be used to identify better legal institutions and better rules .464 This did
not mean that a rule or institution effective in France would necessarily be
better than an existing English institution; it was a principle of Bartolist
philosophy that each national legal system had to be peculiarly adapted to its
setting. 465 But such national systems were not automatically "perfect" as
they had evolved through custom and history. For English civilians, com-
parison of different national doctrinal systems and different national legal
460 For a concise discussion, see Steckley, supra note 50, at 170-73. See also Baker,
supra note 10, at 295.
461 See generally Coing, supra note 126, at 505.
462 This "battle" will be the focus of the second Article in this series.
463 See, e.g., W. BUCKLAND & A. McNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW
xv-xxii (2d ed. F. Lawson ed. 1965); H. DEVRIES, supra note 135, at 1-8; G. PATON, A
TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 41-43 (4th ed. 1972); Hazard, Comparative Law in
Legal Education, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 264 (1951); Rheinstein, Comparative Law-Its
Functions, Methods and Usages, 22 ARK. L. REV. 415 (1968).
464 See T. SMITH,supra note 149, at 143; T. HOLLAND,Alberico Gentili, supra note
14, at 22; Barton, supra note 165, at xx (on St. German); Maitland, supra note 73, at xiv
(on Smith); Thorne, supra note 164, at 421 (on St. German).
465 See T. SMITH, supra note 149, at 143.
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institutions provided critical data from which potential improvements in the
system could be perceived and discussed. 46
6
The efforts of the early civilian writers in this area were truly impressive.
St. German's great dialogue in Doctor and Student has been widely ap-
preciated. 467 But the careful descriptive work of Sir Thomas Smith in De
Republica Anglorum has been largely overlooked in the areas outside of his
constitutional and political analysis. Gentili's powerful and scientific
treatises on the law of relations between nations have been appreciated, but
mostly in foreign countries, 468 and the influence of his Bartolism on his
English followers, Fulbecke and Cowell, has largely been ignored.
Finally, the bold efforts of Fulbecke and Cowell to use comparative legal
studies to educate the English common lawyer have never been adequately
appreciated. Fulbecke's massive and brave book, A Parallele, was for all its
failings the first full, systematic, and categorical comparison of canon, civil,
and common law doctrines. 469 Cowell's extraordinary Institutes was nothing
less than an attempt to restate the entire common law in a logical outline
based on civilian forms. 4 70 His Interpreter, the most intellectually exciting
and controversial law dictionary ever published, represented an applied
comparative law that was ingeneous and remarkable by any standards. 471
Yet, these books have been largely unavailable for centuries, or even, in The
Interpreter's case, suppressed and censored. 472 Now, after over three hun-
dred years, Fulbecke's A Parallele, Cowell's Institutes, and the first edition
of The Interpreter, are being republished. 473 Their contribution to compara-
tive law will be rediscovered.
466 Thus, Smith emphasized, "[L]et us compare ... common wealthes, wich be at
this day in esse, or do remain discribed in true histories, especially in such pointes
wherein the one differeth from the other, to see who hath taken the righter, truer and
more commodious way .... " Id. at 142.
467 See Barton, supra note 165, at li-lix; Thorne, supra note 164, at 421-26.
468 It remains difficult to find English editions of Gentili's works, even today. The
most easily available English editions of the major works remain those published in the
1920's and '30's by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ADVOCATIO
HISPANICA, supra note 153; DE IURE BELLI, supra note 267; DE LEGATIONIBUS,
supra note 117.
469 See notes 233-61 and accompanying text supra. For insights as to European
counterparts, see D. KELLEY, supra note 131; P. VINOGRADOFF, Historical Types of
International Law, supra note 14, at 248. For the influence of the English civilians on
their European counterparts, see Coing, Das Schrifttum der englishchen Civilians und
die Kontinentale Rechtsliteratur in der Zeit zwischen 1550 und 1800, in lus COM-
MUNE: VEROF-FENTLICHUNGEN DES MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUTS FOR EUROPAISCHE
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 1-55 (1975). See also Stein, Continental Influence, supra note 10.
470 See notes 374-94 and accompanying text supra.
41' See generally notes 398-421 and accompanying text supra.
472 See notes 370-71 & 422-26 and accompanying text supra.
473 These books are being republished by Garland Publishing, Inc. as part of its
series Classics of English Legal History in the Modern Era (selected by D. S.
Berkowitz & S. E. Thorne).
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The early civilian writers were the first Englishmen to describe, record,
and systematically arrange data about different legal doctrines and legal
systems. Their attempts to compare, analyze, and utilize this data, if strug-
gling and imperfect, were nevertheless original in every sense. They were
the true pioneers of Anglo-American comparative legal studies.
[T]hey belonged to a world immeasurably rich and wide in comparison
to that of the average chancery clerk or bureaucrat. They were scholars
in more than one kind of law, practitioners in more than one institution,
and they had an interest and experience which wedded them to the
international humanist tradition of their times. 474
474 W. JONES, supra note 53, at 117. Jones spoke of William Lambarde and George
Carew, Masters in Chancery, but his description is equally apt for their civilian
contemporaries.
